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THE ELUSIVE DISTINCTIVENESS OF TRADE DRESS IN EU
TRADEMARK LAW
Dr. César J Ramírez-Montes*
INTRODUCTION
EU law explicitly allows for the permanent registration of the shape of goods
or of the packaging of goods as EU trademarks provided that they are capable
of enabling consumers to distinguish the branded goods from others of different
origin (inherent source “distinctiveness”) and are not considered utilitarian
(nonfunctional) but without defining these significant requirements.1 This is
allowed even without prior market use as evidence of consumer association
(“acquired distinctiveness” or “secondary meaning”). Although there is growing
academic interest in the nonfunctionality requirements,2 comparatively less
attention is paid to source distinctiveness notwithstanding the fact that
international law mandates the use of distinctiveness “as the sole substantive
condition and prerequisite for the protection of a trademark.”3 This Article
provides a systematic analysis of the case law in which the Court of Justice of
the European Union (CJEU) has attempted to craft rational limits around
registration of product shapes (“3D marks,” “shape marks,” or “product trade
dress”) using the distinctiveness requirement as a control device. In its case law,
the CJEU consistently applies specific distinctiveness rules for predicting
consumer associations and reactions in its modified analytical framework
*
IP Lecturer, Leeds University. Many thanks to participants at INTA’s Annual Meeting 2017 in
Barcelona, Spain. Special thanks to Peter Yu, Lisa Ramsay, Graeme Dinwoodie, and Dev Gangjee for helpful
comments. Thanks also to Uma Suthersanen, Iyiola Solanke, Graham Dutfield, Shubha Ghosh, and John Cross
for their valuable suggestions and insights. This Article builds upon my previous work around the unsettled
European approach to trade dress protection, see César J Ramírez-Montes, Trademarking the Look and Feel of
Business Environments in Europe, 25 COLUMB. J. EU L. 75–134 (2019).
1
Council Regulation 2017/1001, arts. 4, 7(1) O.J. (L 154) 1 [hereinafter EUTMR] (defining EU
trademark and absolute grounds for refusal); Council Directive 2015/2436, arts. 3, 4(1) O.J. (L 336) 1
[hereinafter TMD].
2
Apostolos Chronopoulos, De Jure Functionality of Shapes Driven by Technical Considerations in
Manufacturing Methods, 2017 INTELL. PROP. Q. 286; Maeve Lynch, Product Configuration Marks: The Shape
of Things to Come, 6 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 465 (2017); Gabriele Engels & Claire Lehr, Sweets, Cars and
Bottles-Three Dimensional Trademarks, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 797 (2017); Antoon Quaedvlieg, Shapes
with a Technical Function: An Ever-Expanding Exclusion, 1 J. ACAD. EUR. L. 101 (2016); Alain Berthet &
Elisabeth Berthet, La Marque Tridimensionnelle: Mythe ou Réalité?, 61 PROPRIETES INTELLECTUELLES 403
(2016).
3
Qian Zhan, The International Registration of Non-Traditional Trademarks: Compliance with TRIPS
Agreement and the Paris Convention, 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 111, 114 (2017) (arguing that, under TRIPS
Article 15, no other binding obligation is imposed upon WTO Members).
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underpinning the “departs significantly” criterion. Courts and commentators
explicitly acknowledge the dearth of clarity around this pivotal criterion, but
hitherto have not attempted to engage more meaningfully with this effectively
“forgotten” aspect of EU trademark law. This Article’s central claim is that the
criterion’s analytical framework has been fundamentally misunderstood, partly
owing to a lack of judicial articulation of its theoretical basis and partly owing
to a lack of meaningful academic engagement with its evolution and contextual
application in the case law.4 By focusing on inherent distinctiveness as the main
obstacle to registering otherwise nonfunctional trade dress that has yet to test
consumer reaction in the market, this Article throws much needed light upon the
departs significantly criterion which is an important but often neglected aspect
of existing distinctiveness debates.
As this discussion demonstrates, trade dress law is a useful way of revisiting
source distinctiveness and its contextual application. The 2015 elimination of
the “graphical” representation requirement in the definition of a European
trademark reflects a legislative attempt to provide more flexibility around the
technological means of representing unconventional trade dress marks such as
colors and sounds.5 This is also likely to ease the registration path for scent,
taste, tactile, and motion marks. Academic commentary has so far focused on
these nontraditional, “product trade dress marks.”6 However, the existing
debates fail to appreciate that eliminating the graphical representation
requirement still leaves the more fundamental question of the relevant
circumstances for assuming that any (nonfunctional) trade dress may be sourceidentifying under the departs significantly criterion. Unlike previous academic
assessments into this criterion,7 this Article adopts a different methodology that
combines a more exhaustive doctrinal exploration of the historical and factual
situations that galvanized the EU tribunals into crafting specific distinctiveness
rules and a re-appraisal of unarticulated sociological considerations that

4

See infra Parts II and IV.
TMD, supra note 1; EUTMR, supra note 1.
6
Eugene C. Lim & Samtani Anil, Acoustic Branding, Non-Traditional Trademarks, and the Graphical
Representation Requirement: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 5 (2019);
Désiréé Fields & Alasdair Muller, Going Against Tradition: The Effect of Eliminating the Requirement of
Representing a Trademark Graphically on Applications for Non-Traditional Trademarks, 39 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 238 (2017).
7
See Vlotina Liakatou, Trade Dress Distinctiveness in the US: Wal-Mart, Progeny, and Comparison
with the European Standards, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 622 (2010); Jochen Pagenberg, Trade Dress and the
Three-Dimensional Mark–The Neglected Children of Trademark Law, 7 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 381 (2004).
5
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overlooked scholarship came to identify as specifically affecting shape-ofproduct marks.8
In undertaking this unique exploration, I contest deep-seated misconceptions
about the meaning and purposes of the departs significantly criterion, confront
the widely held view that its appropriate threshold remains unclear and challenge
the increasingly popular criticism about the alleged arbitrariness underpinning
the CJEU’s normative presumption of consumer visual habits. There is strong
evidence suggesting this research is timely and highly relevant. Global litigation
concerning Nestlé’s attempts to register (or defend registration of) the shape of
its popular Kit-Kat four-finger chocolate bar not only in the UK,9 and Europe,10
but also across several jurisdictions highlights that a current issue in
international trademark law is the conditions under which product shapes should
be entitled to permanent registration as source-identifying brands.11 One of the
general conditions is distinctiveness, which according to settled EU case law can
only be met if there is some basis for assuming that the proposed product trade
dress will function as a source-identifier because it shows a significant departure
from what consumers expect in the sector.12 More than a decade ago, the CJEU’s
Henkel ruling outlined the departs significantly criterion as the sole analytical
framework for establishing whether product packaging and product shapes may
overcome the non-inherent distinctiveness barrier to be eligible for
registration.13 Under this criterion, “a trademark which significantly departs
from the norm or customs of the sector and thereby fulfils its essential …
function is not devoid of any distinctive character.”14
The test appears closely related to the question of whether, without prior use,
any sign is capable of being indicative of source (or inherently distinctive) in the
sense of aiding consumers immediately to distinguish the commercial origin of
8

See infra Part I.C.1–3.
Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, Ltd. [2017] AC 358 (EWCA) (appeal taken from Eng.).
10
Joined Cases C-84/17, C-85/17 & C-95/17, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Mondelez UK Holdings
& Servs., ECLI:EU:C:2018:596 (July 25, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=
&docid=204401&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4327956; Case C214/15, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK, Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2015:604 (Sept. 16, 2015), http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=167821&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&di
r=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5384175 [hereinafter Kit-Kat Chocolate Bar].
11
Société des Produits Nestlé, SA v. Petra Foods, Ltd., 2016 S.G.C.A. 64 (Court of Appeal of Singapore);
Société des Produits Nestlé, S.A. v. Int’l Foodstuffs, Co., 2015 1 S.A. 492 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
12
C-218/01, Henkel KGaA v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 49 [hereinafter
Henkel Perwoll Bottle].
13
Id.
14
Id.
9
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the applicant’s goods or services from those of other traders.15 It has expanded
to include also any sign that is indistinguishable from the appearance of the
designated goods themselves or represents only part of the product, including a
nonessential feature that the public immediately perceives as a particularly
interesting or attractive detail of that product.16 More recently, the departs
significantly criterion has been extended far beyond shape-of-product marks into
the distinctiveness evaluation of retail service marks representing a 3D retail
environment or store design.17 As I have argued elsewhere, this novel expansion
of EU law effectively provides protection for the look and feel of a wide range
of business environments, bringing European law ever closer to the U.S. concept
of trade dress law.18
Since Henkel Perwoll Bottle, a substantive body of CJEU and European
General Court’s (EGC) case law has emerged around multiple attempts to
register product shapes but most have been unsuccessful for failing to depart
significantly from the norms of the sector and incapable of being acknowledged
by consumers as source-identifiers without prior education.19 Thus, the primary
15
Id.; C-417/16, August Storck KG v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:C:2017:340, ¶ 32 (May 4, 2017), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=190340&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&
occ=first&part=1&cid=4337930; Kit-Kat Chocolate Bar, ECLI:EU:C:2015:604, ¶ 60.
16
See Case C-97/12, Louis Vuitton Malletier v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2014:324, ¶ 55 (May 15, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152347&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5384714 (explaining that the departs significantly test applies to a figurative
mark representing a locking device even if locking devices were not among the goods for which registration was
granted); see also August Storck KG, ECLI:EU:C:2017:340, ¶ 40 (figurative mark representing a white and blue
square-shaped packaging); Case C-96/11, August Storck KG v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2012:537, ¶ 38 (Sept. 6,
2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=126462&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR
&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5384978 (shape of a chocolate mousse with a bas-relief).
17
Case C-421/13, Apple, Inc. v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2070, ¶¶ 19–20
(July 10, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=154829&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5385136.
18
César J Ramírez-Montes, Trade Marking the Look and Feel of Business Environments in Europe, 25
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 75, 78 (2019).
19
The criterion is clearly applicable beyond the traditional categories of product shapes and product
packaging. For instance, position marks, see Case C-521/13 P, Think Schuhwerk GmbH v. OHIM,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2222 (Sept. 11, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
157841&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5385395 (red aglets on shoe
laces); Case C-429/10 P, X Tech. Swiss GmbH v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-00076 (orange coloring of the toe of a
sock); Case T-433/12, Margarete Steiff GmbH v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2014:8 (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=148322&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5385658 (metal button in the middle section of the ear of a soft toy); Case
T-331/12, Sartorius Lab Instruments GmbH & Co. KG v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2014:87 (Feb. 26, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=148261&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5386029 (yellow curve at the bottom edge of an electronic display unit); Case
T-152/07, Lange Uhren GmbH v. OHIM, 2009 E.C.R. II-00144 (geometric shapes on a watch-face). For designs
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basis for accepting or refusing an increasingly large number of unconventional
signs, whether for mass products or luxury goods, turns on the under-explored
meaning and unarticulated policies underpinning this “departs significantly”
criterion.20 National courts in Germany and France have interpreted the criterion
without apparent difficulty but in questionable ways that have eluded proper
academic scrutiny.21 English courts however have struggled to make proper
sense of the principles and confused guidance in the CJEU’s case-law.22 These
competing national views of the test suggests a lack of clarity that has yet to be
properly addressed. For instance, in 2017, the English Court of Appeal was yet
again confronted with the unsettled question of whether, as a matter of principle,
a significant departure from existing shapes on the market is both a necessary
and sufficient condition for assuming the inherent distinctiveness of shape
marks representing car designs.23 In London Taxi Co. v. Frazer-Nash
Research,24 Lord Justice (LJ) Floyd accepted appellant London Taxi Co.’s
(LTC) argument that the language used in some European case law strongly
suggests this is the correct interpretation but was reluctant to endorse this
assumption unreservedly as he felt something else was needed. Indeed, in
Bongrain, a differently composed Court of Appeal had already rejected that
interpretation as a matter of principle.25
applied to the surface of the goods, see Case C-445/02 P, Graverbel v. OHIM 2004 E.C.R. I-6269 (surface
decoration); Case C-307/11 P, Deichmann SE v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2012:254 (Apr. 26, 2012),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=124401&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5386483 (stitching applied to shoes). For pattern marks, see Joined Cases
T-359/12 & T-360/12, Louis Vuitton Malletier v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2015:215, ECLI:EU:T:2015:214 (Apr. 21,
2015) (chequerboard patterns applied to leather goods); Joined Cases C-363/15 P & C-364/15 P Louis Vuitton
Malletier SA v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:C:2016:595 (July 21, 2016) http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=182442&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=267
9691 (court order without decision as parties settled amicably); Case T-376/10, V. Fraas GmbH v. OHIM,
ECLI:EU:T:2012:436, ¶ 64 (Sept. 19, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
127181&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5387131 (tartan pattern in dark
grey, light grey, black, beige, dark red and light red).
20
Id.
21
One example is the decisions from the highest courts in Germany and France over the IR 869586
(corresponding to national French mark no. 023188047) in the name of Revillon Chocolatier SAS involving the
shape of chocolate twigs, see, e.g., BGH Apr. 6, 2017, I ZB 39/16, http://juris.bundesgerichtshof.de/cgibin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht=bgh&Art=en&Datum=2017-4&Seite=6&nr=79906&pos=205&
anz=257 (reversing the German Patent Court’s decision to cancel the registration); Cour de Cassation [Cass.]
[Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] com., Oct. 26, 2010, [09-69687], available at https://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000022978791 (Fr.) (unpublished)
(upholding the Court of Appeal’s decision not to invalidate the registration).
22
See infra Part IV.A.1.
23
Bongrain SA’s Trade Mark Application [2005] 14 RPC 306 (EWCA).
24
London Taxi Co. v. Frazer-Nash Research [2017] AC 1729 (EWCA) (appeal taken from Eng.).
25
Bongrain SA’s Trade Mark Application [2005] 14 RPC 306 (EWCA) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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Having reviewed only two European cases (Freixenet26 and Jaguar27), LJ
Floyd took the same view as Justice Arnold in the High Court that the position
is simply not so straightforward as to be acte claire.28 Unfortunately, none of
them sought clarification from the CJEU. Indeed, Floyd LJ found it unnecessary
to do so to dismiss LTC’s appeal against the conclusion that its Community
Trademark (now “EUTM”) and national registrations over the shape of the
iconic London taxi cab were invalid as the registered car shape was a mere
variant on the standard design features of a car and was neither inherently
distinctive nor had it acquired sufficient secondary meaning.29 In reaching this
conclusion, LJ Floyd applied the departs significantly criterion as resolving itself
into a single question about the extent to which the car shape might significantly
differ from existing motor car shapes without reference to the probable way in
which average consumers respond to the design features of a car.30 It is puzzling
however that LJ Floyd did not turn to academic commentary to explore
alternative interpretations beyond the two EU cases LTC cited to the court.
The international importance of the departs significantly criterion as the
European analytical framework for gauging potential consumer reaction
transcends product shape marks and the physical origins of IP law.31 For
instance, by lowering the representation barrier under the 2015 reforms, the EU
legislature has potentially opened the door for a much wider range of “digital
trade dress marks” that have hitherto been under-examined and under-utilized,
namely trade dress marks for the distinct look and feel of web pages, software
interface, electronic platforms, search engines, digital reports, etc.32 Thus far,
U.S. and European companies have sought registration for individual features
rather than the whole interactive presentation of their services.33 Nonetheless,
26

See generally Joined Cases C-344/10 & C-345/10, Freixenet, SA v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-10205.
See generally Case T-629/14, Jaguar Land Rover, Ltd. v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2015:878 (Nov. 25,
2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=172022&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN
&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5387822.
28
London Taxi Co., [2017] AC 1729, ¶ 42.
29
Id. ¶¶ 50, 68.
30
Id. ¶¶ 45–49.
31
IRENE CALBOLI & MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, THE PROTECTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL MARKS: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 1 (2018) (highlighting how international law sets a relatively low distinctiveness bar for
registration, which opened the door for the recognition of a wide variety of nontraditional brands).
32
Id. at 7 (offering a critical and interdisciplinary analysis of the questions raised by the acceptance of
non-traditional marks across several jurisdictions but not explicitly examining digital trade dress marks).
33
See Google LLC, R-119/2018-2 (2d Bd. App. EUIPO, Aug. 28, 2018) (unreported) (finding insufficient
evidence to prove acquired distinctiveness of the YouTube red icon, relating to a European Union trademark
application); RTL Interactive GmbH, R-334/2018-2 (2d Bd. App. EUIPO, July 25, 2018, unreported) (finding
an unsuccessful application to register figurative mark consisting of a play button, relating to international
27
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without a proper articulation of its meaning and reach, it is unclear how
European tribunals should apply the settled departs significantly criterion to this
novel category of web trade dress brands. Nor is it clear what relevant
considerations they should take into account for assuming consumer
predisposition to treating trade dress in general as source-identifier. The
information age raises significant challenges for traditional IP concepts that were
largely developed offline, but which may need to be revisited to accommodate
new market realities.34
Recent doctrinal developments around subject-matter eligible for
registration highlights the international implications of properly deconstructing
the meaning of the distinctiveness requirement as embodied in the departs
significantly criterion. Indeed, a case in point is Apple’s success in persuading
the CJEU to accept in principle the potential 3D registration of its retail
environment as a service trade dress mark subject to meeting the departs
significantly criterion.35 Moreover, U.S. courts are increasingly willing to accept
that the nonfunctional design and digital presentation of goods and services may
also act as a source-identifying brand for internet consumers.36 Elements of look
and feel may combine “to form a protectable virtual experience that provides the
user with ‘cognitive absorption’; a graphical user interface that facilitates the
development of an intuitive engagement.”37 As European courts increasingly
follow the United States’ lead, nothing in principle prevents U.S. companies
from seeking similar protection in the EU.38 In academic quarters however, the
foundational concept of European distinctiveness is generally under-explored,
and the departs significantly criterion is no exception. Indeed, while

registration); Google LLC, R-489/2016-2 (2d Bd. App. EUIPO, Sept. 23, 2016) (unreported) (unsuccessful
attempt to register the YouTube red icon as a figurative mark); Apple Inc., R-2985/2014-5 (5th Bd. App. EUIPO,
Aug. 7, 2015) (unreported) (unsuccessful application to register figurative mark consisting of a video camera
icon); F. Smit Holding B.V., R-435/2013-2 (2d Bd. App. EUIPO, Jan. 10, 2014) (unreported) (unsuccessful
application to register a figurative mark consisting of a “play” key). But see Case R-2434/2015-2, Apple Inc.
(2d Bd. App. EUIPO, Apr. 8, 2016) (unreported) (finding a successful registration of computer software icon).
34
This is clearly the case of copyright protection, but EU trademark law has not remained immune either,
see C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v eBay, 2011 E.C.R. I-06011 (potential trademark liability of online market owner);
Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08, Google France SARL v. LVM, 2010 E.C.R. I-02417 (potential trademark
infringement of search engine and individual advertisers).
35
R-2434/2015-2, Apple Inc.
36
Conference Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc., No. 3:2006-76, 2010 WL 1626072, at *15 (W.D. Pa.
Mar. 31, 2010).
37
Id. U.S. scholars have also explored the natural extension of trade dress law to protect the look and feel
of digital platforms. See Sabrina Rodrigues, Say “Yes” to the [Trade] Dress: A Comment on Trade Dress
Protection for the “Look and Feel” of Lifestyle Blogs, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1005 (2018).
38
See, e.g., supra note 33 (showing examples of trademark applications filed by U.S. companies).
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acknowledging that the nondistinctiveness hurdle “has a significant role to play
in relation to marks comprising the shape of goods or their packaging,” the latest
UK edition of the definitive practitioner text on trademarks devotes merely a
section to the criterion without substantive examination.39 This is so despite
contemporary commentary highlighting “the rising trend of registering shapes
and other non-traditional trademarks” which, astonishingly, has been
accompanied only by “a partial expansion of the grounds for denying these
registrations or the creation of defenses to permit relevant uses of these or similar
signs….”40
This Article represents the first attempt to unpack and deconstruct the
meaning and policies underlying the settled EU approach to analyzing inherent
distinctiveness claims for product trade dress marks—the elusive departs
significantly criterion. The criterion’s shortcoming as a “test” is that it provides
no specific questions or objective considerations to enable examiners to make
the necessary findings on particular facts.41 Indeed, while Henkel Perwoll Bottle
uncovered the criterion as the starting point for gauging the source-identifying
potential of product trade dress without stricter requirements or categorical
assumptions of nondistinctiveness, the Henkel Perwoll Bottle line of case law
has not specified exactly what constitutes a distinctive product shape that
significantly departs from the adopted norms and thereby fulfils, from the
consumer viewpoint, its source-indicating function.42 However, I would argue
that this is far from constituting an abstract unmanageable approach or
unsuitable criterion for measuring potential consumer association of product
design/shape with trademarks, as some would contend.43
This Article undertakes a more extensive examination of important
developments and nuances in the case law to assert that, contrary to widely-held
beliefs, the CJEU does give us important hints as to the controlling factors and
useful tools to arrive at reasonably predictable results in fact-sensitive
39
KERLY’S LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES §§10–10, 10–86 (David Keeling et al. eds., 16th
ed, 2017).
40
Irene Calboli, Chocolate, Fashion, Toys, and Cabs: The Misunderstood Distinctiveness of NonTraditional Trademarks, 49 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 1, 1–2 (2018).
41
See infra Parts IV.B–C.
42
This is not to say that there are no relevant factors emerging from the case law. See infra id.
43
Annette Kur, Too Common, Too Splendid, or ‘Just Right’? Trade Mark Protection for Product Shapes
in the Light of the CJEU Case Law 26 (Max Planck Inst. for Innovation and Competition Res. Paper No. 14-17,
2014) (arguing that the CJEU’s departs significantly criterion is “rather suitable for protecting creative
achievements rather than for testing the ability of a sign to function as trade mark.”); Ilanah Fhima, Introducing
Reality into Trade Mark Law, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 684, 684–85 (2014).
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determinations of likely consumer reactions.44 Indeed, this Article identifies
those controlling factors that emerge from a tripartite contextual analysis of the
case law: first, the role of branding practices to which consumers are exposed;
second, the importance of general knowledge and third, the experience of the
European Union Intellectual Property Office (“EUIPO” or “the Office”)—
formerly, the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM)—in
articulating the practices and adopted norms of the sector.45 It moreover argues
that one cause of the difficulties is that the criterion in fact entails two
complementary evaluations even though the CJEU’s guidance has not explicitly
addressed them separately, namely the extent of the mark’s departure from the
adopted norms and the extent of its impact upon consumer expectations.46
Merely satisfying one factual condition—a significant difference from what is
customary—cannot and should not automatically meet the other policy
condition underlying source significance for reasons of public interest.47 This
second condition relies on the presumed inability of average consumers to
distinguish the signs from the product of which they are an intrinsic part, even
where such signs are novel and thus outside the norm of the sector. This can be
described as a Chicago approach to distinctiveness in that it implicitly seeks to
develop trademark registration requirements in ways that make it incredibly
difficult—but not impossible—for assiduous manufacturers to restrain
unreasonably the freedom of others to compete effectively by securing
permanent exclusive rights over fundamental geometric forms and thereby
diminish rather than improve social benefits.48 New entrants should not therefore
be disadvantaged by the first manufacturer to register trade dress marks which
may not be exclusively utilitarian but are easier to manufacture or more readily
marketable.49 The pursuit of consumer welfare is part of trademark law and the
distinctiveness method underpinning the departs significantly criterion neatly
grounds registration requirements upon competition law. Thus, the two
complementary assessments within the criterion necessarily require more than

44

See infra Part IV.
Id.
46
See infra Part IV.A.2.
47
Id.
48
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 931–32 (1979).
49
See Joined Cases C-456/01 P & C-457/01 P, Henkel KGaA v. OHIM, AG Opinion, 2004 E.C.R. I-5092,
¶ 87 (3D shape-of-product marks for dishwashing tablets); Joined Cases C-468/01 P to C-472/01 P, Proctor &
Gamble Co. v. OHIM, AG Opinion, 2004 E.C.R. I-5092, ¶ 69 (3D shape-of-product marks for dishwashing
tablets).
45
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mere circumstantial evidence of the type identified in the Windsurfing Chiemsee
line of case law.50
Moreover, trademark law has always viewed attempts to protect 3D shapes
as trademarks with caution and heightened suspicion, and for good reason.51
Unrestrained registration of shape marks confers upon a trader a perpetual
monopoly in products and containers themselves, limiting the freedom of others
to market their own brands of the same (or similar) competing goods and thereby
harming consumer interests in vigorously competitive markets.52 This raises
significant questions of law and policy, which do not usually arise with more
conventional marks such as words and logos.53 The international practice has
been for countries to address these concerns in different ways, either by enacting
“shape specific” provisions for permanently refusing the registration of shapeof-product marks on grounds of “functionality”54 and/or setting a significantly
higher threshold to overcome the general condition of distinctiveness.55 With
regard to distinctiveness, some countries either accept protection of shape marks
only after demonstrated market acceptance (secondary meaning)56 or impose an
exacting test for assuming their source-identifying capacity (inherent
distinctiveness) before registration.57 While the United States eventually came
to adopt the former approach placing greater importance upon secondary
meaning,58 the EU has remained firmly wedded to the latter in promoting a
single distinctiveness standard for all marks.59 Our understanding of

50
See Joined Cases C-108/97 & C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee Produktions- und Vertriebs GmbH v.
Boots- und Segelzubehör Walter Huber, 1999 E.C.R. I-2810, ¶¶ 49–52; see also Joined Cases C-217/13 & C218/13, Oberbank AG v. Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband eV, 2014 E.C.R. 2012, ¶¶ 38, 40–42; Case C98/11 P, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG v. OHIM, 2012 E.C.R. 307, ¶¶ 41–42; Case C-24/05 P, August
Storck KG v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-5693, ¶¶ 23, 26.
51
Dev Gangjee, Paying the Price for Admission: Non-Traditional Marks Across Registration and
Enforcement, in THE PROTECTION OF NON-TRADITIONAL MARKS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 59, 63 (Irene Calboli
& Martin Senftleben eds., 2018) (referring to the UK and Germany, which had traditionally refused registration
of shapes as trademarks).
52
STUDY ON THE OVERALL FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN TRADEMARK SYSTEM, (Max Planck Inst.
2011) Max Planck Institute, 2–26 [hereinafter The Study].
53
Id. ¶¶ 1–30.
54
As in the EU, see TMD, supra note 1, art. 4(1)(e); EUTMR, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(e).
55
The Study, supra note 52, ¶¶ 2–26.
56
Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000) (establishing that product design trade
dress marks can never be inherently source-identifying and must demonstrate acquire source significance after
market use for protection).
57
The Study, supra note 52, ¶¶ 2–27 (observing that case law of the CJEU has arguably established a
rather high threshold for establishing inherent distinctiveness).
58
Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 216.
59
Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde AG, Judgment, 2003 E.C.R. I-3177, ¶ 68.
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distinctiveness therefore plays a central role in determining under what
conditions any subject-matter may be assumed primarily to convey source
information to consumers rather than simply product information.60
This Article supports its claims by adopting a different approach from most
conventional accounts, fleshing out the criterion in its historical context rather
than in the abstract without nuances. Contrary to common opinion, this Article
does not propose abandoning the “depart significantly” criterion as the settled
analytical tool for assessing the suitability of unconventional subject-matter to
serve as trademark. The law should maintain robust safeguards to exclude
standard or striking design elements from registration without material
circumstances to suggest likely consumer acceptance. Unlike LJ Floyd’s view
in London Taxi Co. that the proper interpretation of the departs significantly
criterion is not acte claire,61 this Article argues that a more extensive review of
the CJEU’s case law would reveal otherwise. Furthermore, by undertaking an
extensive review of the criterion’s origins and evolution, this article identifies
some “legacy issues” that have (wrongly) entrenched the role of distinctiveness
as the main safeguard against monopolization of utilitarian shapes, relegating
the more appropriate role of other doctrinal tools such as descriptiveness,
customariness, and functionality.62 Shapes are generally refused registration for
failing to depart significantly from what is customary in the sector without
examining their potential for distorting product competition upon functionality
grounds.63 The effect of this approach has been to unnecessarily stretch
distinctiveness to achieve competition goals that are normally addressed under
the functionality doctrine.
Another cause of the difficulties with the departs significantly criterion is the
(unarticulated) empirical basis for its normative presumption about consumer
habits.64 Under this empirical rule, the CJEU assumes that European average
consumers are not ordinarily in the habit of choosing products based solely upon
their appearance or color, disregarding any verbal or graphic element that may
also be present.65 This rule strongly militates against finding inherent
distinctiveness too easily. Drawing upon empirical evidence, contemporary

60
61
62
63
64
65

See infra Part I.C.
London Taxi Co., [2017] AC 1729, ¶ 42.
See infra Part I.E.
Id.
See infra Part II.
Id.
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scholarship challenges this judicial assumption.66 Some call for its revision,
citing more appropriate scientific proof while others even claim that it
paradoxically provides dysfunctional incentives for traders to invest heavily in
educating consumers as a way of overcoming its presumptive barrier.67 This
Article challenges these increasingly popular criticisms. It analyses the source
of the problems and confusion surrounding the normative presumption about
consumer visual habits, arguing that as a matter of fact there is some empirical
support for it even if the CJEU has never expressly cited it.68 While resting upon
a conservative view of “presumed” consumer expectations, the normative
assumption is an important control device which does allow for empirical
modification and serves the critical function of enabling tribunals to demarcate
a bright line between registered design protection and trademark law’s source
significance.69
The 2015 legislative changes to the Directive and the Regulation have done
nothing to clarify or realign the course of the CJEU’s approach to the
distinctiveness criteria despite the legislative expansion of the universe of
unconventional subject-matter that may now secure registration.70 This suggests
a tacit acknowledgement that there is a central role for courts to play in
developing legal norms in conjunction with legislators. The lack of legislative
clarification thus enhances the Court’s role in articulating an appropriate
distinctiveness threshold that takes account of the specific nature of product
shapes and the unique policy concerns their protection raises.71 This reinforces
one of the central aims of this article regarding the pressing need for a more
rigorous academic engagement with the principles and policies underpinning the
departs significantly criterion. As stated, the approach adopted here is to present
a contextual historical analysis of EU case law so as to highlight significant
nuances in the factual situations confronting the CJEU’s principled approach.72
Whilst the criterion does not render shape-of-product marks effectively
unregistrable, it does require applicants to demonstrate more than the mere fact
that their design or shape is unique or completely unusual. EU law places the
66

Id.
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
The Study, supra note 52, ¶¶ 2–28. The Study served as a basis for the reforming the Trademarks
Directive and the Regulation and suggested either removing the expression “significantly” within the “departs
significantly” criterion or imposing secondary meaning as a pre-condition for registering product shape marks.
None of these proposals were adopted.
71
See infra Part IV.A.3.
72
See infra Part I.C.1–3.
67
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heavy burden of proving distinctiveness upon applicants, not the Office.73
Applicants’ failure to offer a sufficiently developed basis for assuming likely
consumer predisposition means that the normative presumption about consumer
purchasing habits will militate against source significance.74 This is an
inherently fact-sensitive evaluation that renders attempts to register appearance
alone difficult because it forces applicants to demonstrate the existence of
specific material circumstances to displace this normative presumption.75
However, this Article defends the departs significantly criterion given the
extensive monopoly and considerable economic value of registering shapes as
trademark. Properly applied, this criterion enables European law to distinguish
those few instances in which shapes are primarily likely to serve a sourceidentifying function from the vast majority of cases in which product shapes are
simply products.76
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I sets out the general EU approach
to distinctiveness and revisits general principles by highlighting three of these
controversial distinctiveness principles that were developed around product
trade dress and are often cited as the source of academic criticism and discontent.
Part II elaborates upon the most controversial principles around the departs
significantly criterion, namely the empirical rule about consumer habits, and
challenges the assumption that such a rule lacks empirical grounding. Part III
then reappraises the policies of the departs significantly criterion by
demystifying common misunderstandings and the increasingly popular criticism
that its central rule about consumer habits actually creates dysfunctional
incentives. With these clarifications, Part IV turns to examine controlling factors
that emerge from a tri-partite contextual analysis of the case-law: first, the role
of branding practices to which consumers are exposed; second, the importance
of general knowledge; and third, the experience of the EUIPO in articulating the
practices and adopted norms of the sector. Finally, Part V revisits Freixenet as
the only reported case where the CJEU has reversed a finding of noninherent
distinctiveness, highlighting significant nuances that have hitherto escaped
proper examination. It also considers some outstanding issues such as the
emerging rationalization of the CJEU’s jurisprudence in the lower EU tribunals
and the normative implications underlying the CJEU’s empirical rule that there
is ordinarily no consumer habit of assuming commercial origin of products by
reference to their appearance.
73
74
75
76

See infra Part IV.B–C.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part III.A.
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GENERAL APPROACH TO DISTINCTIVENESS ASSESSMENTS

A. The Structure of EU Law
Unconventional marks such as product trade dress brands often protect
products themselves or their features, which potentially allows the proprietor to
control the market for that type of product.77 This has profound implications for
market competition: permanent registration inhibits the freedom of competitors
to design and use not only products of the same shape but also a wide range of
similar forms.78 This defies the rule that there is generally no tension between
trademark law and free competition in the sense that the exclusivity arising from
registration does not typically diminish the ability of others to offer goods for
sale because they can market identical or similar goods drawing from an infinite
supply of potential brand names.79 In fact, competition concerns are particularly
acute where protection is afforded to signs which are indissociable from the
appearance of the goods they designate and which may be of limited supply, as
is the case with shape marks and trade dress marks. 80 Unlike other forms of IP
protection such as registered designs, patents or copyright which are limited in
time, trademark registration of shapes and product features is in principle
perpetual as long as there is market use. Moreover, protection of shapes is not
driven by the desire to limit market exclusivity to specific periods of time at the
end of which their registration will expire, expanding the public domain and
77

The Study, supra note 52, ¶¶ 2–26.
Case C-30/15 P, Simba Toys GmbH & Co. KG v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:C:2016:849, ¶¶ 38–39 (Nov. 10,
2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188220&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5390629. The CJEU itself recognizes the potential that registration of
shape mark has in distorting competition by stressing, before analyzing the functional signs exclusions in
Directive Article 3(1)(e) and EUTMR Article 7(1)(e), that “trade mark law constitutes an essential element of
the system of competition in the EU.” See id. ¶ 36; Joined Cases C-337/12 to C-340/12, Pi-Design AG v. Yoshida
Metal Indus. Co., ECLI:EU:C:2014:129, ¶ 42 (Mar. 6, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=148744&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4334539;
Case C-48/09 P, Lego Juris A/S v. OHIM, 2010 E.C.R. I-08403, ¶ 38.
79
Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, AG Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2014:322, ¶¶ 31–
32 (May 14, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152243&pageIndex=0&
doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5391009; Roland Knaak et al., Study on the Overall
Functioning of the European Trade Mark System, 52 (Max Planck Inst. for Innovation and Competition Res.
Paper No. 12–13, 2011).
80
Case C-163/16, Louboutin v. Van Haren Schoenen BV, AG Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2017:495, ¶ 21
(June 22, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=192069&pageIndex=0&
doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5391766; Case C-163/16, Christian Louboutin v. Van
Haren Schoenen BV, AG Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2018:64, ¶ 57 (Feb. 6, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=199102&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part
=1&cid=5391565; see Simba Toys GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2016:849, ¶¶ 30–31.
78
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fostering product competition by free imitation. The social importance of these
anticompetitive effects cannot be underestimated even though few
commentators have engaged with the central condition for trademark
registration, namely distinctiveness.81
The concept of distinctiveness has a foundational role in trademark law.82
Unless the mark is distinctive of source, the public will not acknowledge it for
its identificatory purpose of signaling the origin of the marked product and
distinguishing it from similar products of competitors.83 Goodwill is unlikely to
attach to the marked goods.84 The central role of distinctiveness is thus to
separate protectable trademarks from other subject-matter.85 It also has a role to
play as a relevant factor for establishing the appropriate penumbra of protection
of a proprietor’s registered mark.86 As one of the most foundational concepts,
trademark law relies heavily upon distinctiveness as a vehicle for setting
appropriate boundaries around registration and fulfilling specific normative
commitments that advance its core goal of promoting and maintaining a
competitive market.87 Nonetheless, distinctiveness as a concept has evolved
largely in connection with conventional categories of mark such as words,
graphics, logos, labels, etc., with almost incidental contact with less
conventional subject-matter like 3D product shapes (or product configurations),
color, color combinations, scents, etc.88 Within the international IP system,
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) mandates
protection for all types of signs provided that they are capable of
distinguishing.89 Similarly, under both the Directive and the Regulation,
European law envisages registration for any signs capable of distinguishing the

81

See infra Part IV.A.
Mark McKenna, Teaching Trademark Theory Through the Lens of Distinctiveness, 52 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 843, 846 (2008).
83
August Storck KG, ECLI:EU:C:2017:340, ¶ 32.
84
Graeme Dinwoodie, Reconceptualizing the Inherent Distinctiveness of Product Design Trade Dress,
75 N.C. L. REV. 471, 483 (1997).
85
McKenna, surpa note 82, at 847.
86
Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v. Klijsen Handel BV, Judgment, 1999 E.C.R.
I-3830, ¶ 20 (“[T]he more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion and
therefore marks with a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the recognition they possess on
the market, enjoy broader protection than marks with a less distinctive character.”).
87
Graeme Dinwoodie, Panel Discussion: Remembering Justice Scalia in IP Cases, 16 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 203, 207 (2016) (“Distinctiveness is a mix of empirical and normative analysis.”).
88
See infra, Part I.B.
89
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 15(1), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
82
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applicant’s goods or services from those of other traders.90 It is striking however
that none of these legal instruments provides any analytical framework for
evaluating the presence or otherwise of a sign’s intrinsic capacity to convey
source information. Unsurprisingly, the courts have played a central role in
articulating and developing such frameworks, bearing in mind basic trademark
principles.91
Under the structure of EU law, TMD Article 4(1) (formerly Article 3(1))
and EUTMR Article 7(1) set out several negative criteria that any registrable
sign must be free of even when satisfying the general positive requirements
for registration under TMD Article 3 (formerly Article 2) and EUTMR
Article 4.92 There are also shape specific provisions that permanently exclude
the registration of functional signs that consist exclusively of the shape or, as of
2015, “another characteristic” which: (i) results from the nature of the goods
themselves; (ii) is necessary to achieve a technical result; or (iii) adds substantial
value to the goods. These permanent exclusions are now listed under Article
4(1)(e) (formerly TMD Article 3(1)(e)) and EUTMR Article 7(1)(e). Thus, by
express intention of the EU legislator, natural, functional and ornamental shapes
or product characteristics are wholly incapable of serving a source-identifying
function and are precluded from ever acquiring source-identifying capacity (or
secondary meaning) even after successful market use and accumulated
consumer goodwill.93 Up until recently there was a paucity of case law around
the meaning and scope of these fatal criteria.94 Following a string of recent CJEU
decisions that offer much needed guidance, there has been a surge in academic
interest around these functional signs exclusions.95 Nevertheless, this renewed
academic interest has not matched a similar interest in the other statutory
grounds that, independently of Articles 4(1)(e) and 7(1)(e), product shapes must
also overcome prior to registration.

90
TMD, supra note 1, art. 3; EUTMR, supra note 1, art. 4; see also Case C-541/18, AS v. Deutsches
Patent- und Markenamt, ECLI:EU:C:2019:725, ¶ 18 (Sept. 12, 2019), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=217669&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=539
3209.
91
See infra Part I.B.
92
TMD, supra note 1, art. 4(1); EUTMR, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
93
Council Directive 2015/2436, O.J. (L 336) 1, 8 [hereinafter Recast Directive] (to approximate the laws
of the Member States relating to trade marks); EUTMR, supra note 1, art. 9.
94
See generally supra note 2.
95
See Lynch, supra note 2, at 465; Chronopoulos, supra note 2, at 287; Engels & Lehr, supra note 2, at
797; Quaedvlieg, supra note 2, at 102.
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Nothing in the wording of EU law prevents shape-of-product marks from
being treated differently, which suggests that they may be examined under one
or more of the other grounds in sub-paragraphs (b)–(d) and refused registration
even if they are not wholly functional.96 Indeed, a major obstacle that has
traditionally stood in the way of applicants seeking to register product trade dress
marks is nondistinctiveness under former EUTMR Article 3(1)(b) (now
Article 4(1)(b)) and Directive/Article 7(1)(b) according to which “trademarks
which are devoid of any distinctive character” are not to be registered or, if
registered, are liable to be declared invalid.97 Similarly, the more specific
illustrations of nondistinctiveness under former EUTMR Article 3(1)(c) and (d)
(now Article 4(1)(c) and (d)) and Directive/Article 7(1)(c) and (d) represent
further obstacles to the unjustified monopolization of graphic shapes that are
descriptive98 or customary99 of the designated goods. It was therefore clear from
the outset that, by express desire of the EU legislature, the registration path for
shapes would be far from easy as they must “remain subject to a multifaceted
examination of whether they are eligible to be registered as trademarks.”100 This
is not therefore as straightforward as with other categories of signs.

B. Distinctiveness Rules of Thumb
Distinctiveness underpins a range of legal doctrines, from validity to scope
of protection to the conditions for maintaining exclusive rights.101 There is
however no guidance in the wording of the former Article 3(1)(b) and
Article7(1)(b) as to the circumstances in which shapes (or any sign) may not be
regarded as “devoid of any distinctive character.”102 Nor is there any textual
indication about the method of assessment and the policy considerations that
96
Linde AG, 2003 E.C.R. I-3177, ¶ 68; see Case C-218/01, Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737
¶ 39 (“3D packaging mark for ‘Perwoll’ bottle.”).
97
EUTMR, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
98
Recast Directive, supra note 93, art. 7; EUTMR, supra note 1, art. 8 (prohibiting the registration of
trademarks “which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind,
quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or of
rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods or service”).
99
Id. (prohibiting the registration of trademarks “which consist exclusively of signs or indications which
have become customary in the current language or in the bona fide and established practices of the trade”).
100
Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde AG, AG Opinion, 2002 E.C.R. I-3164, ¶ 27.
101
Case C-223/18 P, Deichmann SE v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:C:2019:471, ¶ 27 (June 9, 2019),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=214765&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9244742 (“The requirements that apply to verification of the genuine use of
a mark are analogous to those concerning the acquisition by a sign of distinctive character through use for the
purpose of its registration.”).
102
See TMD, supra note 1; EUTMR, supra note 1.
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should guide any distinctiveness evaluation.103 In view of this legislative
omission, the challenging task of articulating the guiding principles of the EU
distinctiveness standard has fallen to the CJEU, which arguably adopts a
purposive interpretation relying upon the normative goals of trademark law and
the overriding aims of the common market.104 It has formulated several
fundamental principles, some of which are of general application to all signs and
some of which have played a central role in the registrability of product trade
dress marks:
1) every sign of every category must be “distinctive” of the source: it
must be capable of identifying the product as originating from a
particular undertaking, and thus distinguishing it from those of other
undertakings;105
2) distinctive signs are capable of fulfilling the essential function of a
trademark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the
marked product or service to the consumer or end-user by enabling
the recipient, without any possibility of confusion, to distinguish the
product or service from others which have another origin;106
3) distinctiveness evaluations can neither occur in the abstract nor
separately from the designated goods or services;107
4) in the concrete examination of whether any sign has the requisite
distinctiveness, it is appropriate to take the standpoint and
perception of the relevant public, which consists of average
consumers of those goods or services;108
5) the legal fiction of the average consumer is assumed to be
reasonably well-informed, reasonably observant, and circumspect;
103
See TMD, supra note 1. EU legislator did provide extensive guidance on the assessment criteria for the
likelihood of confusion.
104
Case C-104/00, DKV Deutsche Krankenversicherung AG v. OHIM, AG Opinion, 2002 E.C.R. I-7563,
¶ 34 [hereinafter Companyline]. Central in this task has been the non-binding Opinions of the Court’s Advocates
General.
105
Case C-64/02, OHIM v. Erpo Möbelwerk GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-10031, ¶ 33 [hereinafter Erpo]
(discussing slogan mark DAS PRINZIP DER BEQUEMLICHKEIT or “The Principle of Comfort”); Case
C-218/01, Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 30.
106
Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Remington, 2002 E.C.R. I-05475, ¶ 31 [hereinafter
Remington]; Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 30.
107
Case C-517/99, Merz & Krell GmbH & Co., 2001 E.C.R. I-06959, ¶ 29 (discussing word mark “Bravo”
for writing implements); Remington, 2002 E.C.R. I-05475, ¶ 59; Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. BeneluxMarkenbureau, 2003 E.C.R. I-03793, ¶ 76 [hereinafter Libertel].
108
Libertel, 2003 E.C.R. I-03793, ¶ 45; Case C-37/03, BioID AG v. OHIM, 2005 E.C.R. I-07975, ¶ 28
(discussing compound mark “BioID”); Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. 88, ¶ 51; Case C-329/02, SAT.1
Satellitenfernsehen GmbH v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-08317, ¶ 24 [hereinafter SAT.1].
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and provides the yardstick against which all questions of
distinctiveness must be answered;109
the difficulties in demonstrating inherent distinctiveness, which
may be associated with certain categories of signs due to their very
nature, do not justify imposing specific requirements that
supplement or derogate from the general distinctiveness criteria;110
nor do those difficulties justify rules under which certain signs are
found noninherently distinctive as a matter of principle111 or without
an a priori examination on the facts;112
in principle, the distinctiveness criteria of 3D shape-of-product
marks are no different from those applicable to other categories of
marks;113
though the starting point is equal criteria for all marks, the relevant
public’s perception is not necessarily the same for each of those
categories, and it may prove more difficult to establish
distinctiveness for some categories of mark than for others;114
EU law is thus guided by the empirical rule that average consumers
are not in the habit of making assumptions about the origin of goods
on the basis of their color,115 shape, shape of their packaging,116 or
even advertising slogans,117 in the absence of any graphic or word
elements;

109
Remington, 2002 E.C.R. I-05475, ¶ 63; Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde AG, 2002 E.C.R.
I-3164, ¶ 41; Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 50.
110
Erpo, 2004 E.C.R. I-10031 ¶ 36; Case C-404/02, Nichols plc v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2004 E.C.R.
I-08499, ¶ 26 (discussing surname mark).
111
Linde AG, 2002 E.C.R. I-3164, ¶ 75 (discussing 3D shape-of-product marks for the shape of a forklift,
a torch, and a wristwatch); Libertel, 2003 E.C.R. I-03793, ¶ 41.
112
Case C-265/09, OHIM v. BORCO-Marken-Import Matthiesen GmbH & Co., 2010 E.C.R. I-08265,
¶ 37 (discussing single letter mark); Nichols plc, 2004 E.C.R. I-08499, ¶ 29 (discussing surname mark).
113
Remington, 2002 E.C.R. I-05475, ¶ 49; Linde AG, 2002 E.C.R. I-3164, ¶ 42; Joined Cases C-456/01 P
& C-457/01 P, Henkel KGaA v. OHIM, Judgment, 2004 E.C.R. I-5115, ¶ 38 [hereinafter Henkel Dishwashing
Tablets] (discussing 3D shape-of-product marks for dishwashing tablets); Joined Cases C-468/01 P to
C-472/01 P, Procter & Gamble Co. v. OHIM, Judgment, 2004 E.C.R. I-5145, ¶ 36 [hereinafter P&G
Dishwashing Tablets] (discussing 3D shape-of-product marks for dishwashing tablets).
114
Linde AG, 2002 E.C.R. I-3164, ¶ 48; Henkel Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R. I-5115, ¶ 38
(discussing 3D shape-of-product marks for dishwashing tablets); P&G Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R.
I-5145, ¶ 36 (discussing 3D shape-of-product marks for dishwashing tablets); Glaverbel v. OHIM, 2002 E.C.R.
II-3887, ¶ 23 (discussing figurative mark consisting of the texture of a glass surface); Nichols plc, 2004 E.C.R.
I-08499, ¶ 26 (discussing surname mark); Erpo, 2004 E.C.R. I-10031, ¶ 35 (discussing slogan marks).
115
Libertel, 2003 E.C.R. I-03793, ¶ 65.
116
C-218/01, Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737 ¶ 30; Henkel Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R.
I-5115 ¶ 38; P&G Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R. I-5145 ¶ 36.
117
Case C-311/11, Smart Techs. ULC v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2012:460, ¶ 26 (July 12, 2012),
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11) the grounds for refusing registration are independent of one another,
and each call for separate examination, which makes it possible to
conclude that a mark cannot function as a trademark for reasons
other than its descriptive or customary character, though only one
ground suffices to refuse registration;118
12) conversely, the fact that a mark is not exclusively descriptive or
customary of the goods or services is no basis for concluding that
the mark is inherently distinctive;119
13) by virtue of settled case law, the possibility of registering certain
marks may be limited for reasons relating to the public interest;120
14) the grounds are therefore underpinned by public policy
considerations and, while there is some overlap between the
grounds, their public policy nature requires that each of them must
be kept separate and interpreted by reference to the specific public
interest aim underlying it;121
15) the specific public interest may, or even must, entail different
considerations depending upon which ground is at issue;122
16) while the specific objective of rejecting descriptive, customary, and
functional signs is to preserve their availability by keeping their use
free for all—and thereby protect competitor interests and freedom
of competition—such competition concerns do not explicitly
underpin the omnibus role of the nondistinctiveness ground;123
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=124990&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=4333927 (discussing the slogan mark “Wir Machen das Besondere Einfach”);
Case C-398/08 P, Audi AG v. OHIM, 2010 E.C.R. I-00535, ¶ 37 (discussing the slogan mark Vorsprung durch
Technik); Erpo, 2004 E.C.R. I-10031, ¶ 35.
118
Case C-265/00, Campina Melkunie v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, 2004 E.C.R. I-1705, ¶ 19 (discussing
word mark “BioMild” for various milk products); Case C-51/10 P, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol sp. z o.o.
v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-01541, ¶ 46.
119
Case C-363/99, Koninklijke KPN Nederland NV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, Judgment, 2004 E.C.R.
I-1651, ¶ 70 [hereinafter Postkantoor].
120
Joined Cases C-108/97 & C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee Produktions- und Vertriebs GmbH v.
Boots- und Segelzubehör Walter Huber, 1999 E.C.R. I-2810, ¶ 25; Case C-299/99, Remington, 2002 E.C.R.
I-05475, ¶ 77; Libertel, 2003 E.C.R. I-03793, ¶ 50.
121
Libertel, 2003 E.C.R. I-03793, ¶ 51; Erpo, 2004 E.C.R. I-10031, ¶ 39; Henkel Dishwashing Tablets,
2004 E.C.R. I-5115, ¶ 45; Postkantoor, 2004 E.C.R. I-1651, ¶ 94; Case C-304/06 P, Eurohypo AG v. OHIM,
2008 E.C.R. I-3316, ¶ 54; Joined Cases C-337/12 to C-340/12, Pi-Design AG v. Yoshida Metal Indus. Co.,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:129, ¶ 44 (Mar. 6, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
148744&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2684769.
122
Henkel Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R. I-5115, ¶ 46; Case C-37/03, BioID AG v. OHIM,
2005 E.C.R. I-07975, ¶ 59; Case C-173/04 P, Deutsche SiSi-Werke GmbH v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-568, ¶ 59
(regarding shapes of stand-up pouches for fruit drinks) [hereinafter SiSi-Werke].
123
SAT.1, 2004 E.C.R. I-08317, ¶ 36; BioID AG, 2005 E.C.R. I-07975, ¶ 62; Erpo, 2004 E.C.R. I-10031,
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17) instead, the general interest underlying the nondistinctiveness
barrier is inextricably associated with the essential function of the
mark and specifically includes the average consumer’s interests in
being able to recognize the goods covered by a trademark and
associate them with a particular manufacturer;124
18) the only exception in which competitor interests are part of the
distinctiveness assessment is the registration of color per se marks
for which the CJEU has fashioned a public interest aim not to
restrict unduly the availability of colors for other competitors selling
the same goods or services.125
Academics have questioned some of these principles, particularly the equal
treatment for all marks (Principle 8), the empirical rule about consumer habits
(Principle 10), and the general interest aim pursued by distinctiveness which
focusses only on the mark’s essential function with no explicit regard for
competitor interests (Principle 16). These criticisms are commonly raised in the
context of shape marks and, by extension, the departs significantly criterion. The
following sections evaluate Principles 8 and 16 while Part II examines the
arguments around Principle 10.
C. Equal Treatment Principle
Marks which are devoid of any distinctiveness also cannot fulfill their
essential function in the sense of Principle 2. A nondistinctiveness objection is
linked to the prima facie inability of consumers to treat shape alone as a
guarantee of commercial origin for the designated goods. Therefore, the
European nondistinctiveness barrier excludes those signs that, according to
presumed expectations of average consumers, will not reliably convey source
significance.126 The CJEU has consistently ruled that all marks must be treated
equally, but it has also provided a rebuttable presumption—according to
Principle 10—that EU consumers do not normally infer commercial origin from
the shape or color of the product or its container, disregarding any graphic or
¶ 37.
124
SiSi-Werke, 2006 E.C.R. I-568, ¶ 69 (regarding shapes of stand-up pouches for fruit drinks); Henkel
Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R. I-5115, ¶ 48; Eurohypo AG, 2008 E.C.R. I-3316, ¶ 59.
125
Case C-447/02 P, KWS Saat AG v. OHIM, Judgment, 2004 E.C.R. I-10133, ¶ 68 (“[A] colour does
not in itself have a distinctive character….”); Case C-49/02, Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH, 2004 E.C.R.
I-6152, ¶ 41 (reaffirming that there is “a public interest in not unduly restricting the availability of colours for
the other operators who offer for sale goods or services of the same type”); Libertel, 2003 E.C.R. I-03793, ¶ 55.
126
Libertel, 2003 E.C.R. I-03793, ¶ 39; Remington, 2002 E.C.R. I-05475, ¶ 63; Linde AG, 2002 E.C.R.
I-3164, ¶ 41; Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 50.
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verbal elements. As the Court has openly acknowledged, the upshot of its
empirical rule is that it could prove more difficult (but not impossible) to
establish inherent distinctiveness for certain categories of mark, like packaging
and shape marks, than for word or figurative marks.127 This inherent difficulty
applies to any sign that is indistinguishable from the appearance of the goods it
designates. The Court has also crafted the rule that generally “the more closely
the shape for which registration is sought resembles the shape most likely to be
taken by the product in question, the greater … the likelihood of the shape being
devoid of any distinctive character…. ”128 It is in the context of all these
principles that the CJEU has consistently summarized the threshold for
overcoming nondistinctiveness under former Article 3(1)(b) and Article 7(1)(b)
by stating that “only a mark that departs significantly from the norm or customs
of the sector and thereby fulfils its essential function of indicating origin is not
devoid of any distinctive character…. ”129
Beyond these pointers, no further elaboration is offered. Does this render the
test for tribunals and national courts hopelessly abstract and unworkable, as
some academics claim?130 Part III of this Article will demonstrate that such
claims are unfounded. Yet, contrary to what applicants frequently assert, the
Court never said that a shape mark would possess the necessary distinctiveness
as long as it departed significantly from the adopted norms of the sector.131 Nor
did it say that the “norm” as a point of comparison is limited to existing designs
or shapes on the market, such that in the absence of examples regarding identical
or similar shapes the proposed mark cannot be noninherently distinctive
according to presumed consumer expectations.132 Even if the product shape has
yet to exist on the market and is truly new and perceptibly different from others,
its design may still naturally come to mind for consumers in the light of the
nature and type of products they have experienced before.133 Therefore,

127

Linde AG, 2002 E.C.R. I-3164, ¶ 48; Henkel Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R. I-5115, ¶ 38; P&G
Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R. I-5145, ¶ 36.
128
Case C-136/02 P, Mag Instrument, Inc. v OHIM, Judgment, 2004 E.C.R. I-9182, ¶ 31. This Article
will refer to this rule as the “obvious shape” rule.
129
C-417/16, August Storck KG v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:C:2017:340, ¶ 35 (May 4, 2017); Case C-445/13 P,
Voss of Norway ASA v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2015:303, ¶ 91 (May 7, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=164150&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=5400466 [hereinafter Voss]; Mag Instruments, Inc., 2004 E.C.R. I-9182, ¶ 31; Henkel Dishwashing
Tablets, 2004 E.C.R. I-5115, ¶ 39; P&G Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R. I-5145, ¶37.
130
Kur, supra note 43; Fhima, supra note 43.
131
Voss, ECLI:EU:C:2015:303, ¶ 91.
132
See infra Part V.B.
133
Id.
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“customs of the sector” cannot be interpreted solely in the light of current
practice; this is the obvious shape rule’s effect.134 Much less did the Court say
that in ascertaining the norm or customs a tribunal had to survey the “prior art,”
as some claim they must.135 Part IV will highlight the vital role of the Office’s
general experience in articulating market practices and predicting likely
consumer reaction.
Academic criticisms frequently seize upon the Court’s language about equal
distinctiveness criteria for all marks without imposing stricter requirements upon
shape marks in order to argue that the departs significantly criterion actually
constitutes a more demanding distinctiveness standard than the allegedly lower
standard for other marks.136 Some even claim that “nowhere is a significant
departure from existing signs on the market required.…”137 One cannot help but
wonder whether academic concentration upon this principle has diverted
attention from the plain fact that, from a trademark perspective, shape marks are
born with a disability—namely, they primarily convey product-related
information rather than source-related information. The Court has rightly held
that, in evaluating their source-identifying capacity, it is legitimate to focus
attention upon these innate difficulties.138 Distinctive signs must communicate a
commercial message to consumers to be eligible for registration, i.e., that
someone stands behind the marked product even though the source is unknown.
As English courts acknowledge, “although the criteria are the same, the factual
position concerning shape of goods marks is different”139 for the simple reason
that “unlike a word mark or a device, a mere shape can communicate further
information only with difficulty.”140 Due to their handicap, product shapes
generally convey a technical or ornamental message rather than one about origin
unless the public has been educated otherwise. This was expressly

134

See supra footnote 113 and the cases cited therein.
Kur, supra note 43, at 26.
136
See id.; see also Ilanah Fhima, The Public Interest in European Trade Mark Law, 2017 INTELL. PROP.
Q. 311, 318.
137
Fhima, supra note 136, at 318; cf. Case T-408/15, Globo Comunicação e Participações S/A v. OHIM,
ECLI:EU:T:2016:468, ¶ 57 (Sept. 13, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
183262&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5395306 [hereinafter Globo]
(“A trade mark consisting of sounds resembling a ringing sound cannot perform an identifying function unless
it includes elements capable of distinguishing it from other sound marks….”).
138
This is particularly the case regarding slogan marks which also serve promotional functions, indications
of quality, or incitements to purchase the designated goods or services but cannot, by virtue of that use, be
excluded. See Erpo, 2004 E.C.R. I-10031, ¶ 36.
139
Unilever Plc’s Trade Mark Applications, [2003] RPC 35, [651, 663, ¶ 36].
140
Bongrain SA, Re Trade Mark Application, [2003] EWHC (Ch) 531 [13].
135
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acknowledged by the manner in which the EU legislature drafted the specific
prohibitions against functional signs in former Article 3(1)(e) and
Article 7(1)(e).141

1. The Impact of Historical Factors upon EU Distinctiveness
The fact remains that academic criticisms all too often overlook important
historical reasons for why European distinctiveness became the primary obstacle
for shape marks and, in the process, came (wrongly) to assume the “protective”
role of the functionality doctrine in former Article 3(1)(e) and Article 7(1)(e).
There were indeed several historical factors that put these distinctiveness
provisions under strenuous pressure to act as the main bulwark against easy
monopolization of shapes.
First, the deep-seated reluctance of the then-OHIM (now EUIPO) to apply
the provision that expressly concerns functional product shapes despite the
CJEU’s initial instruction in Remington, Linde, and Henkel Perwoll Bottle to
treat the functionality provisions in Article 3(1)(e) and Article 7(1)(e) as a “preliminary obstacle” liable to prevent registration.142 According to some accounts,
OHIM Examiners had received internal instructions “to examine shape mark by
ruling out a priori and, as such, the application of the grounds for refusal described in Article 7(1)(e) CTMR.”143 The reason for a priori excluding any investigation into competitive effects of the registration was that the functionality
provisions were considered “excessively difficult to interpret.”144 Some scholars
describe it as an anomalous situation, which resulted in EU Examiners consistently avoiding the very test they were required to apply first.145 Second, the
weight of opinion also supported this anomalous approach, advocating a narrow
construction of functionality and arguing that “dealing with [shape marks] on

141
Joined Cases C-337/12 to C-340/12, Pi-Design AG v. Yoshida Metal Indus. Co.,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:129, ¶ 26 (Mar. 6, 2014) (“[B]y restricting the ground for refusal set out in Article 7(1)(e)(ii)
… to signs which consist ‘exclusively’ of the shape of goods which is ‘necessary’ to obtain a technical result,
the legislature duly took into account that any shape of goods is, to a certain extent, functional….”); Case C48/09 P, Lego Juris A/S v. OHIM, 2010 E.C.R. I-08403, ¶ 48.
142
Case C-299/99, Remington, 2002 E.C.R. I-05475; Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde AG,
2002 E.C.R. I-3164, ¶ 44; C-218/01, Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 36.
143
STEFANO SANDRI & SERGIO RIZZO, NON-CONVENTIONAL TRADE MARKS AND COMMUNITY LAW 53
(2003).
144
Id.; see also Jean-Christophe Troussel & Peter van den Broecke, Is European Community Trademark
Law Getting in Good Shape?, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1066, 1072 (2003).
145
SANDRI & RIZZO, supra note 143, at 53.
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the grounds of lack of distinctiveness seems preferable, because trademark protection remains available for the shape if it acquires distinctiveness by use.…”146
This view was widely supported in Germany.147 But others rightly wondered
whether the free choice of refusal grounds might open “a sympathetic door to
the registration of shapes which the Directive intended to isolate from registration.”148 Indeed, in supporting a restrictive view of functionality to permit protecting accumulated consumer goodwill, some even claimed that “we would be
better off if the [Article 7(1)(e)] provision were deleted entirely, since threedimensional marks can be dealt with under [Article] 7(1)(b).”149 Third, coupled
with these questionable opinions, commentators also encouraged brand owners
to address the emerging issue of supermarket lookalikes and copycats “by seeking to register any new pack design or get-up” and securing permanent exclusivity rather than remedies through unfair competition or passing off.150 This
inevitably led to a massive surge in applications to register product shapes and
get-up as trademarks.151 Fourth, after relegating functionality to a dormant provision with only incidental relevance, commentators even argued that the wording “devoid of any distinctive character” had to be interpreted restrictively as
requiring, not a high, but a minimum degree of distinctiveness.152 According to
146
Joachim Bornkamm, Harmonising Trade Mark Law in Europe: The Stephen Stewart Memorial
Lecture, 1999 INTELL. PROP. Q. 283, 290 (discussing Federal German judge and member of the
Bundesgerichtshof or Federal Supreme Court writing ex judicially in its analysis of the German case law around
the harmonized German Trade Mark Act). This view of testing the registrability of shape marks on
distinctiveness grounds first and then functionality originated in the Benelux. Charles Gielen & Benoît Strowel,
The Benelux Trademark Act: A Guide to Trademark Law in Europe, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 543, 548 (1996).
147
D.W., The Registration of New Trade Mark Forms, 32 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
161, 169 (2001) (discussing German judge at the Federal Patent Court also writing ex judicially to support that
courts’ application of “extreme caution” to the equivalent German provision implementing Article 3(1)(e), so
that functionality is an obstacle of minor importance that does not prevent non-distinctive or descriptive shapes
being registered).
148
Alison Firth, Shapes as Trade Marks: Public Policy, Functional Considerations, and Consumer Perception, 23 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 86, 91 (2001).
149
David T. Keeling, About Kinetic Watches, Easy Banking, and Nappies That Keep a Baby Dry: A Review
of Recent European Case Law on Absolute Grounds for Refusal to Register Trade Marks, 2003 INTELL. PROP.
Q. 131, 137.
150
Belinda Mills, Own Label Products and the “Lookalike” Phenomenon: A Lack of Trade Dress and
Unfair Competition?, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 116, 130 (1995) (“One of the weaknesses of the new law is
the requirement that three-dimensional marks must be distinctive.”); see Ruth E. Annand, Lookalikes Under the
New United Kingdom Trade Marks Act 1994, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 142, 146 (1996) (discussing brand owners
may register get-up or trade dress which is distinctive as a whole under the UK Trade Marks Act in their fight
against own-brand lookalikes); see Proctor & Gamble’s Trade Mark Applications, [1999] RPC 673, 676 (Eng.)
(3D bottle mark) (providing an example of this attempt to curb lookalikes through registration).
151
See infra Part I.E.
152
Achim Bender & Philipp Von Kapff, Born to Be Free: The Community Trade Mark in Practice: Appeal
Decisions on Absolute Grounds: Current Decisions of the Boards of Appeal of OHIM, 32 INT’L REV. INTELL.
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this minimalist view, “only a trace of distinctive character is prima facie required
for registration of shapes … as trademarks.”153 The Appeal Boards at OHIM
consistently adopted this questionable view, and in some earlier decisions the
Court of First Instance (now the European General Court or EGC) went even
further in supporting the lowest bar possible of “any distinctive character” by
asking “whether there appeared to be no possibility that the sign in question may
be capable of distinguishing, in the eyes of the public to which it is addressed,
the products or services referred to from those of a different origin…. ”154 These
questionable interpretations failed to appreciate that, had the EU legislature intended “minimal” or “modest” distinctiveness, it would certainly have chosen
that word.
2. The Influence of the Baby-Dry Decision upon Distinctiveness
To make matters even worse, the 2001 Baby-Dry decision, with its test of
“any perceptible difference” between the proposed word combination and the
terms used in common parlance to designate the goods or services (or their
characteristics), had a ripple effect well beyond verbal compound marks
consisting of word combinations and neologisms.155 Emboldened by this
controversial ruling and the academic views outlined above, brand owners
seized upon this purely minimum threshold to claim that the existence of any
differences between the features making up the overall impression of the
proposed trade dress and the usual way of configuring or presenting the goods
were apt to satisfy the minimum distinctiveness for registration. Procter &
Gamble’s and Henkel’s attempts to register their dishwashing tablets are a case
in point. On appeal against the refusal before the CJEU, Henkel argued that the
lower EU tribunals should have confined themselves to ascertaining whether the
arrangement of features in its tablets was different from the typical ones.
Similarly, relying upon Baby-Dry, Procter & Gamble argued that for get-up
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 625, 635 (2001); see Arnaud Folliard-Monguiral & David Rogers, The Protection of
Shapes by the Community Trade Mark, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 169, 170 (2003).
153
Jenny Bergquist & Duncan Curley, Shape Trade Marks and Fast-Moving Consumer Goods, 30 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 17, 23 (2008); see Proctor & Gamble’s Trade Mark Applications, [1999] RPC [673, 680]
(Eng.).
154
Case T-87/00, Bank für Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG v. OHIM, 2001 E.C.R. II-01259, ¶¶ 36, 40; see also
Case T-64/15, Shoe Branding Eur. BVBA v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2015:973, ¶ 15 (Dec. 15, 2015), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=172986&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&o
cc=first&part=1&cid=5397468 (two-stripe position mark); Case T-441/05, IVG Immobilien AG v. OHIM, 2007
E.C.R. II-01937, ¶ 42 (single letter mark).
155
Case C-383/99 P, Procter & Gamble Co. v. OHIM, Judgment, 2001 E.C.R. I-6279, ¶ 40 [hereinafter
Baby-Dry].
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marks to overcome the nondistinctiveness ground it was necessary, first, to
ascertain what is the usual get-up of the relevant product on the market and,
second, to determine whether, from the consumer’s point of view, the shape
applied-for is perceptibly different. As OHIM rightly argued before the CJEU,
this standard meant finding 3D shapes registrable as trademarks if they meet
only one condition—being different from any other shape—and thus
assimilating the conditions for trademark registration with those of designs.156
While not explicitly addressing Procter & Gamble’s proposed standard, it is
clear that the CJEU’s tablets rulings (decided on the same day) flatly rejected
the attempt to transfer across the Baby-Dry test to trade dress marks without
substantive qualifications. The Court affirmed the practical application of the
departs significantly criterion it had articulated a few months earlier in Henkel
Perwoll Bottle, namely that the decisive factor is not an abstract assessment of
features which differ from the customary presentation of products of the same
type.157 Rather, it is the analytical weight of the presumed expectations of an
average consumer who has no initial predisposition to regard a product’s shape
or its packaging as source-identifier regardless of its price.158 Indeed, Henkel
Perwoll Bottle’s instructions had tied the departs significantly criterion seeking
to ascertain a shape mark’s source-identifying capacity to a mandatory
assessment of “the perception of the average consumer … to verify that it fulfills
its essential function, namely that of guaranteeing the origin of the product.”159
As the Advocate General’s (AG) opinion stated in the dishwashing tablets
rulings, the washing tablets were rightly found noninherently distinctive despite
their new innovative design because “the consumer’s ability to distinguish the
signs from the product of which they are an intrinsic part, as well as from other
similar signs, only emerges, by definition, when the product is placed on the
market.”160 As long as Henkel and Procter & Gamble were the only
manufacturers using the claimed get-up to sell detergent blocks that were
previously available only in powder or liquid form, there was no remote point
of comparison; and, as Henkel mandates, it was impossible to verify whether the

156
Henkel Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R. I-5115, ¶¶ 26–27; P&G Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R.
I-5145, ¶¶ 26–27.
157
Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737.
158
See Joined Cases C-456/01 P & C-457/01 P, and C-468/01 P to C-472/01 P, and C-473/01 P &
C-474/01 P, Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, 2003 E.C.R. I-5092, ¶ 57.
159
Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 51.
160
Henkel Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R. I-5115, ¶ 69; P&G Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R.
I-5145.
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get-up marks would enable consumers to distinguish the striking tablets from
those of other undertakings.161
3. The Demise of the Baby-Dry Distinctiveness Standard
Henkel Perwoll Bottle and the detergent tablets rulings also signaled a more
significant shift in the European approach to distinctiveness that is often
overlooked in academic commentary on shape marks. In qualifying the
necessary departure from the norm as significant rather than simple, the CJEU
in Henkel Perwoll Bottle sought to bring the method of assessment for shapes in
line with its reformulation of Baby-Dry’s test into a perceptible difference (not
just any difference) for composite word marks that it subsequently adopted in
Companyline, Postkantoor, BioMild, and Eurohypo. In Companyline, the
influential AG opinion proposed that a difference should be regarded as
perceptible “if it affects significant elements either of the appearance of the mark
claimed or of its semantic content.”162 Echoing the AG’s proposal, the CJEU
significantly raised the distinctiveness bar for unusual word juxtapositions by
ruling that merely bringing together customary terms, each of which is ineligible
for registration, “without any graphic or semantic modification, does not imbue
them with any additional characteristic such as to render the sign, taken as
whole, capable of distinguishing….”163
The need for an additional element was confirmed in Eurohypo, in which an
added element was missing to conclude that the combination of two current
components, EURO and HYPO for mortgage loan services, might be “unusual
or have its own meaning which, in the perception of the relevant public,
distinguishes the services offered by the appellant from those of a different
commercial origin.”164 Thus, compound trademarks, such as abbreviations or
neologisms, had to depart significantly from the lexical rules of the relevant
language of the average consumer in the same way that product trade dress
marks must depart significantly from the common market practices in presenting
similar products to customers. In Postkantoor and BioMild, the CJEU took
161

See Baby-Dry, 2001 E.C.R. I-6279, ¶ 29.
Companyline, 2002 E.C.R. I-7563, ¶ 51 (“[A]s regards ‘form,’ there will always be a perceptible
difference where, by virtue of the fact that a combination is unusual or fanciful, a neologism becomes more than
the sum of its parts. As regards the intended ‘meaning,’ if the difference is to be perceptible, the connotation of
the composite sign must not be identical to the sum of the semantic import of the individual descriptive parts.”).
This was the same approach he had proposed for descriptiveness in Postkantoor, which the CJEU implicitly
adopted. See Postkantoor, 2004 E.C.R. I-1651.
163
Companyline, 2002 E.C.R. I-7563, ¶ 23.
164
Case C-304/06 P, Eurohypo AG v. OHIM, 2008 E.C.R. I-3316, ¶ 69.
162
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further decisive steps to move away from Baby-Dry’s low bar for registration,
recalibrating “perceptible difference” as well as raising the nondescriptiveness
standard for composite word marks by requiring only differences of a certain
magnitude. It held that, as a general rule, a mere combination of descriptive
elements remains descriptive of the relevant goods or services for the purposes
of Articles 3(1)(c) and 7(1)(c); merely bringing together those elements “without
introducing any usual variations, in particular as to syntax or meaning,” cannot
result in anything other than an exclusively descriptive mark.165 That
combination may nonetheless overcome the descriptiveness barrier “provided
that it creates an impression which is significantly far removed from that
produced by the simple combination of those elements.”166
Because the unusual variation must significantly affect both the aural and
visual impression produced by the word mark, one cannot help but notice that
“significantly far removed” for word-combination marks evokes the significant
departure criterion from the usual presentation of a shape mark. Thus, the CJEU
heightened the bar in deciding that a word-combination mark composed of
elements, each of which describes characteristics of the goods or services, is
itself descriptive and unable to function as a source-identifier without more:
[U]nless there is a perceptible difference between the word and the
mere sum of its parts: that assumes either that, because of the unusual
nature of the combination in relation to the goods or services, the word
creates an impression which is sufficiently far removed from that produced by the mere combination of meanings lent by the elements of
which it is composed, with the result that the word is more than the
sum of its parts, or that the word has become part of everyday language
and has acquired its own meaning, with the result that it is now independent of its components.167

This heightened descriptiveness standard applies equally to new words
which are not listed in dictionaries,168 but it strikes the right balance in requiring
that the word itself, not just its components, be wholly descriptive.169 In a clear

165
Postkantoor, 2004 E.C.R. I-1651, ¶ 98; Case C-265/00, Campina Melkunie BV v. BeneluxMerkenbureau, 2004 E.C.R. I-1705, ¶ 39.
166
Postkantoor, 2004 E.C.R. I-1651, ¶ 99.
167
Id. ¶ 100. For a critical examination of the evolved “perceptible difference” test, see Case C-408/08 P,
Lancôme Parfums et Beauté & Cie SNC v. OHIM, AG Opinion, 2010 E.C.R. I-01347, ¶¶ 90–98.
168
Campina Melkunie BV, 2004 E.C.R. I-1705, ¶ 41.
169
Case C-273/05 P, OHIM v. Celltech R&D Ltd., Judgment, 2007 E.C.R. I-2912, ¶ 76; SAT.1,
2004 E.C.R. I-08317, ¶ 28 (“The mere fact that each of those elements, considered separately, is devoid of
distinctive character does not mean that their combination cannot present a distinctive character.”); Case C-92/10
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move to abandon the Baby-Dry criteria, the Court also clarified any ambiguity
around the scope of descriptiveness by reinstating the public interest pursued by
the descriptiveness ground in keeping descriptive signs free for all.170
The “any perceptible difference” test for comparing marks is a minimal test
that can comprise any difference however small, but subsequent developments
in the CJEU’s case law found it insufficient to guarantee that trademarks can
fulfilll their indentifying function. In reformulating the perceptible difference
test for composite word marks and adopting the departs significantly criterion
for all types of trade dress, the Court has laid to rest the debate around minimal
levels of distinctiveness resulting from the statutory wording and problematic
rulings like Baby-Dry.171 This can be seen most clearly in Mag Instruments.172
Nonetheless, it is also the case that the requirement for a composite sign to be
more than the mere sum of its parts in order to meet the perceptible difference
standard is arguably equivalent to the departs significantly criterion as that
perceptible difference standard applies equally across categories of marks.
Indeed, the perceptible difference standard has been applied to packaging trade
dress marks in Corona173 and Voss,174 and product trade dress marks in Mag
Instruments175 and Timehouse.176 Contrary to common opinion, the same
stringent standard of distinctiveness is therefore applied to all marks, without
bias or discrimination against shapes.

P, Media-Saturn-Holding GmbH v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-00002, ¶ 36 (slogan mark BestBuy).
170
Case C-150/02 P, Streamserve Inc. v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-01461, ¶ 25; Case C-191/01 P, OHIM v.
Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., Judgment, 2003 E.C.R. I-12473, ¶ 31 (Doublemint chewing gum case).
171
Case C-24/05 P, August Storck KG v. OHIM, AG Opinion, 2006 E.C.R. I-5680, ¶ 47 (shape of
Werther’s Original sweet).
172
Case C-136/02 P, Mag Instrument Inc. v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-9182, ¶¶ 24–25. The appellant relied
upon Baby-Dry to argue that, as with word marks, “any perceptible difference” in relation to goods in common
use is sufficient for the proposed shape mark not to be devoid of any distinctiveness and satisfy the required
minimal distinctiveness. This followed from the lower court’s finding that the propose shapes were “variants of
a common torch shape.” The CJEU flatly rejected this argument.
173
Case T-399/02, Eurocermex SA v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. II-01391 ¶ 31, aff’d Case C-286/04 P,
2005 E.C.R. I-05797, ¶¶ 29–30.
174
Voss, ECLI:EU:C:2015:303, ¶¶ 126–128 (rejecting appellant’s argument that it was error to apply the
criteria developed around composite word marks, according to which a combination of non-distinctive
components can have sufficient distinctiveness provided that, taken as a whole, it amounts to more than just the
mere sum of its parts).
175
Case C-136/02P, Mag Instrument, Inc. v. OHIM, AG Opinion, 2004 E.C.R. I-9169, ¶¶ 30–37
(applying, alongside the departs significantly criterion, the perceptible difference test to a shape-of-product mark
(shape of a torch) to demonstrate that no more stringent criteria had been used).
176
Case C-453/11 P, Timehouse GmbH v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2012:291, ¶ 40 (May 14, 2012),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=123947&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode
=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5400666.
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D. The Public Interest Aim of Distinctiveness
According to settled case law, an absolute ground for refusing registration
must be interpreted in the light of the public interest underlying it.177 These
public interest considerations play a central role in the scope and reach of the
European refusal grounds even though they are not explicitly outlined in the
legislation.178 When public interest is raised in the registration context, its aim
is to limit the potential monopolization of the mark in question.179 A longstanding criticism of the way the CJEU has attempted to define the
distinctiveness standard has been that it focuses solely on whether average
consumers are likely to understand the mark as source-indicating, without regard
for policy considerations such as competitors’ present or future interests in the
availability of alternative signs.180 These policy considerations in preserving
availability have been explicitly acknowledged for color per se marks, mainly
on the ground that the number of colors that the public is capable of
distinguishing is limited and, as a result, there is a limited number of colors that
are in fact commercially available as potential trademarks for goods or
services.181 The limited availability of colors means that “a small number of
trademark registrations for certain services or goods could exhaust the entire
range of colors available.”182 In Libertel, the Court regarded this risk of “color
depletion” as incompatible with a system of undistorted competition for at least
two reasons.183 One is because the excessive monopoly arising from registration
could have the effect of “an unjustified competitive advantage for a single
trader.”184 The other is because such extensive monopoly would do nothing to
foster economic development or the spirit of enterprise “for established traders
to be able to register the entire range of colors that is in fact available for their
own benefit, to the detriment of new traders.”185
A great deal is made of Libertel’s general interest in not unduly restricting
availability and keeping certain signs in the public domain to preserve
competition as the only exception the CJEU has recognized when evaluating the
177

See generally supra note 122.
Jeremy Phillips, Trade Mark Law and the Need to Keep Free, 36 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. &
COMPETITION L. 389 (2005).
179
Fhima, supra note 136, at 318.
180
The Study, supra note 52.
181
Case C-104/01, Libtertel Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, 2003 E.C.R. I-03793, ¶ 47.
182
Id. ¶ 54.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
178
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distinctiveness of color marks but which cannot, according to case law, extend
beyond colors into distinctiveness assessments of other categories of equally
limited signs.186 Indeed, this contrast features prominently in the problems
identified by the Max Plank Institute Study on the Overall Functioning of the
European Trademark System (the Study).187 As Principle 16 states, competitors’
present or future interests in having unrestricted access to descriptive,
customary, and functional signs are part of a “need to keep free for all” policy
reflected in the refusal grounds in former Articles 3(1)(c)–(e) and 7(1)(c)–(e).188
However, this is not the policy objective underpinning the European requirement
of distinctiveness in former Article 3(1)(b) and Article 7(1)(b).189 The
distinctiveness ground includes the interests of consumers in ensuring that the
proposed mark can fulfill its essential function of indicating the source. As long
as there are grounds for assuming that the proposed mark is likely to aid
consumers in their transactional behavior, it may be registered without
investigating whether competition interests are better served by keeping it free
for all to use.
1. Academic Criticisms
According to some critics, the same aim in preserving availability should
apply to other signs that are in limited supply; for example, single letters and
numbers, common names, colors, and, generally, those signs that are
indistinguishable from the appearance of the goods such as shapes.190 This was
recently endorsed by AG Szpunar in his Louboutin opinion,191 despite consensus
among previous Advocates General that, aside from colors, there is no apparent

186

The Study, supra note 52.
Id.
188
See TMD, supra note 1, art. 3(1)(c)–(e); EUWTR, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(c)–(e).
189
See supra Part I.B.
190
Michael Handler, The Distinctive Problem of European Trade Mark Law, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.
306–12 (2005); see also Kur, supra note 43.
191
Case C‑163/16, Christian Louboutin SAS v. Van Haren Schoenen BV, Additional AG Opinion,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:64, ¶ 65 (Feb. 6, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
199102&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2640434
(accepting
the
possibility that, in case the CJEU were to adopt a narrow view and refuse treating the Louboutin red-soled mark
as a “shape” of the goods within the meaning of the Article 3(1)(e), distinctiveness evaluations in Article 3(1)(b)
could also be subject of whether registration would run counter to the general interest in preserving availability
of a signs that are indissociable from the appearance of the goods like shapes or are of limited supply. Their
distinctiveness therefore would be subject to same policies underpinning functionality in Article 3(1)(e) even
though their availability cannot be secured on a lasting basis under Article 3(1)(b). AG cited Kur and
Senftleben’s academic proposal for this additional availability aim of distinctiveness); see id. n.10 (citing A. Kur
& M. Senftleben, EUR. TRADE MARK L. 115 (2017)).
187
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reason for concluding that an otherwise nondescript mark is incapable of
indicating source on the basis of competitor’s interests in preserving
availability.192 Though Louboutin offered the CJEU the opportunity to reexamine this long-standing question, its rather short decision did not address it
at all as the Court simply ruled that the European functionality policies could
not apply in the case of a sign consisting of a color applied to the sole of a highheeled shoe because that sign cannot constitute a “shape” within meaning of
former Article 3(1)(e).193
Some commentators argue that, in addressing the impossibility of
considering competitors’ interests in distinctiveness assessments owing to
different general interests, the CJEU has reacted by “starkly expanding the ambit
of [CTMR] Article 7(1)(e) … to ordinary shapes as well as to outstanding
designs, but the improvement that may mean for the interests of competition
comes at the cost of reduced transparency and legal certainty.”194 However, this
account is inconsistent with the historical development of the Court’s case law
around shape marks.195 The CJEU unequivocally decided at a very early juncture
that the first obstacle for shapes was the competition goals of functionality rather
than limited consumer perception underpinning distinctiveness.196 It was
competitors’ freedoms and market competition concerns that featured
prominently in the Court’s approach to shape marks. None of the apparent
inconsistencies that some perceive between functionality and distinctiveness
would arise if ordinary, utilitarian, or aesthetically pleasing shapes were first
subjected to the functionality criteria.197 European functionality constitutes the
exclusionary ab initio legal tool despite its position within the legislation,
leaving distinctiveness the residual exclusionary role it was meant to have for
shapes.198

192
See Case C-173/04 P, Deutsche SiSi-Werke v. OHIM, AG Opinion, 2005 E.C.R. I-551, ¶ 41; Case
C-37/03 P, BIOID v. OHIM, AG Opinion, 2005 E.C.R. 338, ¶ 36; Case C-136/02 P, MAG Mag instrument v.
OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. 592, ¶ 2; Joined Cases C-468/01 P to C-472/01 P, P&G v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. 259, ¶ 36;
Joined Cases C-456/01 P and C-457/01 P, Henkel v. OHIM, AG Opinion, 2003 E.C.R. 602, ¶ 38 (Nov. 6, 2003);
but see Case C-304/06 P, Eurohypo v. OHIM, AG Opinion, 2008 E.C.R. 261, ¶ 50.
193
Christian Louboutin SAS, ECLI:EU:C:2018:64, ¶ 27.
194
Kur, supra note 43, at 6 (analyzing the Hauck ruling to highlight what she perceives as inconsistencies
in the relationship between the criteria for excluding natural shapes and distinctiveness, on the one hand, and the
tension between the criteria for excluding value-adding shapes and the departs significantly criterion, on the
other).
195
See supra Part I.C.1–3.
196
Id.
197
As the CJEU recently recalled in Kit-Kat Chocolate Bar, ECLI:EU:C:2015:604, ¶ 40.
198
Troussel & Broecke, supra note 144, at 1072.
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2. Competitors’ Interests Within Distinctiveness
What is rather puzzling about the arguments regarding signs that are of
limited supply and whose exclusivity may affect the legitimate ability of traders
to compete effectively is that the legislature itself included letters, numerals,
personal names, and shapes amongst the categories of registrable signs that are
prima facie assumed to meet the general capacity to distinguish in CMTR former
Article 2 and Article 4. These registrable marks thus avoid being excluded
permanently from registration under CMTR former Article 3(1)(a) and
Article 7(1)(a). Indeed, the legislator saw no need to put in place additional
safeguards to maintain permanently in the public domain the limited supply of
names, letters, and numerals by preventing assiduous traders securing
unjustified market advantages through their permanent registration.199 In the
same way, it crafted broad functionality criteria for ensuring purely functional
shapes are permanently in the public domain for everyone to use. The only
potential objections to registering common names, letters, and numbers are the
nondistinctiveness, descriptiveness, and customariness objections, which are the
same hurdles for all other marks. This means that such signs could still be
available for exclusivity following successful market use, even if competitors’
interests were also included in distinctiveness evaluations and had a bearing on
the potential registrability of signs in limited supply. The potential for
exclusivity exists because, by express legislative desire and unlike the case of
functional shapes, European law has left this door permanently open.200 If there
are grounds for legitimate criticisms, these should be aimed at policy makers,
not the Court’s attempts to articulate general interests that limit the scope for
registration.
Another more plausible explanation for acknowledging only a colordepletion public interest has less to do with the Court’s lack of proper
engagement with the impact of registration across different interest groups and
more to do with the limited policy space left by the EU legislature. Indeed, for
Maniatis, Libertel underlines “the need to develop a wider theory of
functionality that will cover not only shapes, but other functional characteristics
of products as well.”201 The narrow scope of the functionality doctrine in the
199
Case C-404/02, Nichols v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2004 E.C.R. 538, ¶ 31 (“The registration of a
trade mark constituted by a surname cannot be refused in order to ensure that no advantage is afforded to the
first applicant since Directive 89/104 contains no provision to that effect….”).
200
See EUTMR supra note 1, art. 7(1)(3); TMD supra note 1, art. 4(4).
201
Spyros Maniatis, Whither European Trade Mark Law? Arsenal and Davidoff: The Creative Disorder
Stage, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. REV. 99, 114 (2003). Maniatis continues to believe that “a stronger functionality
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former Article 3(1)(e) and Article 7(1)(e) targeting exclusively shapes forced the
Court “to stretch the scope of distinctiveness and graphical representation in
order to deal with nonshape, potential functionality cases.”202 There is indeed
force in Maniatis’s observations. As AG Szpunar recently noted, the 2015
legislative changes are likely to ease the pressure upon distinctiveness by
widening the scope of the functional signs criteria to cover, in addition to the
shape, another characteristic of the goods as potential grounds for functionality
to apply to a wider range of registrable signs.203
E. Lingering Legacy Issues
There remain nonetheless “legacy issues” regarding the free choice of
refusal grounds and the perceived harshness of a functionality finding, the effect
of which has been to stretch the European concept of distinctiveness almost to
breaking point.204 Where functionality should be the ab initio analytical tool,
European courts tend to rely heavily upon distinctiveness to deal with functional
attributes of sounds and colors.205 Indeed, the departs significantly criterion,
rather than functionality criteria, is commonly applied to blatant attempts to
register get-up marks with functional advantages that raise more fundamental
questions about distorting product competition than the potential difficulties of
provision could deal with the peculiarities of shapes and colours without having to raise the distinctiveness
barrier for specific types of sign.” See Syros Maniatis, The Max Planck Study on the European Trade Mark
System: A Critical Summary, 2 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 163, 168.
202
Id.
203
Louboutin, ECLI:EU:C:2017:495, ¶ 62.
204
For a recent example of “legacy issues” around the free choice of refusal grounds, see C-437/15 P,
EUIPO v. Deluxe Labs. Inc., ECLI:EU:C:2017:41, ¶¶ 74–77 (Jan. 25, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=187127&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=5405442 (stating in agreement with previous Opinions of other Advocates General that the examination
of word marks should begin with descriptiveness rather than distinctiveness, which is not what the General Court
did. Given the clear overlap between the two grounds, courts should deal with both grounds rather than limit
their examination to one of them. Though distinctiveness is intended to cover all circumstances in which a sign
is not apt to distinguish, it is preferable in the interest of consistency to begin with the broad descriptiveness
ground and its underlying objective in keeping signs free for all and only then deal with distinctiveness.). For a
final refusal to register the figurative mark DELUXE for a large number of goods/services, see Case T-222/14
RENV, Deluxe Entm’t Serv. Grp. Inc. v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:T:2018:402 (July 4, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=203616&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&
part=1&cid=5451271.
205
Globo, ECLI:EU:T:2016:468, ¶ 52 (sound mark consisting of two repetitive ringing tones); C-45/11 P,
Deutsch Bahn v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. 808, ¶¶ 50, 60. A color combination mark consisting of two horizontal
lines running along coaches for railway services is noninherently distinctive because red is commonly used for
functional purposes such as warning in parts of railway engines and safety enclosures for electrical equipment
beside railway lines, traffic signs, level crossing barriers and rail transport traffic signs, and the space between
trains and the borders of railway platforms.
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consumer association. For instance, in P&G Tabs I, the Board’s findings that the
solid-form detergent tablets displayed obvious practical advantages for both
consumers and manufacturers in the sense of being “easier to use,” “easier to
manufacture,” and “more readily marketable” ought to have been part of a
potential examination into whether their get-up was necessary to achieve a
technical result.206 In particular, the Board’s concern that permanent registration
would entitle the applicants alone to monopolize the fundamental packaging
concept of selling Class 3 detergent products in solid form, and thereby force
competitors to continue to market theirs in liquid or powder, clearly highlights
the potential for abnormal competitive advantages that generally underpins
functionality, not distinctiveness.207
Similarly, in Deutsche Sisi-Werke, the Board viewed the get-up of stand-up
pouches for drinks—distinguished by their convex shape and widened bottoms
with lateral indents—as presenting practical advantages for consumers, owing
to its more flexible shape, by making it easy to grip the pouch and helping it to
remain upright.208 More significantly, for packaging manufacturers, “one
advantage of producing stand-up pouches in place of other kinds of packaging
for beverages is the low cost of materials.”209 Equally important, because they
are smaller in volume and weigh less, the stand-up pouches’ shape also
performed a technical result in facilitating minimal storage and transportation
costs.210 Again, the Board raised competition concerns for the future interests of
beverage manufacturers in the unrestricted use of stand-up pouches, but the
outcome of the refusal turned upon the packaging being insufficiently unusual
for consumers to perceive it as a source-identifier even if it was unusual to find
juice packaged in stand-up pouches.211 On appeal, both the EGC and the CJEU
upheld the refusal using the departs significantly criterion without regard for the
206
Case R-509/1999-1, Procter & Gamble Co., ¶ 13 (1st Bd. App. Mar. 8, 2000) (unreported). On appeal
to the CJEU, P&G Dishwashing Tablets, 2004 E.C.R. I-05141, ¶ 69.
207
See Case R-707/1999-1, Procter & Gamble Co. v. OHIM, ¶¶ 15–16 (1st Bd. App. June 20, 2000)
(unreported); Case R-436/1999-1, Unilever v. OHIM, ¶¶ 12–13 (1st Bd. App. Sept. 14, 2000) (unreported);
General Case R-768/1999-3, Detergents v. OHIM, ¶ 15 (3d Bd. App. Apr. 13, 2000) (unreported); Case R
75/1999-3, Henkel v. OHIM (3d Bd. App. Nov. 25, 1999) (unreported), aff’d Case T-30/00, Henkel, ¶ 53 (2d
Chamber Sept. 19, 2001); Case R-73/1999-3, Henkel, (3d Bd. App. Sept. 21, 2000) (unreported), aff’d Case T337/99, Henkel, ¶ 50 (2d Chamber Sept. 19, 2001); R 1086/2000-1, Unilever, Case Decision, ¶¶ 13–14 (1st Bd.
App. May 22, 2001) (unreported), aff’d Case T-194/01, Unilever, ¶¶ 6, 66; Case R-1184/2004-1, Procter &
Gamble Co., ¶ 24 (1st Bd. App. June 4, 2004) (unreported), aff’d Joined Cases T 241/05, T 262/05 to T 264/05,
T 346/05, T 347/05, T 29/06 to T 31/06, Proctor & Gamble Co. v. OHIM 2007 E.C.R. II-1549.
208
Case R 719/1999-2, Deutsche SiSi-Werke v. OHIM, ¶ 16 (2d Bd. App. Feb. 28, 2002) (unreported).
209
Id. ¶ 18.
210
Id. ¶ 18.
211
Id. ¶ 20.
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Board’s central functionality findings.212 Moreover, functionality’s competition
goals are not the only role that distinctiveness is being forced to take.
1. Unnecessary Strains upon EU Distinctiveness
A further example of the legacy issues is that nondistinctiveness is generally
applied in lieu of the descriptiveness and customariness objections, both of
which pursue explicit competitors’ interests in preserving availability.213 For
instance, in August Storck II, the finding that shape of the twisted gold wrapper
was “a normal and traditional form of the wrapping of sweets” led the Board to
conclude that the packaging mark was customary and ineligible for registration
because the applicant’s competitors had an interest in choosing a gold doubletwist for wrapping their sweets.214 Rather than applying Article 7(1)(d) which
prohibits the registration of marks that have become customary in current trade
practices and for which there is a public interest aim in keeping customary signs
free for all, the Board (and the eventually the CJEU) used the departs
significantly criterion in Article 7(1)(b) as the basis for the refusal.215 Thus,
August Storck II unnecessarily strained distinctiveness to accommodate
competitor interests.
Other commentators draw attention to the inadequate role of the
descriptiveness ground in keeping descriptive shapes free for all. In her critique
of the CJEU’s decisions that product shape and packaging marks must also be
considered for their descriptiveness and the potential for considerations about
their present or future availability, Annette Kur argues that “shapes are
descriptive in a strict sense only in exceptional cases, such as the bulgy shape of
wine bottles that may indicate certain geographical origin.”216 She observes that
the obvious difficulty that the Court has not addressed is that the descriptiveness
provision is geared towards traditional forms of marks such as word- and
picture-marks.217 Given the difficulties in applying descriptiveness beyond
shapes that may serve specific qualitative aspects, Kur asserts that
considerations of competitor interests are confined to those rare cases.218 This
results in the descriptiveness objection becoming “dead letter” because shapes

212
213
214
215
216
217
218

Case C-173/04, Deutsche SiSi-Werke GmbH & Co. Betriebs KG v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-577-78.
See supra Part I.B.
Case C-25/05, August Storck KG v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-5754.
Id.
Kur, supra note 43, at 5.
Id.
Id.
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are generally only assessed on distinctiveness grounds.219 Other commentators
would appear to agree with this critique.220 However, these academic opinions
are difficult to reconcile with how judges actually view the more appropriate
role of descriptiveness in assessing the eligibility of shape-of-product marks. As
AG Colomer repeatedly argued,
it is preferable initially to classify signs comprising the shape of goods
by reference to Article 7(1)(c) of the Regulation, so that the Examiner
considers whether the sign … essentially conveys the idea of the goods
formed by the average consumer and if [so] he would have to refuse it
registration on the basis of Article 7(1)(c) because it constitutes a new
graphic description of the goods.221

If this descriptiveness ground applies, this opens up the possibility of
reliance upon the availability requirement to enable EU tribunals to weigh
considerations regarding the future, when considering the suitability of a shape
to function as a trademark.222 It is according to this overriding interest that the
distinctiveness (as a category) of a 3D shape-of-product mark must be
assessed.223 Moreover, descriptiveness has clear advantages over
nondistinctiveness. The novelty of the shape does not prevent it from being
merely descriptive of the kind of product because the number of products on the
market cannot counter its descriptive nature as a shape mark.224 By contrast, such
a mark may be nondescript “when the consumer, on looking at it, does not
necessarily have the impression that he is perceiving it as an example of the
relevant category or quality.”225
Some English courts have followed this approach. Justice Patten in Dyson
initially decided to consider the potential descriptiveness of the transparent bin
independently of the more general question of whether the mark might be
distinctive under former Article 3(1)(a)–(b).226 He agreed with the Examiner that
the transparent bin as the essential feature of the proposed marks served “to

219

See id. at 6.
Fhima, supra note 136, at 318.
221
Case C-136/02, Mag Instrument, Inc. v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-9174.
222
Id.
223
Case C-468/01, Procter & Gamble v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-5105.
224
Id. at I-5107.
225
Id. at I-5105.
226
Dyson Ltd.’s Trade Mark Application [2003] EWHC (Ch) 1062 [18]-[19], [2003] RPC 47 (appeal
taken from Eng.). Article 3(1)(c) requires courts to consider two separate but related aspects of descriptiveness:
(i) whether the descriptive nature of the sign is such as effectively to rob it of commercial distinctiveness; and
(ii) whether its use of ordinary descriptiveness (whether literal or graphic) is unfairly monopolistic. See id.
220
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identify the vacuum cleaner as bagless” and informed consumers about what the
machine is or does but communicated nothing about its commercial origin.227 In
Justice Patten’s view, “it is always going to be difficult to avoid a charge of mere
descriptiveness, when the sign comprises part of the goods or the goods
themselves, rather than an invented word, phrase, or design.”228 Some academics
would agree with this view, endorsing the need for a significant departure from
commonplace shapes because otherwise the shape would probably be merely
descriptive of the type of product as a matter of law and thus unable to function
as source-identifier as a matter of fact.229 LJ Jacob in Bongrain followed the
same route in considering descriptiveness first and then noninherently
distinctiveness of the proposed flower-shaped cheese mark.230 The evidence
showed that the public regarded the “ridged effect” of the shape as indicating
convenient notional lines for cutting wedges of the cheese and this perception of
shape having a function (i.e., intended purpose) could be relevant for a
descriptiveness objection under former Article 3(1)(c) as well as
nondistinctiveness under former Article 3(1)(b).231 Therefore, contrary to what
some academics argue, at least some courts have found it possible to consider
the potential descriptiveness of shapes, calling upon the overriding interest in
avoiding their monopolistic appropriations.
II. EMPIRICAL RULE ABOUT CONSUMER HABITS
A. Is There Some Basis for This Rule?
A central tenet of the CJEU’s case law on trade dress marks is the empirical
rule that there is normally no consumer habit of differentiating goods or services
by reference to their color or appearance.232 This rule makes it exceedingly
difficult to find all signs that are indistinguishable from the appearance of the
designated goods, such as product shapes (including packaging and colors),
inherently distinctive. Further, as compared with other categories of marks, their
registration is more likely to depend upon evidence of secondary meaning

227

Id. ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 38. Justice Patten eventually agreed there was no evidence that the transparent bin could function
as a guarantee of origin and was therefore non-inherently distinctive, which made it unnecessary to decide the
descriptiveness objection. See id.
229
Troussel & Broecke, supra note 144, at 1087.
230
Bongrain SA’s Trade Mark Application [2005] 14 RPC 306 (EWCA) (appeal taken from Eng.).
231
Id.
232
See generally supra note 115.
228
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following successful market use.233 Although the CJEU’s cautious view of
consumer habits were previously endorsed in some academic quarters,234 most
contemporary scholars severely criticize this consumer-based presumption
against inherent distinctiveness for being “arbitrary”235 and resting upon “largely
untested assumptions about consumer reaction.”236 According to these critics,
this lack of substantiation ignores the fact that some consumers may be both
more visual than verbal in their perception and recollection of symbols as well
as capable of drawing meaning from a large array of phenomena not limited to
linguistic signs.237 Indeed, the dissenting voices would endorse the view that, in
the modern landscape of globalized markets and sophisticated digital networks,
broader societal and cultural developments are precipitating the demise of
linguistic communications as “[s]ociety is becoming more visual and less
lexical.”238 The immediate effect of this “detextualization of society” has been
to enhance the trademark significance of product design configurations for
global consumers in global markets as a way to circumvent linguistic and
cultural differences. Therefore, broader assumptions about consumer habits that
ignore new visual realities threaten to “divorce trademark protection from the
market realities that warrant its existence.”239

233

See generally supra note 115.
Annette Kur, Harmonisation of the Trademark Laws in Europe: An Overview, 28 INT’L REV. INDUS.
& COPYRIGHT L. 1, 20 n.119 (1997); Lutz Schmidt, Definition of a Trade Mark by the European Trade Marks
Regime–A Theoretical Exercise?, 30 INT’L REV. INDUS. & COPYRIGHT L. 738, 750 (1999); Andrew Griffiths,
Modernising Trade Mark Law and Promoting Economic Efficacy: An Evaluation of the Baby-Dry Judgment and
Its Aftermath, 2003 INTELL. PROP. Q. 1, 7 (suggesting why, in practice, consumers might be unlikely to perceive
a proposed mark, such as shape or color, as a trademark.).
235
Danny Friedmann, The Bottle is the Message: Only the Distinctive Serve as 3D Community Trade
Marks, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. LAW & PRAC. 35, 39 (2015).
236
Robert Burrell & Huw Beverly-Smith, Shaving the Trade Marks Directive Down to Size?, 4 MODERN
L. REV. 570, 579 (2000); see also Annette Kur, Fundamental Concerns in the Harmonisation of (European)
Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 151, 164
(Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis eds., 2008) (“Until now, the [CJEU’s] assertations concerning the way in
which ‘unconventional’ forms of signs are perceived by consumers have not been underpinned by empirical
evidence.”).
237
See Annette Kur, supra note 236, at 164.
238
Graeme Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Telological Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L.
REV. 611, 615 (1999); see also Michael Murray, Leaping Language and Cultural Barriers with Visual Legal
Rhetoric, 49 U. SAN FRANCISCO L. REV. F. 61, 68 (2015) (“Cognitive studies and brain science continually
demonstrate the advantages of speed and efficiency of visual rhetorical elements over purely verbal
communication.”).
239
Dinwoodie, supra note 238, at 644; see also Dinwoodie, supra note 84, at 558 (“In the modern
marketplace … consumers do often base purchasing decisions on visual communication, which may flow equally
from the shape of the product itself as from supplementary identifying decoration.”).
234
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The dissenting voices also claim that “there is an element of circularity in
attempting to assess what consumers understand by particular indicia, since their
understanding will be determined in part by what we allow to be protected as a
trademark.”240 Even prominent national judges, writing ex-judicially, have
publicly endorsed these criticisms, arguing that it is time the law adopted a less
restrictive approach towards the legal recognition of the appearance of goods as
trademarks because, by liberalizing the protection of 3D marks, consumers will
then become accustomed to treating such marks as source-identifiers and in time
consumer associations will become more settled.241 In turn, expanded protection
for product get-up marks is also likely to encourage manufacturers to conceive
and develop source-indicating product design in markets where verbal labels
may have limited informational value.242 This could then enhance market
information and reduce consumer search costs as postulated by the economic
account of trademark law.243 There are, however, several problematic
assumptions in these dissenting opinions.
First, while it is true that the CJEU’s normative presumption generalizes
about consumer habits and desires without offering empirically verified support,
it does not necessarily mean there is no empirical basis for such a rule. By
examining insights from cognitive science about how consumers react to
configurations generally, some commentators have observed that “the law has
intuitively adopted a host of cognitive principles.”244 For instance, one of these
principles is that objects carried in memory are typically organized into
categories with prototypes, not as specific items or brands.245 “Different shapes
may thus be variously pleasing, but they are not typically treated as having a
special significance apart from their psychological category.”246 Shapes
generally indicate categories of goods, not brands. The law has therefore rightly
240
Robert Burrell & Michael Hendler, Making Sense of Trade Mark Law, 2003 INTELL. PROP. Q. 388,
399, n.69; Keeling, supra note 148, at 142, n.33; Burrell & Beverly-Smith, supra note 232, at 579.
241
Eike Ullmann, Absolute Grounds for Refusal: Three-Dimensional Marks the Shape of Goods as a
Trade Mark – Illusion or Opportunity? (Apr. 23. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://euipo.
europa.eu/en/office/ejs/pdf/Ullmann%20TR%20EN%20Revised.pdf; see also Burrell & Beverly-Smith, supra
note 232, at 579.
242
Dinwoodie, supra note 84, at 558–60 (explaining several reasons why producers may seek to use
product designs rather than verbal labels as source-identifiers).
243
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. &
ECON. 265 (1987)
244
Jerre B. Swann & Michael J. Tarr, Configuration Protection Harmonised, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1182,
1194 (2004) (outlining several cognitive principles about consumer perception of objects that have somehow
made their way into legal analysis).
245
Id.
246
Id. at 1193.
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assumed that consumers will instinctively resort to a label to ascertain a
product’s origin.247 Though these observations relate to U.S. law, a general
exclusion of consumer predisposition exists to equate product design and colors
with the source without being educated first,248 though they remain equally
pertinent to European law.
Second, the empirical rule is also sensitive to the fact that consumer
expectations and habits are not static but are constantly evolving. Discrete
developments in EU case law clearly demonstrate that under this rule there is no
blind assumption that consumers are, in principle, indifferent to the shape as an
indication of origin of the product.249 For instance, EU trademark law has not
foreclosed individualized scrutiny of its consumer generalizations, allowing the
possibility that contextual circumstances may exist to conclude that, at least in a
specific market, consumer purchasing habits are indeed different in the sense of
being guided by the look of products or services.250 Third, the argument that
consumer habits and expectations of what is source-indicating depends largely
on what the law allows to be registered as a trademark has been rightly dismissed

247

Id.; see also Jerre B. Swann, The Configuration Quagmire: Is Protection Anticompetitive or Beneficial
to Consumers and the Need to Synthesise Extremes?, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 253, 259 (1997) (“[C]osts and
commercial considerations may dictate … that many products look alike….”).
248
Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000). For a critical comment of the decision,
see Graeme Dinwoodie, The Seventh Annual Honourable Helen Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in Intellectual
Property Law: The Trademark Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 196–
99 (2004) (arguing that the normative exclusion of consumer predisposition reflects an anti-competitive concern
that is usually addressed in functionality analysis, not distinctiveness).
249
See infra Part IV. A.2.
250
Case C-546/10 P, Wilfer v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-574, ¶ 55. The applicant argued that where a practice
exists whereby certain unconventional marks are customarily used as a means of identification for special
products and the public is now accustomed to perceiving as trademarks signs other than word marks, only a
minimum degree of distinctiveness is required and the “departs significantly” case law does not apply as this is
limited to mass products. In rejecting this argument, the CJEU stated that “on the contrary, it follows from that
case law that, if the appearance of the goods in a given sector, or that of a component of those goods, serves to
indicate the manufacturer [as the claimant argued regarding the headstock of a guitar], it is only because the
appearance of a sufficient number of those goods or of their components differs significantly from the norm or
customs of that sector.” (my own translation) See also Louis Vuitton Malleiter, ECLI:EU:T:2015:214, ¶ 34; Case
T-63/15, Shoe Branding Eur. v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2015:972, ¶ 28 (Dec. 15, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=172987&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=5413037; Case T-410/10, Bottega Veneta Int’l S.a.r.l. v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2013:149, ¶ 63 (Mar. 22,
2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=135522&pageIndex=0&doclang=
FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5414176 (handbags in the fashion sector); Case T-376/10, V.
Fraas GmbH v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:2012:185, ¶ 64 (Apr. 18, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=122283&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=54
14384 (tartan pattern in dark grey, light grey, black, beige, dark red, and light red); Case T-358/04, Georg
Neumann GmbH v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. I-263, ¶ 45.
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as “put[ting] the cart firmly before the horse.”251 More fundamentally, this
argument implicitly touches upon a significant normative debate about the
proper way of rationalizing the intrinsic nature and role of trademark protection,
namely, “should trademark law be structured reactively to protect whatever
consumer understanding (or business goodwill) develops? Or, should it
proactively seek to shape the ways in which consumers shop and producers sell
or acquire rights, thus shaping how the economy functions?”252
This proactive-reactive dilemma masks a crucial policy-making role for
courts in the sense that they may develop trademark law in a way that aims to
create social and commercial norms—rather than merely reflect them—which
inform the content of the principles by which the law is to be guided.253 These
normative choices are most acute in contested expansionisms such as product
design protection though courts frequently encounter similar choices in other
fast-evolving contexts as well. Thus, scholars concerned with the unreflective
expansion of trademark rights have decidedly favored the norms-creator role
which courts play in crafting rules that reflect an appropriate balancing of
competing values and interests.254 For some, the norms-creator role of European
law is apparent outside the registration context, particularly in the infringement
context over the Internet where the CJEU has sought to shape unsettled
consumer expectations and lawful advertising conduct in accordance with the
aims of undistorted competition underpinning the Common Market.255 In the
registration context therefore it is at least arguable that the CJEU has consciously
elevated the norms-creator role of European trademark law over reactive lawmaking by proactively construing the presumed responses of the average
consumer and, in the process, shaping the commercial choices of producers and
the way rival traders may compete in several contexts.

251

KERLY’S LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES, supra note 39, §§ 10–45.
Graeme Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State,
41 HOUSTON L. REV. 885, 962 (2004).
253
Id.
254
See Dinwoodie, supra note 252, at 922–23 (discussing the relevance of the territoriality principle in
globalized markets); Graeme Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Policies and Fair Use,
in TRADE MARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 368, 388 (Graeme
Dinwoodie & Mark Janis eds., 2008) (discussing expansive forms of infringement based upon consumer
confusion); Stacey Dogan & Mark Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet,
41 HOUSTON L. REV. 777, 783 (2008) (the regulation of commercial practices on the Internet that may implicate
consumer behavior and the potential liability of search engines and advertisers).
255
Jennifer Davis, Promoting the Public Interest and the European Trade Mark Directive: A
Contradictory Approach, 14 ERA FORUM 117, 124 (2013).
252
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In stating that without prior use it could prove more difficult to register signs
that coincide with the look of goods or services, the Court is implicitly seeking
to mold—rather than purely react to—desirable commercial practices and
attempting to influence producer behavior in encouraging traders to select
verbal/graphic labels over designs to identify source.256 Perhaps EU traders are
even being encouraged to opt for other forms of IP protection available such as
registered design rights.257 This normatively desirable competitive behavior is
then likely to influence and guide consumer behavior when making purchasing
decisions. Furthermore, even prominent scholars like Graeme Dinwoodie, who
are critical of judicial embedding of (unsupported) social generalizations about
consumer habits as a rule of law, do acknowledge that a normative presumption
similar to the one adopted by the CJEU “probably correlates generally with our
intuitions.”258 Indeed, Dinwoodie has recently conceded that this presumption is
not an unreasonable concern about “the greater anti-competitive effects
associated with protection for shape or color marks.”259
B. EU Case Law Prior to the Empirical Rule
As the previous discussion demonstrates, sound policy reasons exist for an
empirical rule that promotes the kind of consumer associations and business
goodwill that the law (not traders) deems socially desirable even though the
CJEU has never explicitly articulated those reasons. Such policy reasons are
easy to identify when we closely examine the embryonic stages of EU case law
operating under the uncritical acceptance that average consumers are in the
visual habit of choosing products on the basis of their color or appearance
disregarding textual/graphical indicia. In this period, European tribunals tended
to equate mere abstract arbitrariness with inherent distinctiveness by requiring
product get-up marks simply to display a particular character or striking
individuality so as to be easily impressed on the mind.260 That is, abstract criteria
256
Dinwoodie, supra note 248, at 209 (arguing the same message was sent to U.S. producers in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart).
257
This view is explicitly espoused by AG Colomer in supporting the CJEU’s broader interpretation of
the shape exclusions under TMD Article 3(1)(e) and EUTMR Article 7(1)(e) in order to preserve the paramount
concern against unjustified market advantages. See Joined Cases C-53/01 to C-55/01, Linde AG, AG Opinion,
2002 E.C.R. I-3164, ¶ 29.
258
Graeme Dinwoodie, Trademark Law and Social Norms (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), in
Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 98 TRADEMARK
REP. 1086, 1092 n.29 (2008).
259
Graeme Dinwoodie & Dev Saif Gangjee, The Image of the Consume in EU Trade Mark Law, in THE
IMAGES OF THE CONSUMER IN EU LAW 354 (Dorota Leczykiewickz & Stephen Weatherhill eds., 2016).
260
Case R-199/1998-2, Kellogg Co., ¶ 14 (2d Bd. App. Mar. 26, 1999) (unreported) (shape of a biscuit);
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such as being so original as to stand out and be outside the context of what was
customary in the trade.261 Under this “unusualness” test, there was seldom any
investigation into the typical market practices by which consumers were mainly
guided in their purchasing choices.262 Formal criteria such as originality and eyecatchiness were deemed sufficient to hold consumers’ attention, thereby
automatically rendering product design source-identifying and eligible for
registration.263
More crucially, to the extent that there was seldom any consideration for the
possibility of consumers being attracted purely by the ornamental or functional
aspects of the product shape/design, the unusualness test contained no rational
limits upon the subject-matter that could be registered as a mark.264 Indeed, in
contrast to the cautious position adopted from the outset in some Member
States,265 the Appeal Boards simply adopted the principle that “[t]here is no
empirical rule that the three-dimensional reproduction of a product cannot be
Case R-139/1999-1, Eckes-Granini GmbH, ¶ 9 (1st Bd. App. Aug. 4, 1999) (unreported) (Granini Flasche); Case
R-205/1998-2, GenossenschaftDeutscherBrunnenEg, ¶ 27 (2d Bd. App. Nov. 17, 1999) (unreported)
(Brunneneinheitsflasche); Case R-337/2001-1 Benson Holdings, ¶ 9 (1st Bd. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (unreported)
(feeding bottle).
261
See generally id.
262
Id.
263
Id.
264
The most mundane features of product design were considered source-identifying simply on the basis
of their arbitrariness or novelty. See Case R-82/1999-1, Warman Int., ¶ 13 (1st Bd. App. Dec. 21, 1999)
(unreported) (configuration of a pump with ribbings); Case R-608/1999-3, Jockey Int. Inc. (May 19, 2000)
(inverted Y design on underpants); Case R-171/1998-2, Leng-D’Or S.A. (June 6, 2000) (shape of a snack); Case
R-145/1999, Profilpas s.n.c., (July 17, 2000) (metal profile); Case R-753/1999-1, Premonex Consulting Ltd.
(Jan. 17, 2001) (shape of a container with two openings at the top and sprandrel-like walls); Case R-275/20001, Novo Nordisk A/S (Sept. 22, 2000) (shape of a dispenser); Case R-449/1999-2, Corning Inc., (Mar. 21, 2001)
(five raised ribs depicted on contact lenses); Case R-321/2000-3, Jose Cuervo, S.A. DE C.V. (Apr. 4, 2001)
(glass bottle with striations in the glass giving the impression of two bottles); Case R-476/2001-3, Eurocos
Cosmetic GmbH (Aug. 7, 2001) (perfume bottle with wavy vertical sides and bubbles within the glass of the
front of the bottle); Case R-694/1999-1, Parker Pen Prods. (June 3, 2002) (shape of a pen clicker); Case R1174/2000-1, Celli Spa (Jan. 15, 2002) (cobra shape of a pump for beer); Case R-245/2000-1, Boehringer
Ingelheim Int’l GmbH (Jan. 17, 2002) (top part of an inhaler); Case R-320/2000-2, ASTA Medica
Aktiengesellschaft (Feb. 8, 2002) (shape of a dry-powder inhaler). There were obviously some notable examples
where the product design was considered ordinary, commonplace or simply likely to be seen as purely functional
or ornamental. See Case R-558/2000-1, Sorgenti Monte Bianco-Terme di Courmayeur Spa, (Oct. 26, 2001)
(shape of a plastic bottle with grooves); Case R-36/2000-1, Parker Pen Prods. (June 3, 2002) (shape of a pen
clicker); Case R-490/2001-3, G.D. Searle & Co. (June 19, 2002) (shape of a pharmaceutical pill); Case
R-421/2002-1, Rocchetta S.p.A. (Nov. 15, 2002) (shape of a bottle ribbing); Case R-942/2002-2, Pret A Manger,
(Eur.) Ltd. (Aug. 4, 2003) (bottle with ridges on the upper and lower part).
265
Wickes Plc’s Trade Mark Application [1998] RPC 698, 706 (EWCA); Case O/334/00, In re
ReemtsmaCigarettenfabriken GmbH, (Sept. 7, 2000); Colgate-Palmolive Co.’s Trade Mark Application, [2001]
RPC 26, 523, 540 (EWCA); P&G’s TM Application, [1998] RPC 710, 714; Glaxo’s TM, [2001] E.T.M.R. 9,
96, 106, ¶ 31.
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capable of serving as an indication of its commercial origin.”266 The Boards
simply assumed there was no apparent basis for doubting that the target
consumers would not acknowledge an outstanding and strikingly unusual shape,
in comparison with a typical shape existing on the market, as an indication of
business origin.267
The questionable belief that an arbitrary shape would be necessarily taken
by the public as a badge of origin gave the (wrong) impression that the
conditions for design protection and the general criterion of trademark
distinctiveness were interchangeable or largely assimilated without any
consideration for the undesirable social costs of this approach.268 To address this
problem, isolated Board decisions began to impose a “high level of
distinctiveness” for the registration of shapes consisting of ordinary everyday
goods.269 Some national courts even imposed a “capricious addition” test (i.e., a
nonfunctional embellishment) upon shapes as a means of assessing whether they
were capable of distinguishing.270 This discriminatory treatment was short-lived,
however. It was in this context that the CJEU categorically rejected imposing
different distinctiveness thresholds for different categories of mark.271 It
therefore endorsed a single distinctiveness test for all marks. Nonetheless, the
Court had to find an analytical tool that properly acknowledged and addressed
the plain fact that certain nontraditional signs such as shapes, packaging and
slogans have characteristics and a specific nature different from other more
conventional signs such as word marks. As discussed in the previous section,
this doctrinal recognition of certain signs having an innate disability from a
266
Case R-104/1999-3, Hans Grohe GmbH (3d Bd. App. Oct. 28, 1999) (2001) 6 IIC 679, 681, ¶ 17 (shape
of a jet regulator for water taps); see also Case R-70/1999-3, Henkel KGaA (Sept. 21, 1999); Case R-607/19993, Henkel KGaA (July 5, 2000) (demonstrating an unsuccessful application to register the shape of a plastic
bottle for washing-up liquid); Case R-205/1998-2, GenossenschaftDeutscherBrunnenEg, ¶ 25 (2d Bd. App.
Nov. 17, 1999) (unreported) (Brunneneinheitsflasche).
267
Case R-164/1998-1, Valeria Roncato S.p.A., ¶ 12 (1st Bd. App. Apr. 12, 1999) (unreported)
(representation of a metal buckle for handbags, suitcases, etc.).
268
Some isolated OHIM decisions did highlight the importance of this distinction between the
distinctiveness standard and that of design protection. See Case R-466/1999-3, Tokai Europe GmbH, ¶ 26
(3d Bd. App. Oct. 18, 2000) (unreported) (shape of a lighter).
269
Case R-55/1998-2, British Petroleum Co Plc’s Application, (2d Bd. App. OHIM) [1999] E.T.M.R. 282,
¶¶ 24–25; Case R-60/1998-2, British Petroleum Co Plc’s Application, ¶¶ 24–25 (2d Bd. App. Dec. 17, 1998)
(unreported); Case R-75/1999-3, Henkel KGaA, (Nov. 25, 1999); cf. Case R0436/1999-1, Unilever (Sept. 14,
2000).
270
Philips Elecs. NV v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd. [1999] EWCA (Civ) 23 [45] RPC 809 [818]
(Eng.); Bach & Bach Flower Remedies Trade Marks [2000] EWCA (Civ) 14 [34] RPC 513, 526 (Eng.) (applying
the capricious addition test to word marks).
271
Case C-299/99, Koninklijke Philips Elecs. NV v. Remington Consumer Prods. Ltd., 2002 E.C.R.
I-5509; Rado Uhren AG, 2003 E.C.R. I-3195, ¶ 46.
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source perspective eventually led to a more individualized, concrete
examination of all signs following specific empirical rules and normative
presumptions. Consumer perception of shapes having a function is explicitly
acknowledged in the very wording of former Article 3(1)(e) and Article 7(1)(e)
and these considerations remain pertinent outside of functionality, even if the
shape successfully escapes its strict wording.272
The negative effects of the unreflective approach adopted in the earlier case
law on inherent distinctiveness can still be seen today in more recent litigation
involving product trade dress marks. A case in point is Yoshida Metal’s
registrations over the shape of a knife as CMTs in 2001. The registrations were
successful solely on the basis of their “entirely arbitrary” dot patterns bearing
the handle of the knife without any appraisal of the trade practices or consumer
habits in the cutlery market, let alone any consideration for the marks’ potential
functionality under the functional signs exclusions.273 Though in 2014 the CJEU
reversed the refusal to cancel the registrations for being necessary to achieve a
technical result contrary to CTMR Article 7(1)(e)(ii),274 the litigation has so far
generated two additional decisions from the EGC275 and a further decision from
272

Case T-25/11, Germans Boada SA v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:T:2013:40, ¶ 41 (Jan. 29, 2013), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=133105&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&
occ=first&part=1&cid=5427001 (shape of a manual cutting-machine); Case T-383/15, Dima Verwaltungs
GmbH v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:T:2016:257, ¶ 22 (Apr. 20, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=177642&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5427139
(shape of an open cubic box); Case T-326/15, Dima Verwaltungs GmbH v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:T:2016:255, ¶ 22
(Apr. 20, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=177641&pageIndex=
0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5427211 (shape of a box consisting of two open
cubes); Case T-171/12, Perri v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2014:817, ¶ 44 (Sept. 24, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157985&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=2649226 (shape of turnbuckle); Joined Cases T-253/09 & T-254/09, Wilo SE v. OHIM, 2010 E.C.R.
207, ¶ 27 (shape of a motor casing).
273
Case R-1070/2000-2, Yoshida Metal Indus. Co., ¶ 11 (2d Bd. App. Oct. 31, 2001) (unreported); Case
R-1085/2000-2, Yoshida Metal Indus. Co., ¶ 11 (2d Bd. App. Oct. 31, 2001) (unreported).
274
Pi-Design, ECLI:EU:C:2014:129 (reversing the EGC’s decision for limiting the functionality
assessment to the graphical representation of the marks instead of looking beyond this and into the actual use
made of the mark by the proprietor).
275
Joined Cases T-331/10 RENV & T-416/10 RENV, Yoshida Metal Indus. Co. v. OHIM
ECLI:EU:T:2015:302 (May 21, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
164339&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5428835
(confirming
the
functionality of the dot patterns appearing on the knife handles); Case T-331/10, Yoshida Metal Indus. Co. v.
OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2012:220 (May 8, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&
docid=122561&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5429245;
Case
T416/10, ECLI:EU:T:2012:222 (May 8, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid
=122565&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5429411
(reversing
the
Board’s decisions to cancel the CTMs for relying on “reverse engineering” to find out what the marks really
presented in its functionality assessment).
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the CJEU.276 In its latest pronouncement in 2017, the CJEU confirmed the
“particular strictness” of the legislative intention underpinning the functional
signs exclusion which applies provided all the essential characteristics of the
sign perform a technical function even when the shape has ornamental or
arbitrary aspects that may confer source significance.277 Choosing
distinctiveness over the preliminary functionality obstacle is a legacy issue that
leads to unnecessary litigation and waste of judicial resources.
Other notable examples of these negative effects are the successful
registrations of the HENKEL flasche,278 the PERRIER-VITTEL bottle279 and
the JEEP car grille.280 None of these decisions made any reference to the
empirical rule about consumer habits and merely assumed the existence of
settled consumer predisposition to equate shape with origin on the basis of
manufacturers’ long-standing efforts to use the technical necessity for packaging
as a means of attracting the public’s attention to their goods. These decisions
shifted the focus away from the presumed expectations of average consumers to
producer behavior. Applicants281 and commentators282 continue to cite these
registrations as unquestionable illustrations of the right approach that supports a
liberal view of registrability. However, these EGC decisions are arguably no
longer good law because, apart from omitting any reference to the normative
presumption of consumer habits, they also relied upon a minimalist threshold of
distinctiveness contrary to the CJEU’s Henkel Perwoll Bottle ruling.283 It
follows from that ruling that the presumed expectations of the average consumer
remain a decisive factor in distinctiveness assessments.284 Individualized and
276

Pi-Design, ECLI:EU:C:2014:129.
Case C-421/15, Yoshida Metal Indus. Co. v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:C:2017:360, ¶ 21 (May 11, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=190588&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5429879; Case C-421/15 P, Yoshida Metal Indus. Co. v. EUIPO,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:939, ¶ 65 (Dec. 8, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
186067&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5430071.
278
Case T-393/02, Henkel KGaA v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-4133, ¶¶ 48–49.
279
Case T-305/02, Nestlé Waters Fr. v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. II-5209.
280
Case T-128/01, DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. II-703 [hereinafter Jeep Car Grille].
281
Case C-238/06 P, Develey Holding GmbH v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. I-9739; Bongrain SA’s Trade Mark
Application [2005] 14 RPC 306 (EWCA) (appeal taken from Eng.) (applicant arguing case law supported the
“striking-and-unusual-is-enough” approach).
282
Friedmann, supra note 235; Guy Tritton, Distinctiveness and Acquired Distinctiveness: The Approach
and Territorial Aspects, 13 ERA FORUM 227, 230 (2012).
283
Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737; see also Peter Turner-Kerr, EU Intellectual Property:
Recent Case Developments, 2004 INTELL. PROP. Q. 448, 478 (noting that the holding of Nestlé Waters is
inconsistent with the holding of Henkel that a mere divergence from the norm was insufficient to exclude TMD
Article 3(1)(b)).
284
Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 49.
277
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contextualized evaluations of consumer reaction rather than abstract
assessments of a shape’s striking features undermine the departs significantly
criterion, which rests upon a strong presumption against consumer
predisposition to product shapes. Had this empirical rule been applied, these
EGC decisions would most likely have reached a different outcome.
III. REVISITING THE “DEPART SIGNIFICANTLY” CRITERION
A. Demystifying Common Misunderstandings
Some pre-Henkel Perwoll Bottle decisions clearly had a sense that in the
relevant market consumers would be unlikely to show any pre-disposition to
treating product get-up marks as an indication of origin, but tribunals struggled
to articulate the reasons.285 The empirical rule about presumed consumer
responses adopted in Henkel Perwoll Bottle provided a more rational basis for
predicting the inherent ability of unused shapes to indicate origin, and, according
to some commentators, was grounded upon a blend of normative and empirical
characterizations of the average consumer within a more contextual analysis.286
The rule’s normative and empirical blend is a central aspect of the departs
significantly criterion. Under this criterion, “the sole decisive factor” is whether
any nonverbal mark allows the relevant consumer to identify and distinguish the
origin of goods or services on the market.287 In the case of 3D marks, the sign
may potentially catch consumers’ attention as a result of being new,
uncustomary, or strikingly unusual, but its trademark significance is not a fait
accompli.

285
Case R-354/1999-2, Black & Decker Corp., ¶ 13 (2d Bd. App. May 23, 2001) (unreported); Case
R-335/2003-2, Les Grands Chais de France S.A., ¶ 16 (3d Bd. App. June 28, 2000) (unreported); Case
R-446/1999-3, Tokai Europe GmbH, ¶ 30 (3d Bd. App. Oct. 18, 2001) (unreported).
286
Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 259, at 353.
287
The impact upon the target public is an essential part of the distinctiveness assessment under TMD
Article 3(1)(b) (or the equivalent CMTR Article 7(1)(b)). See Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke
A/S, ECLI:EU:C:2014:322 (May 14, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
152243; Case T-806/14, August Storck KG v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:T:2016:284 (May 10, 2016),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=177962&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5432775 aff’d August Storck KG v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:C:2017:340 (May 4,
2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=190340&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5433264; Case T-70/14, Melt Water v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2015:9
(Jan. 14, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=161378&pageIndex=0&
doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5433400; Case C-25/05 P, August Storck v. OHIM,
2006 E.C.R. I-5719 (opining that perception of three-dimensional pictures varies from perception of other
marks); Case C-173/04 P, Deutsche SiSi-Werke GmbH v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-568.
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As the earlier cases demonstrate, to focus solely on the extent to which the
get-up mark deviates from existing or obvious forms in order to predict its
eligibility for protection erroneously collapses the “departs significantly”
inquiry into a single question, namely the extent to which it breaks new ground
amongst products of that type. This single-question approach conveniently bypasses any contextual and normative evaluations into likely consumer
reactions.288 From a policy perspective, this would yield the undesirable result
of turning every novel and arbitrary design into a perpetual trademark monopoly
without important policy-levers such as designer freedom that prevents the
scope of design protection from hampering follow-on innovation.289 Design
registration could thus become pointless. From a doctrinal perspective, focusing
solely on the extent to which the get-up mark differs from what is customary in
the sector simply obviates the need for the consumer as an important vehicle for
accommodating normative goals and setting desirable boundaries. 290
The (presumed) absence of consumer predisposition to equate certain signs
with source-identifiers is therefore a (rebuttable) normative presumption that the
CJEU created to safeguard against turning trademark registration into a registry
for perpetual monopolies in designs. Without it, any arbitrary, unusual, or eyecatching product shape would be entitled to registration as a trademark.291 This
is effectively a proxy for novelty or individual character criteria, not
distinctiveness. Though the CJEU has never provided any scientific support for
this normative presumption, there is in fact some compelling basis for it.292
Moreover, the presumption rests upon other logical observations of how
consumers react to product design generally. As a practical matter, average
consumers are aware that there are good technical or aesthetic reasons why an
article may have a particular shape. Thus, the primary message conveyed by the
shape may be of a technical or ornamental nature (or both) and with no a priori

288
For an example of this questionable approach to the distinctiveness evaluation business trade dress
marks, see César J. Ramírez-Montes, Trademarking the Look and Feel of Business Environments in Europe,
25 COLUMB. J. EU L. 75, 112–13.
289
Council Regulation 6/2002, art. 10, of Dec. 12, 2001 on Community Designs, 2001 O.J. (L 3) 1, 5
(EC); see also Dyson Ltd. v. Vax Ltd. [2010] EWHC (Pat) 1923 [34] (Eng.) (outlining several factors that may
constrain designer freedom in assessing the proper scope of registered design protection), aff’d [2011] EWCA
(Civ) 1206; Case T-9/07, Grupo Promer Mon Graphic, SA v. OHIM, 2010 E.C.R. II-981, aff’d Case C-281/10 P,
Grupo Promer Mon Graphic, SA v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-10178.
290
Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 259, 345–46.
291
Unilever PLC’s Trademark Applications [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2709, [2003] RPC 35 [28] (Eng.) (Jacob,
J., explaining the Vienetta trademark on ice-cream cones and expressing concern over such a common shape
being classified as distinct for trademark purposes).
292
See supra Part II.A.
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reason why consumers should care that a shape is being used for the additional
purpose of indicating the commercial origin of the goods.293 Common sense
dictates that not every sign or design affixed by traders to their goods or services
will necessarily have a trademark impact on potential consumers. Similarly,
unlike most word marks, there may be a finite number of appearances which a
product may take given its intended purpose and the expectations of potential
consumers.294 Thus, there is a risk of “design depletion” as shapes cannot be
indefinitely dissimilar and still be recognized.295 As discussed, depletion public
interest is specifically recognized to preserve the availability of abstract colors
but does not extend to distinctiveness assessments of other signs in limited
supply such as shapes.296 These legitimate concerns are more appropriately
addressed under functionality, not distinctiveness.297 Nevertheless, the departs
significantly criterion arguably addresses shape depletion concerns in its own
limited way. The criterion attempts to prevent the easy monopolization of basic
or obvious forms of product design that, while not entirely functional, are
unlikely to be treated as source-identifiers according to the presumed
expectations of consumers.298
Those who criticize the test for imposing an exceedingly high threshold of
distinctiveness upon product get-up marks simply pay insufficient attention to
the inadequacies of applying the traditional analytical rules for measuring the
distinctiveness of word marks.299 Indeed, there is a recognition that the
nondistinctiveness objections to registration “were not formulated with a view
to unusual forms of signs such as product shapes, and are therefore not easy to
apply.”300 Whereas the potential distinguishing capacity of a word mark is

293
Betafence Ltd. v. Registrar of Trademarks, [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1353, [15] (Eng.); see also Dinwoodie,
supra note 87, at 207 (acknowledging that Justice Scalia in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Wal-Mart case relied upon
his own empirical observations to deny that product design could ever be inherently distinctive).
294
Case R-321/2000-3, Jose Cuervo, S.A. DE C.V., ¶ 17 (3d Bd. App. Apr. 4, 2001) (unreported); Case
R-476/2001-3, Eurocos Cosmetic GmbH, ¶ 19 (3d Bd. App. Aug. 7, 2001) (unreported) (noting there is not an
unlimited range of shape for goods and packaging).
295
Bongrain SA’s Trade Mark Application [2005] RPC 306 (Civ) [24] (Eng.) (stating that the “depletion”
public interest recognized in color marks by the CJEU may also apply to shape marks in the EU); see also FunDamental Too v. Gemmy Indus. Corp., 111 F.3d 993, 1001 (2d Cir. 1997) (recognizing design depletion is a
public interest in U.S. law); Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1448 (3d Cir. 1994).
296
See supra Part I.D.
297
GRAEME DINWOODIE & MARK JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND POLICY 159
(4th ed. Wolters Kluwe, NY, 2014).
298
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 264.
299
See, e.g., Jochen Pagenberg, Trade Dress and I Three-Dimensional Mark–The Neglected Children of
Trademark Law?, 7 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 831, 834 (2004).
300
The Study, supra note 52, at 70–71.
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generally analyzed by reference to the relationship between the semantic content
of the sign and the essential characteristics of the designated goods or
services,301 the same cannot be said about product shapes. In the case of product
shape marks, “the difference between the sign and the object which the sign
indicates is blurred in that the object becomes the sign in relation to itself.”302
Competition concerns are particularly implicated in this situation as trademark
registration is not intended to restrain competition in products themselves.303
Nor do critics appreciate that the general requirement of distinctiveness has been
under sustained pressure ever since applicants learned to circumvent the
draconian refusal under former Article 3(1)(e) and Article 7(1)(e) by focusing
instead upon the highly unusual or unique character of their shape marks as a
proxy for their origin-indicating character.304 In doing so, applicants divert the
tribunal’s attention away from an examination under the “preliminary obstacle”
of functionality.305 Such a judicial approach was considered preferable as
registration remains available upon proof acquired secondary meaning.306 It is
thus unsurprising that this sympathetic interpretation of the refusal grounds
towards applicants has generated far more case law around distinctiveness than
around the specific provisions regarding product shape marks.307

301
Case T-230/05, Golf USA, Inc. v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. II-0023; Case T-289/02, Telepharmacy Sols.
Inc. v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. II-2851.
302
Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, Judgment, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2233 (Sept. 18,
2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157848&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN
&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9069977; see also Betafence Ltd. v. Registrar of Trademarks [2005]
EWHC (Ch) 1353 [16] (Eng.).
303
See Annette Kur, Strategic Branding: Does Trademark Law Provide for Sufficient Self Help and SelfHealing Forces?, 18 (Max Planck Inst. for Intell. Prop., Competition & Tax L. Res., Paper No. 08-03, 2007);
Knaak et al., supra note 79, at 70.
304
See supra, Part I, C-1.
305
Firth, supra note 148, at 89–92; see also Arnaud Folliard-Monguiral & David Rogers, Significant Case
Law from 2004 on the Community Trademark from the Court of First Instance, the European Court of Justice,
and OHIM, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 133, 136 (2005) (observing that the ground for refusing the registration
of functional shapes in Article 7(1)(e)(ii) has rarely been raised before OHIM); Case C-371/06, Benetton Grp.
SpA v. G-Star Int’l BV, 2007 E.C.R. I-7711 (confirming that the third indent of functional shapes in CTMR
Article 7(1)(e)(iii) that excludes shapes that render the product’s appearance attractive is also a preliminary
obstacle which can apply even after the shape acquired source association in the mind of consumers).
306
See supra Part I.
307
For examples of this “sympathetic” view of distinctiveness resolving any doubts in favor of the
applicant, see Case R-799/2013-2, Absolut Co. Aktiebolag, ¶ 59 (2d Bd. App. Nov. 26, 2014), (unreported);
Case R-1206/2006-2, Coca-Cola Co., ¶ 18 (2d Bd. App. Dec. 22, 2006), (unreported); Case R-724/2006-2,
Doskocil Mfg. Co., ¶ 20 (2d Bd. App. Nov. 22, 2006), (unreported).
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1. Problematic Assumptions
The unarticulated theoretical basis of the depart significantly criterion has
also led to some confusion about its specific character and purpose. For instance,
a study by the Max Planck Institute (the Study) highlighted difficulties in
ascertaining the difference between the criterion and the individual character for
design protection and whether the difference is merely one of degree.308 It
argued that the criterion raises a serious paradox—namely that ambitious
designs that diverge significantly from standard forms in the sector are the only
way to overcome the nondistinctiveness ground and are likely to be seen as
particularly attractive products by consumers.309 For the same reason, ambitious
designs are likely to be permanently excluded as the aesthetically pleasing
qualities of a shape that add substantial value to the goods.310 An example of this
dilemma is Danish corporation Bang & Olufsen’s attempt to register its pencilshaped loudspeaker design as a Community Trade Mark (now called an “EU
Trade Mark”). In 2007, the loudspeaker was found to be truly arbitrary,
distancing itself from customary designs in the sector in a way which could not
be considered altogether common.311 The loudspeaker therefore departed so
significantly from other customary designs that the Board’s refusal was
reversed.312 In 2011, however, the loudspeaker design was once again refused
registration upon the ground that its “pure, slender, timeless sculpture” was “an
element which [would] be very important in the consumer’s choice,” rendering
the shape aesthetically functional in the sense of adding substantial value to the
goods in breach of CTMR Article 7(1)(e)(iii).313 The pencil-shaped design was
thus permanently barred from registration.314 Some commentators have
endorsed the Study’s views, decrying the alleged dilemma posed by the departs
significantly criterion.315 However, there are several reasons why I disagree with
these criticisms.

308

See Knaak et al., supra note 79, at 70–71.
See id. at 71–72.
310
See id.
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
Case T-508/08, Bang & Olufsen A/S v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. II-06975.
314
See id.
315
See generally Sara Balice, Tripp Trapp Case: The Court of Justice on 3D Trademarks, 37 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 807, 812 (2015). For an academic examination of the alleged paradox posed by the Bang & Olufsen
decision and a call for abolishing the exclusion of value-adding shapes, see Charles Gielen, Substantial Value
Rule: How It Came into Being and Why It Should Be Abolished, 3 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 164, 168 (2014).
309
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First, the fact that many packaging marks such as bottles have been refused
registration for lacking trademark significance even though they were bespoke
creations by art designers strongly suggests that the individual character and
distinctiveness tests are by no means interchangeable.316 While according to
informed professionals, the innovative character of these packaging designs
might have rendered them eligible for design protection and might even suggest
a significant divergence from the norm, their source-identifying capability
according to “presumed” expectations of consumers is far from self-evident. The
2007 Bang & Olufsen decision is symptomatic of the “striking and unusual”-issufficient-to-hold-consumer-attention approach that prevailed in the earlier
stages of European case law.317 While purporting to apply the departs
significantly criterion, the EGC simply collapsed the whole contextual analysis
into a single consideration about the aesthetic aspirations embodied in the “organ
pipe” shape of the loudspeaker.318 The EGC found the shape to be “truly
specific” and “a striking design which is remembered easily.”319 However, at no
point did the Court attempt to verify the actual impact of the striking features
upon hi-fi equipment consumers (who have no predisposition to shapes as
source-identifiers) and whether such consumers simply expect these products to
display an aesthetically striking design without attaching any source
significance.320 Nor did it attempt to find material circumstances to suggest that
a manufacturer’s practice exists in this market of differentiating origin of goods
by virtue of their arbitrary design with highly attentive consumers relying upon
this practice.321

316
See generally Case R-377/1999-1, Perrier Vittel Mgmt. et Technologie, ¶ 13 (1st Bd. App. July 25,
2000) (unreported); Case R-453/2001-2, Pi-Design AG, ¶¶ 21–22 (2d Bd. App. Nov. 4, 2002) (unreported); Case
R-241/2002-2, Guinness United Distillers & Vintners Amsterdam B.V., ¶ 12 (2d Bd. App. May 21, 2003)
(unreported); Case R-236/2003-2, Frischpack GmbH & Co. KG, ¶ 46 (2d Bd. App. Sept. 8, 2003) (unreported),
aff’d Case T-360/03, 2004 E.C.R. II-4099.
317
See supra Part II.B.
318
Case T-460/05, Bang & Olufsen A/S v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. II-4209.
319
Id. (“Even if the existence of specific or original characteristics does not constitute an essential
condition for registration, the fact remains that their presence may, on the other hand, confer the required degree
of distinctiveness on a Trademark.”).
320
Id.
321
In fact, the EGC cited with approval its own Jeep Car Grille, 2003 E.C.R. II-703, decision which, this
Article argues, is incompatible with the CJEU Henkel ruling. See Bang & Olufsen A/S, 2007 E.C.R. II-4209.
Furthermore, the decision is also difficult to reconcile with EGC’s own decision in Enercon as well as the
CJEU’s subsequent approval and endorsement of the Board’s finding that highly attentive consumers looking to
make a significant investment in the goods are likely to orient themselves by the producer’s name rather than by
mere design. See Case T-71/06, Enercon GmbH v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. II-156; Case C-20/08 P, Enercon GmbH
v. OHIM, 2008 E.C.R. I-179.
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Second, the departs significantly criterion is essentially underpinned by the
normative responses and expectations of the average consumer whereas the
value-adding shapes exclusion is grounded upon a broader range of
fundamentally objective facts, of which the consumer perception is a relevant
but not decisive factor.322 In Hauck, the CJEU did not endorse the Study’s view
that the question of whether a shape gives substantial value to the goods is
“essentially depend[ent] on the public’s apprehension, which involves
subjective evaluations.”323 Implicitly, it adopted the broader view of market
effects arising from registration in the AG’s opinion. According to that opinion,
objective circumstances must show that “the aesthetic characteristics of a shape
affect the attractiveness of the goods to such an extent that the reservation
thereof to a single undertaking would distort competition on the market
concerned.”324 Amongst these objective criteria, the dissimilarity of the shape
from other customary shapes on the market and the public perception are factors,
but neither are decisive.325
Third, and closely related, the 2011 Bang & Olufsen decision to refuse the
organ pipe design for increasing the appeal (i.e., the value) of the product is
hardly a paradigmatic example of any dilemma that ambitious designs face but
a clear example of legacy issues that this Article highlights.326 That is, a wellentrenched reluctance in the lower European tribunals first to ascertain whether
product shapes can overcome the preliminary functionality obstacle in CTMR
Article 7(1)(e) prior to any investigation into consumer associations, as the
CJEU has repeatedly stated.327 Indeed, in its 2007 decision, the EGC had
remarked that it clearly emerged from the Board’s assessment that the design
mark was “essentially dictated by aesthetic considerations.”328 This finding
should have prompted the Board to consider the potential application of the
322
See Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, AG Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2014:322
(May 14, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152243&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9069977.
323
Knaak et al., supra note 79, at 73.
324
Hauck GmbH & Co. KG, ECLI:EU:C:2014:322.
325
See id. (explaining that such objective criteria may involve “the nature of the category of goods under
consideration, the artistic value of the shape concerned, its dissimilarity from other shapes in common use on
the market concerned, a substantial price difference in relation to other competing products with similar
characteristics, and the development by the manufacturer of a promotion strategy emphasising principally the
aesthetic characteristics of the goods concerned”).
326
See supra Part I.E.
327
For a recent example, see Case C-215/14, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK Ltd.,
Judgment, ECLI:EU:C:2015:604 (Sept. 16, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&
docid=167821&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9071160.
328
Case T-460/05, Bang & Olufsen A/S v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. II-4209.
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ornamental shapes exclusion following the CJEU’s instructions to ensure a full
and stringent approach to the registration grounds. No such apparent dilemma
would exist had the design been first examined against functionality as the ab
initio exclusionary obstacle for shapes. Once a shape mark is objectively found
to be aesthetically functional regarding the economic effects of its registration
upon competition, it is wholly irrelevant how ambitious the designer might have
been in departing from adopted norms regarding the presumed expectation of
average consumers.329
Even when the initial examination proceeded upon the functional shapes
exclusions under CTMR Article 7(1)(e), EU tribunals tended to adopt a rather
narrow interpretation of this provision as the mere presence of “an additional
element,” however significant, was sufficient to render the provision
inapplicable.330 Moreover, the ambitious design dilemma identified in the Study
implies that the purpose of trademark law is to incentivize innovation or
creativity, which is certainly not the case. More troubling, what social value is
there when ambitious designers might not even bother to seek time-limited
design protection if they can use trademark law to obtain an indefinite
monopoly?
B. Is It Really Counter-Productive?
The empirical rule underpinning the depart significantly criterion has
recently come under further attack for being counterproductive. Dutch IP
professors Martin Senftleben and Lotte Anemaet both regard the rule as the
CJEU’s attempt to keep certain nontraditional signs in the public domain, but
they argue that it paradoxically encourages traders to invest heavily in marketing
efforts that aim to educate consumers to treat product get-up marks and colors
as source-identifiers.331 As more traders succeed in doing so and acquire
329

Kit-Kat Chocolate Bar, ECLI:EU:C:2015:604, ¶ 38.
This is clearly the approach adopted in the dishwashing tablet cases. See Case R-70/1999-3, Henkel
KGaA, ¶ 19 (3d Bd. App. Sept. 21, 1999), (unreported) (discussing red and white rectangular dish-washing
tablet), aff’d Case T-337/99, 2001 E.C.R. II-2601, and Joined Cases C-456 & C-457/01 P, Henkel Dishwashing
Tablets, 2004 E.C.R. I-5115; Case R-506/1999-1, Procter & Gamble Co. (1st Bd. App. Mar. 8, 2000)
(unreported) (examining “square tablet[s] with chamfered edges and beveled corners and with speckles and a
dark square depression in the centre of its upper surface”), aff’d Case T-128/00, 2001 E.C.R. II-2785; Case R508/1999-1, Procter & Gamble Co., ¶¶ 11–12 (1st Bd. App. Mar. 8, 2000) (unreported) (assessing “rectangular
tablet[s] with chamfered edges and slightly rounded corners and with speckles and a dark triangular depression
in the centre”), aff’d Case T-129/00, 2001 E.C.R. II-2793; see also Case R-217/1999-1, Westfälische
Fleischwarenfabrik Stockmeyer GmbH, ¶ 13 (1st Bd. App. Apr. 14, 2000) (unreported) (shape of mini-pizza
packaging).
331
Lotte Anemaet, The Public Domain Is Under Pressure–Why We Should Not Rely on Empirical Data
330
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registration on the basis of secondary meaning, the normative assumption that
there is no consumer predisposition to unconventional signs becomes harder to
sustain and simply loses credibility.332 According to Senftleben and Anemaet,
notwithstanding its laudable aim, the CJEU’s empirical rule actually results in
providing “dysfunctional incentives” for assiduous traders who are undeterred
because the option of securing registration following investment efforts remains
open.333 Senftleben argues that the CJEU should rethink its empirical rule334
while Anemaet goes even further than this. She champions a normative
exclusion of nontraditional marks from registration even in the presence of
acquired distinctiveness on the basis that empirical research demonstrates
conclusively that consumers do not actually experience more difficulties in
deriving origin from the shape or color of products as they do with traditional
marks.335 But these academic criticisms are problematic for several reasons.
First, it is puzzling to view the empirical rule as seeking to preserve as robust
a public domain as possible given that the structure of European law actually
allows for the registration of noninherently distinctive marks after successful
market use.336 Statutes must be interpreted in a way that avoids rendering
provisions superfluous; adopting the normative exclusion advocated by
Anemaet would inevitably have that effect. When the preservation of the public
domain is the central interest, the legislator has explicitly said so in the case of
a specific category of functional signs falling into Articles 4(1)(e) and 7(1)(e).

When Assessing Trademark Distinctiveness, 3 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 303, 309 (2016);
Martin Senftleben, Public Domain Preservation in EU Trademark Law–A Model for Other Regions?,
103 TRADEMARK REP. 775, 802 (2013). This academic argument against restricting protection for nonverbal
marks by referencing consumer expectations and market forces may also be found in earlier work by other
German scholars, who also argued that this is an easy barrier to overcome. See Kur, supra note 303, at 19–20.
332
See Kur, supra note 303, at 19–20.
333
Anemaet, supra note 331, at 320 (arguing that the possibility of acquiring distinctiveness through use
may be stimulating traders to invest heavily in non-traditional signs notwithstanding the CJEU’s assumption that
the distinctiveness bar is high enough to act as a deterrent); Senftleben, supra note 331, at 802. The empirical
rule about consumer habits may be encouraging merchants to develop marketing strategies to educate consumers.
Id.; see also Martin Senftleben, Free Signs and Free Use – How to Offer Room for Freedom of Expression
Within the Trademark System, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 354,
369–70 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015) (observing that the reliance on the prevention of consumer confusion as
a criterion for trademark protection rests on circular reasoning in the sense that, without the possibility of
acquiring trademark significance through use, there would less incentive for investment and the instances of
confusion less likely to arise).
334
Senftleben, supra note 331, at 802.
335
Anemaet, supra note 331, at 314–19. Complete exclusion from registration is contrary to international
law, as TRIPs Article 15 requires that all forms of signs capable of distinguishing goods or services must be
accepted for registration. See also Knaak et al., supra note 79, at 70.
336
See EUTMR, supra note 1, art.7(1)(3); TMD, supra note 1, art. 4(4).
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Functional signs are permanently excluded even in the presence of accumulated
consumer goodwill.337 Second, the possibility that consumers may become
accustomed to equating shape or color with commercial origin is a relevant
consideration for the acquisition of distinctiveness, not for the theoretical
prediction underpinning inherent distinctiveness. Settled case law acknowledges
this principle, which intuitively accords with Anemaet’s references to her
findings about empirical research.338 Third, the fact that it is clear that in a
particular sector there is a consumer habit of choosing certain products by
reference to their appearance or color due to other traders’ successful marketing
efforts affords no basis for concluding that registration must automatically
follow in all cases or that minimal distinctiveness may suffice. Indeed, case law
shows that, if the sector is one where there is consumer predisposition, inherent
distinctiveness is conceivable but does not automatically mean that any
proposed mark is intrinsically distinctive.339 Rather, the existence of those

337
For the equivalent exclusion in Article 7(1)(e) regulation, see Case C-421/15 P, Yoshida Metal Indus.
Co. v. EUIPO, Judgment, ECLI:EU:C:2017:360 (May 11, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=190588&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=907
1689; Case C-48/09 P, Lego Juris A/S v. OHIM, 2010 E.C.R. I-8403. See also Uma Suthersanen, The European
Court of Justice in Philips v. Remington–Trademarks and Market Freedom, 2003 INTELL. PROP. Q. 257, 274–
75.
338
Case T-88/00, Mag Instrument, Inc. v. OHIM, 2002 E.C.R. II-467, aff’d Case C-136/02 P, 2004 E.C.R.
I-9165; Case T-36/01, Glaverbel v. OHIM, 2002 E.C.R. II-3887, aff’d Case C-445/02 P, 2004 E.C.R. I-6267;
Joined Cases T-128 & T-129/00, Procter & Gamble Co. v. OHIM, 2001 E.C.R. II-2785, aff’d C-473 &
C-474/01P, 2004 E.C.R. I-5173; Case T-194/01, Unilever NV v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. II-383; Case T-337/99
Henkel KGaA v. OHIM, 2001 E.C.R. II-2597.
339
See, e.g., Case T-1/09, August Storck KG v. OHIM, 2010 E.C.R. II-297, aff’d Case C-96/11 P,
Judgment, ECLI:EU:C:2012:537 (Sept. 6, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F
&num=c-96/11&td=ALL (explaining how even if consumers of confectionary are already used to 3D marks
similar to the applicant’s and, in light of the plurality of forms available, consumers are equally in the habit of
equating certain forms with the commercial origin of the product, the General Court rightly held that what
matters is whether this particular mark has trademark significance); Case C-547/10 P, Wilfer v. OHIM,
2011 E.C.R. I-127; Case T-129/04, Develey Holding GmbH v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. II-811 (discussing that even
if there is a consumer habit of perceiving the packaging of everyday products as indication of their commercial
source, “that general conclusion does not mean that all packaging of such goods has the distinctive character
required for registration”), aff’d Case C-238/06 P, 2007 E.C.R. I-9375; see also Joined Cases T-359 & T-360/12,
Louis Vuitton Malletier v. OHIM, Judgment, ECLI:EU:T:2015:215 (Apr. 21, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?docid=163833&doclang=EN (“[T]he applicant’s argument that consumers are
accustomed to perceiving a pattern as an indication of the commercial origin of goods is irrelevant because the
fact that such signs are recognised as marks by consumers does not necessarily mean that they have an inherent
distinctive character.”), aff’d Joined Cases C-363 & 364/15 P, Louis Vuitton Malletier v. EUIPO, Order,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:595 (July 21, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
182442&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9073032 (appeals dismissed
without a decision); Case T-104/16, Puma SE v. EUIPO, Judgment, ECLI:EU:T:2017:153 (Mar. 9, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=188745&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9073132 (observing how even if there is a special practice in the sports
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branding practices and consumer habits is no more than an indication that it may
be possible for such shapes to acquire secondary meaning in the future or
through a significant marketing campaign. The mere fact that one product shape
is found to be source-identifying has never been a basis for arguing that the
design of all products of that type necessarily will be inherently indicative of
source.340
1. EU Functionality as the Proper Safeguard of Public Domain
There is, nevertheless, one salient point in these academic critiques.
Senftleben’s and Anemaet’s arguments regard the need to develop trademark
law in a way that preserves and promotes the public domain by permanently
excluding from registration descriptive, nontraditional, and culturally significant
signs without the possibility of ever acquiring secondary meaning.341 Their main
complaint is that the grounds for refusing registration contribute significantly to
the reservoir of signs available for common use supporting the public domain,
but that the current threshold for establishing inherent or acquired
distinctiveness is so easy to overcome that it is arguably no longer an appropriate
safeguard.342 The authors stake their claims even though the most
comprehensive review on the functioning of the EU trademark system called for
lowering the threshold for acquiring distinctiveness for shapes and colors to
ensure their registration as CTMs does not become “unrealistic.”343 However,
keeping culturally significant signs permanently in the public domain is the
industry which allows for the registration of slogans expressing an “attitude or lifestyle,” the mark “FOREVER
FASTER” was likely to be perceived only as a promotional formula). Even where a practice exists where
professionals and guitarists use the shape of certain components of the whole product as an indicator of the
product’s origin, i.e., the headstock of a guitar, those products are not excluded from the application of the case
law establishing the depart significantly test. Wilfer, 2011 E.C.R. I-127. That test is not limited to mass products,
nor does the practice imply that a minimum degree of distinctiveness suffices. Id. On the contrary, “if the
appearance of goods in a given sector, or that of a component of those goods, serves to indicate the manufacturer,
that is only because the appearance of a sufficient number of those goods or of their components differs
significantly from the norm or customs of that sector.” Id.
340
Case T-291/16, Anta (China) Co. v. EUIPO, Judgment, ECLI:EU:T:2017:253 (Apr. 5, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=189619&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9073203 (figurative mark representing two lines forming an acute angle for
sportswear); Case T-579/14, Birkenstock Sales GmbH v. EUIPO, Judgment, ECLI:EU:T:2016:650 (Nov. 9,
2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=185231&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&
mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9073384 (figurative mark of a wavy pattern for footwear). Other
scholars have implicitly rejected the academic view adopted by Anemaet and Senftleben. See Dinwoodie, supra
note 84, at 591.
341
See Anemaet, supra note 331; Senftleben, supra note 331.
342
See generally id.
343
Knaak et al., supra note 79, at 71.
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province of functionality, not distinctiveness. Here again we find the pernicious
effects of the legacy issues.344 A clear illustration is Lindt’s attempts to claim
exclusive rights over the 3D shape of a chocolate Easter bunny in a gold package
displaying a red ribbon and a little bell around its neck.
Lindt’s 2004 application was refused for being noninherently distinctive and
lacking secondary meaning.345 Upon examining the branding practices of the
confectionary sector and the perception of chocolate consumers, the Office
found that “bunnies are one of the wealth of shapes of chocolate products,
particularly around the Easter period.”346 Lindt’s sitting bunny was thus one of
the typical shapes for Easter, with each of its features and overall combination
being nothing more than a customary shape corresponding to the norms and
customs of the sector. Given the direct link between bunnies and Easter, the
features were essential and traditional embellishments that European consumers
would expect to see in Easter bunnies.347 This opened up the possibility that
Lindt was seeking to monopolize functional characteristics of the shape that
consumers would look for in competitors Easter bunnies. Instead of applying
functionality’s protective barrier as a preliminary obstacle, both the EGC and
CJEU focused solely on the customary and noninherently distinctive character
of the shape, affirming the refusal for failing to depart significantly from the
norm.348 However, it was not until 2017 that, in considering Lindt’s second
registration attempt, the Grand Board of Appeal at EUIPO held that “the Easter
bunny is part of the folklore surrounding Easter” and the proposed shape is “in
itself the essential element which determines the value of the chocolate
goods.”349 Consumers are unlikely to purchase Easter bunnies that do not have
traditional features of gifts for children. Thus, the shape and appearance
represent a decisive purchasing criterion for consumers and an essential element
in Lindt’s marketing strategy.350 The Grand Board confirmed the central role of
functionality in preserving culturally significant signs by stating that
Article 7(1)(e)(iii) prevents the registration of design features that correspond to
344

See supra Part I.E.
Case R-1332/2005-4, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG (4th Bd. App. June 11, 2008)
(unreported).
346
Id. ¶ 43.
347
Id. ¶ 53.
348
Case C-98/11 P, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG v. OHIM, Judgment, ECLI:EU:C:2012:307
(May 24, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=123102&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9073586.
349
Case R-2450/2011, G Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG (July 7, 2017, Grand Chamber,
unreported ¶¶ 37–38.
350
Id.
345
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“traditional aesthetic elements of Easter chocolate specialties.”351 It concluded
that Lindt “cannot attempt to monopolize Easter symbols, or extend indefinitely,
by virtue of trademark protection, design features of its chocolate bunnies, which
could, at most, be protected as part of a design, for a limited period of time.”352
Academic concerns about the market setting the limits for what will be
registered rather than the need to leave it free in the public interest have also
been raised by others.353 Both Senftleben and Anemaet largely base their
arguments on examples from German law. However, for a long time German
courts have applied a distinctiveness test which is arguably at variance with
CJEU interpretations.354 In its case law, the German Bundesgerichtshof (i.e., the
Federal Court of Justice) consistently adopts a questionable approach to
distinctiveness by treating “devoid of any distinctiveness” as requiring “a
351

Id. ¶ 40.
Id. ¶ 45.
353
Jennifer Davis has written extensively on the British idea developed in pre-Directive case law of the
“trade mark common” as a metaphor for a category of signs (including nondistinctive and descriptive signs)
which should remain free for others to use even in the presence of factual distinctiveness in the marketplace on
the basis that the public has a continuing (positive) right of access to such marks. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 255;
Jennifer Davis, Protecting the Common: Delineating a Public Domain in Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW
AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 117 (Graeme Dinwoodie & Mark Janis eds., 2008)
[hereinafter Davis, Protecting the Common]; Jennifer Davis, The Need to Leave Free for Others to Use and the
Trademarks Common, in TRADEMARK USE 29 (Jeremy Phillips & Ilanah Simon eds., 2005) [hereinafter Davis,
The Need to Leave Free for Others]; Jennifer Davis, A European Constitution for IPRS? Competition,
Trademarks, and Culturally Significant Signs, 41 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1005, 1022 (2004) [hereinafter
Davis, A European Constitution for IPRS?]; Jennifer Davis, European Trademark Law and the Enclosure of the
Commons, 2002 INTELL. PROP. Q. 342, 367 [hereinafter Davis, Enclosure of the Commons]. But not everyone
supports importing public interest concerns into the interpretation of the grounds for refusing registration. See
Jeremy Phillips, Trademark Law and the Need to Keep Free, 36 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L.
389, 393 (2005). However, in framing her arguments against the market-led approach that arguably underpins
the Directive, Davis omits any reference to the CJEU’s rule regarding consumer expectations and perception
which, as Oberbank mandates, does not permit tribunals to rest the acquisition of distinctiveness solely upon
abstract figures and predetermined percentages relating to the degree of consumer recognition. But see Joined
Cases C-217/13 & C-218/13, Oberbank AG v. Deutscher Sparkaasen- und Giroverband eV, Judgment,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2012 (June 19, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
153812&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=843867.
354
Anemaet, supra note 331, at 313; Senftleben, supra note 331, at 803–04. In fact, Senftleben refers to
the German decisions regarding the registration of Marlene Dietrich’s portrait for several goods and services.
See Senftleben, supra note 331; Senftleben, supra note 333. In those cases, however, the German Federal Court
began its distinctiveness evaluation by stating that “[i]n principle, a generous standard is to be assumed, that is,
every distinction, however small, is sufficient to overcome the obstacle to protection.” Bundesgerichtshof [BGH]
[Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 31, 2010, I ZB 62/09, MEDIEN INTERNET UND RECHT [MIR] 1 (13), 2010 (Ger.);
see also BGH Apr. 24, 2008, I ZB 21/06, MIR 1 (18), 2010 (“When assessing the distinctive character, the basis
is to start from a generous scale.”). Other German commentators appear completely unfazed by the misguided
view of distinctiveness. See Birgit Clark, Hooray for Hollywood? (No) Trademark Protection for Marlene
Dietrich’s Image, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 314, 315 (2009).
352
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generous measure” in the sense that “any distinctiveness, however slight,
suffices to overcome this ground for refusal …”355 Under this generous measure,
any sign could overcome the protective barriers underpinning the absolute
grounds and secure registration even if it has only a minimal level of
distinctiveness.356 Following the CJEU’s principle that the same assessment of
inherent distinctiveness should apply to secondary meaning acquired through
use, the German courts set an equally low threshold to overcome what the CJEU
has described as a “major exception”357 under former Article 3(3).
It would seem the German interpretation of this fundamental requirement is
grounded on an outdated, abandoned view of distinctiveness such as the one
adopted in Baby-Dry. However, Baby-Dry is generally criticized for
representing “the high water mark afforded to minimally distinctive signs”358
and dispensing with the overriding public interest objective of keeping certain
signs free “in favour of an apparent presumption of registrability.”359 It is clear
that the CJEU has subsequently departed from Baby-Dry in significant ways.360
Indeed, in Deichmann the CJEU flatly rejected the appellant’s argument based
upon settled case law of the German courts according to which, in contrast to
the element of potentiality underlying descriptiveness, the statutory wording of
the nondistinctiveness ground did not permit refusal unless the mark was found
355
BGH May 22, 2014, IIC 263, 264; BGH Feb. 19, 2014, IIC; BGH Apr. 27, 2006, IIC 867 (869); BGH
Dec. 4, 2003, IIC 967 (968); [2002] E.T.M.R. 456 (461) (Ger.) (reversing the refusal to register the shape of
a product because the correct standard of distinctiveness “must be generous, that is, any distinctiveness, be it
even of the weakest kind, will be sufficient to overcome the barrier to protection”).
356
Likoerflasche Trademark, [2002] E.T.M.R. 456 (461).
357
Windsurfing, 1999 E.C.R. I-2810, ¶ 45.
358
Davis, The Need to Leave Free for Others, supra note 353, at 41; see also Tim Pfeiffer, Descriptive
Trademarks: The Impact of the Baby-Dry Case Considered, 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 373, 377 (2002). By
adopting the modern view of trademarks advocated by applicant Procter & Gamble, Baby-Dry considerably
lowered the burden and threshold for the registrability of descriptive signs. Id.
359
Peter Turner-Kerr, EU Intellectual Property Law: Recent Case Developments, 2004 INTELL. PROP. Q.
448, 461. But others have deployed an economic analysis of Baby-Dry to praise it for promoting economic
efficiency by setting a minimal threshold of distinctiveness despite acknowledging that the costs for the general
public and other traders are hard to gauge. See Griffiths, supra note 234, at 33–35.
360
See supra Part I. There are some cases where the CJEU has explicitly referred to the “minimal level of
distinctiveness” required to justify registration. See Case C-97/12 P, Louis Vuitton Malletier v. OHIM,
Judgment, ECLI:EU:C:2014:324, ¶ 99 (May 15, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=152347&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9074225; Case C398/08 P, Audi AG v. OHIM, 2010 E.T.M.R. 18, ¶ 39. Nevertheless, these isolated references to minimal
distinctiveness must be read in the context of the CJEU’s categorical rejection of reliance upon possible defenses
to justify a liberal registration policy and its clear instructions that the examination of the grounds for registration
must not be minimal but stringent and full. See Case C-51/10 P, Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol sp. z o.o. v.
OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-1546, ¶ 61; Case C-64/02 P, OHIM v. Erpo Möbelwerk GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-10051,
¶ 45; Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, 2003 E.C.R. I-3822, ¶¶ 58–59.
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devoid of distinctiveness in all cases.361 That is, the mere possibility of a
potentially distinctive use of the sign, however remote, suffices to overcome the
objection.
Jennifer Davis has rightly drawn attention to the market-led approach
arguably embodied in the Directive under which the market is the ultimate
arbiter for what may be registered.362 But, notwithstanding its market-led
character, this does not inexorably mean that there is no room for
accommodating normative goals and policy considerations within the
distinctiveness evaluation in pursuit of other interests and values. Indeed, some
tribunals have found that the stringent and full examination of all the factual
circumstances (including the empirical rule about consumer reactions)
underpinning the distinctiveness appraisal does enable this foundational concept
in some cases to be a bulwark against the appropriation of culturally significant
signs that ought to be in the public domain.363 However, this limited role of
361
Case C-307/11 P, Deichmann SE v. OHIM, Order, ECLI:EU:C:2012:254 (Apr. 26, 2012), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-307/11&language=EN; see also Case T-29/16, Caffè Nero Grp. Ltd. v. EUIPO,
Judgment, ECLI:EU:T:2016:635, ¶ 41 (Oct. 27, 2016), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=184903&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9074780; Case T37/16, Caffè Nero Grp. Ltd. v. EUIPO, Judgment, ECLI:EU:T:2016:634, ¶ 46 (Oct. 27, 2016), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=184901&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&o
cc=first&part=1&cid=9074780 (declining to consider the “best-case scenario” approach, that is, whether a mark
should then be registered if it can reasonably be assumed that the mark is distinctive of the goods).
362
Davis, A European Constitution for IPRS?, supra note 353, at 1012.
363
See Anne Frank-Fonds’ Trademark Application [2015] 132 RPC 914 (App. Person) [10], [21] (Eng.)
(arguing that the title “The Diary of Anne Frank” is understood, from the consumer’s perspective and perception,
as explanatory of the subject-matter of the designated goods and services and constitutes a property easily
understood by the relevant consumers of those goods and services); Anne Frank-Fonds v. OBPI, R.G.,
2012/AR/2166 (Courd’Appel de Bruxelles Oct. 2, 2013) (unreported) (using the consumer perception to
conclude that the title “Het dagboek van Anne Frank” (The Diary of Anne Frank) would be perceived
immediately as a reference to the work of Anne Frank, not as source-indicator of the company that produces the
designated goods and services) (relying on the overriding public interest aim in keeping descriptive signs free
for all to base the refusal of both inherent and acquired distinctiveness as the perpetual monopolization of a
culturally significant sign has the effect of expanding copyright protection); Executrices of the Estate of Diana,
Princess of Wales’ Application [2001] E.T.M.R. 254 [38] (UK) (applying the presumptions and understandings
of the average consumer test to conclude that this consumer would not expect all goods and services bearing the
image and name of “Diana, Princess of Wales” to be commercialized under the control of a single undertaking
because he or she would be aware that members of the Royal Family would not use their name or title as a
trademark for commercial purposes). But tribunals may reach divergent conclusions when they set the
distinctiveness bar too low. E.g., Case R-118/2014-1, Disney Enters., ¶¶ 17, 22, 29 (1st Bd. App. Mar. 18, 2015)
(discussing that while in theory being the title of a book or a film is not, alone, an obstacle to registration, the
sign must be understood as a trademark and the relevant consumers will instantly understand “The Jungle Book”
as providing some kind of information relating to the goods or services designated); Case R-1856/2013-2, Fostier
v. Disney Enters., ¶¶ 16, 28, 34–26 (2d Bd. App. Feb. 25, 2015) (explaining that by applying the empirical rule
regarding consumer perception, the Board allows the cancellation of the registered Community mark
“Pinocchio” in relation to all the goods and services that refer to the story of Pinocchio). But cf. Joined Cases R-
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distinctiveness cannot mean it should assume the more appropriate role of
functionality.
IV. CONTEXTUAL EXAMINATION OF THE DEPARTS SIGNIFICANTLY CRITERION
A. Is It Really an Abstract Criterion?
Apart from general observations about its alleged restrictiveness, a
substantive academic analysis of the departs significantly criterion has yet to
feature in the literature. This paucity however has not prevented some
commentators arguing that the test “does risk veering into abstraction” if merely
being a significantly different or fanciful shape suffices to establish inherent
distinctiveness.364 This abstraction arguably exists notwithstanding references to
the presumed expectations of the average consumer. For others, cases such as
Henkel Flasche and Freixenet suggest that “it is both necessary and sufficient
that the shape is significantly different from the norms or customs of the sector
to overcome an objection of lack of distinctive character.”365 This departs
significantly criterion would thus appear “less onerous” than the test for securing
design registration in respect of a design that has individual character over the
prior art, not simply the norms or customs of the relevant sector.366 Accordingly,
these opinions welcome the Bongrain decision in which the English Court of
Appeal interpreted the reference to “thereby fulfils its essential function” in the
second part of the CJEU’s departs significantly criterion as meaning nothing
more than a fanciful or unusual shape could fulfill the essential function of
indicating commercial origin, not that it must.367

2400/2014-4 & R-2401/2014-4, Anne Frank-Fonds, ¶¶ 34–35 (4th Bd. App. Aug. 31, 2015) (unreported)
(reversing the Examiner’s refusal to register the marks “Le Journal d’Anne Frank” and “Das Tagebuch der Anne
Frank” as these titles are unique and distinctive of the designated goods). The Board further held that there is no
such thing as the requirement of availability in European Community law that prevents accepting “the minimum
degree of distinctiveness” required. Id. For a brief comment, see Nedim Malovi, OHIM Fourth Board of Appeal
Considers “Le Journal d’Anne Franke” Sufficiently Distinctive to Be a Trademark, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. &
PRAC. 229 (2016). Neither Senftleben’s nor Anemaet’s critiques cite any of these decisions. See Senftleben,
supra note 333, at 354.
364
Fhima, supra note 43, at 685.
365
Tritton, supra note 282, at 231. Others implicitly accept that only one condition underpins the departs
significantly criterion. See Liakatou, supra note 7, at 630. It is generally established that “only a mark which
departs significantly from the norm or customs of the sector” fulfills its essential function and is therefore not
devoid of any distinctiveness. Id.
366
Tritton, supra note 282, at 238–39.
367
Bongrain SA’s Trade Mark Application [2005] RPC 306 (Civ) [26]–[27].
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English decisions have indeed followed Bongrain as a matter of principle
but frequently expressed the view that the CJEU is yet to clarify this
interpretation.368 In the recent challenge to the registration of the 3D shapes of
the iconic London Hackney black cab owned by LTC, it was argued that the
phrase “and consequently” used in the recent EGC decision in Jaguar369
removes any lingering doubt that there might have been when the CJEU used
that phrase in Freixenet.370 LJ Floyd acknowledged there was much force in
LTC’s submissions but, in his view, the matter is simply not acte claire.371 In
examining LTC’s appeal against cancellation of its registered shape marks, LJ
Floyd identified in the CJEU’s case law three steps in deciding whether the mark
differs significantly from the norms and customs of the sector.372 First,
determine what the sector is.373 Second, identify common norms and customs, if
any, of that sector.374 Third, decide whether the mark departs significantly from
those norms and customs.375 His lordship applied this test to a list of
characteristics that LTC identified as rendering its motor car shapes inherently
source-identifying.376
Though the Court of Appeal reached the correct decision in dismissing the
appeal, the approach reveals inconsistencies with established CJEU’s case law
and principles. For instance, as Part I demonstrates, Henkel Perwoll Bottle
categorically established that the sole decisive factor is not an abstract
assessment of features which differ from the customary presentation of products
of the same type, but whether there are grounds for assuming that the target
public might, without being educated, perceive the trade dress primarily as a
source-indicating brand.377 Regardless of the high cost of cars, case law of the
EU law assumes that sophisticated consumers have no initial predisposition to
regarding the appearance of a car as an indication of its manufacturing source.

368
London Taxi Corp. v. Frazer-Nash Research Ltd. [2016] EWHC 579 (Ch) [172]; see also Société des
Produits Nestlé S.A. v. Cadbury UK Ltd. [2014] EWHC 591 (Ch) [37], aff’d [2017] EWCA (Civ) (Eng.);
Betafence Ltd. v. Registrar of Trademarks [2005] EWHC (Ch) [17] (Eng.).
369
Case T-629/14, Jaguar Land Rover Ltd. v. OHIM, Judgment, ECLI:EU:T:2015:878, ¶¶ 25–26
(Nov. 25, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=172022&pageIndex=0&
doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=376052.
370
See supra Introduction.
371
London Taxi Co. v. Frazer-Nash Research Ltd. [2017] EWCA 1729 (Civ) [42] (Eng.).
372
Id. ¶ 45.
373
Id. ¶ 43.
374
Id.
375
Id.
376
Id.
377
Case C-218/01, Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶¶ 45, 50–51.
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An evaluation of consumer perception thus carries the central analytical weight
when considering both inherent and acquired distinctiveness, as recently
affirmed by the CJEU378 and the English Court of Appeal in Kit-Kat
ChocolateBar.379 This was indeed the essential factor for endorsing the lack of
secondary meaning in London Taxi Co. since there was no apparent reason why
average consumers, whether taxi drivers or users of taxi services, should care
that the registered shape of the taxis denoted exclusively LTC trade origin.380
The paramount importance of consumer perception as an essential factor for
deciding all questions of distinctiveness is also emphasized when contrasting the
European functionality criteria with distinctiveness.381
1. Consumer Expectations of Car Shapes
The EUIPO emphasizes presumed consumer expectations rather than
abstract assessments of product features in appeals over refusals to register
motor car shapes as EUTMs in which the relationship between design rights and
trademarks appears heavily contested. This approach makes sense since
European design law is a prominent part of the IP protection for the car
industry.382 According to the EUIPO, it is common knowledge that the car
industry is quite a competitive market, particularly the category of compact cars
which is characterized by high price competition based upon performance and
safety.383 As such, consumers are accustomed to experiencing a wide variety of
designs that are nevertheless becoming increasingly standardized due to

378
Joined Cases C-84/17 P, C-85/17 P, & C-95/17 P, Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Mondelez UK
Holdings & Servs. Ltd., Judgment, ECLI:EU:C:2018:596 (July 25, 2018), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=204401&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=907
6119.
379
Société des Produits Nestlé SA v. Cadbury UK Ltd. [2017] EWCA (Civ) 358 [77–79].
380
London Taxi Corp. [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1729 [66–67].
381
See Case C-205/13, Hauck GmbH & Co. KG v. Stokke A/S, AG Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2014:322
(May 14, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=152243&text=&doclang=EN&
part=1&occ=first&mode=LST&pageIndex=0&cid=9076236; Case C-48/09 P, Lego Juris A/S v. OHIM, 2010
E.C.R. I-8403.
382
See Joined Cases C-397/16 & C-435/16, Acacia S.r.l. v. Pneusgarda S.r.l., AG Opinion,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:730, ¶ 40 (Sept. 28, 2017), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=
195105&text=&doclang=EN&part=1&occ=first&mode=LST&pageIndex=0&cid=9076236.
383
Case R-3244/2014-2, Toyota Joshida Kabushiki Kaisha, ¶ 22 (2d Bd. App. Nov. 27, 2015) (unreported)
(position mark consisting of hook-like shaped LED lamps); Case R-1709/2013-2, Jaguar Land Rover Ltd., ¶ 25
(2d Bd. App. Apr. 24, 2014) (unreported) (car shape); Case R-401/2010-4, Toyota Joshida Kabushiki Kaisha,
¶ 21 (4th Bd. App. July 27, 2010) (unreported) (car shape); Case R-753/2007-4, Volkswagen AG, ¶ 25 (4th Bd.
App. Nov. 5, 2007) (unreported) (car silhouette); Case R-1306/2007-4, Volkswagen AG, ¶ 25 (4th Bd. App.
Nov. 6, 2007), (unreported) (car silhouette).
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technical and performance constraints.384 Within those constraints, it is common
practice for car manufacturers to use features of the car’s hull to present
aesthetically appealing designs.385 But the capacity to appeal rather than denote
a unique source belongs to designs, not trademarks.386 Consumers may thus be
attracted to the shape of a car primarily for aesthetic reasons and/or utilitarian
design, not because the shape indicates a unique source. EUIPO decisions also
establish the possibility that average consumers looking to make a significant
investment are more likely to look to other traditional means of commercial
identification such as the manufacturer’s logo or emblem placed on the car, i.e.,
the grille or the back.387
It is also possible that professional consumers, who are specialists displaying
a high level of attention towards design features, may generally be aware of the
possibility of protecting either the shape of goods not as trademarks, but through
registration as a design or the technical solution or functional characteristics of
a product through registration as a patent.388 These professionals are thus likely
to care less about the potential source significance of the car shape. Nevertheless,
none of these possibilities were explored in London Taxi Co. It was also
questionable to rely upon Jaguar’s reference to “and consequently” in applying
the departs significantly criterion to the configuration of the Land Rover. In
Jaguar, the Board considered the shape mark to depict an apparatus for
locomotion by land, but not by air or by water.389 It reasoned that the car shape
consequently departed so significantly from the customary shapes of apparatus
for locomotion by air and water that “it should, therefore, not be in conflict with
[CTMR] Article 7(1)(b).”390 On appeal, the EGC agreed but held that the same
reasoning ought to have led the Board to allow the application for “vehicles for
384
See generally Toyota Joshida Kabushiki Kaisha, 2015 R-3244/2014-2; Jaguar Land Rover Ltd, 2014
R-1709/2013-2; Toyota Joshida Kabushiki Kaisha, 2010 R-401/2010-4; Volkswagen AG, 2007 R-1306/2007-4.
385
See Toyota Joshida Kabushiki Kaisha, 2015 R-3244/2014-2; Jaguar Land Rover Ltd, 2014 R1709/2013-2; Toyota Joshida Kabushiki Kaisha, 2010 R-401/2010-4; Volkswagen AG, 2007 R-1306/2007-4.
386
Case R-827/2005-1, Gen. Motors Corp., ¶14 (1st Bd. of App., Jan. 18, 2006) (unreported) at [14] (car
shape); Case R-16/2005-1 Gen. Motors Corp., ¶10 (1st Bd. of App., Jan.16 2006) (unreported) at [10] (car
shape).
387
See Gen. Motors Corp., 2006 R-827/2005-1, ¶15 (car shape); General Motors Corp., 2006 R-16/20051 ¶15 (car shape).
388
See Case R-2020/2016-2, Airbus S.A.S., ¶37 (2d Bd of App., Jan. 26, 2018, EUIPO) (unreported) (3D
shape of a cockpit); Case T-351/07, Somm Srl v. OHIM, 2008 E.C.R. II-331 (3D shelter for shade); Case R939/2005-1, Gen. Motors Corp., ¶14 (1st Bd of App., Jan. 18, 2006, OHIM) (unreported) (shape of a vintage
pick-up truck).
389
Case R-1622/2013-2, Jaguar Land Rover Ltd. v. OHIM (2d Bd of App., Apr. 24, 2014) (unreported),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=T-629/14.
390
Id. ¶ 20.
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locomotion by air and water.”391 According to the EGC, as the shape mark was
for vehicles for land locomotion rather than air or water, “[i]t must, therefore, be
regarded as departing significantly from the norm and customs of the sector for
vehicles for locomotion by air and water and, consequently, as not being devoid
of any distinctive character….”392 However, the Board’s cursory conclusion was
largely based upon its belief that “it would be quite remarkable if the applicant
succeeded in producing an airplane or a ship looking like the vehicle appliedfor.”393 This was a lax interpretation of the departs significantly criterion merely
because the limited success of the registration was pointless for the proprietor.
Indeed, the Board’s reasoning (and the EGC’s approval) when considering the
car shape against the customary shapes of apparatus and vehicles by land is
contradictory, as demonstrated in its finding that “the fact that the relevant public
may be more attentive to the different technical or aesthetic details of the
product, does not suffice, on its own, to establish that that public is used to
recognizing an indication of origin in the shape of the products.”394 No such
customer habit was found in connection with air and land apparatus/vehicles.
Therefore, the “and consequently” reference in Jaguar cannot have the weight
that LTC alleged before the Court of Appeal.395
2. “Departs Significantly” Entails a Two-Step Test
As demonstrated by the London Taxi Co. litigation, academic opinions and
court decisions rarely engage with the extensive and refined case law around the
contextualized assessments underpinning the departs significantly criterion,
overlooking important nuances. One of the nuances is the fact that Bongrain’s
interpretation of “thereby” and the explicit commitment to the presumed
attitudes of consumers are consistent with significant developments in European
case law.396 Indeed, the CJEU itself has implicitly suggested that a significant
departure is a necessary but insufficient condition alone to render the
nondistinctiveness objection inapplicable. Precisely because of the importance
of the nature and character of the proposed sign, the CJEU has specifically

391

Id.
Case T-629/14, Jaguar Land Rover Ltd. v. OHIM, Judgment, ECLI:EU:T:2015:878 (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=172022&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=9078725.
393
Case R-1622/2013-2, Jaguar Land Rover Ltd., ¶ 20 (2d Bd. App. Apr. 24, 2014) (unreported).
394
Id. ¶ 30.
395
Id.
396
Compare LTC, [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1729 (Eng.) (evidencing a lack of discussion of the departs
significantly criterion), with Bongrain SA’s Trade Mark Application [2005] RPC 306 (Civ) [26]–[27] (Eng.).
392
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instructed that competent authorities must always refer to the reality of consumer
perception as a form of verification requirement that the sign is likely to function
as a trademark.397 This is so irrespective of the extent of the sign’s departure
from the adopted norms. 398 This is clearly a matter of first impression; the
trademark must permit average consumers immediately to distinguish the
designated goods or services from those of other companies “without conducting
an analytical or comparative examination and without paying particular
attention.”399 Furthermore, this is hardly an abstract examination. The ordinary
use of trademarks as source-identifiers in the specific sector is likely to influence
the habits and presumed expectations of the average consumer.400
Libertel supports the view that, for the normative presumption about
consumer habits to be rebutted, the subject-matter represented by the sign in
question must be in current commercial practice used as a means of
identification.401 SAT.1 epitomizes this approach and the need for a marketspecific appraisal.402 Furthermore, the fact that in the relevant sector there is
evidence of an established practice of identifying products by their look does not
necessarily mean that the required distinctiveness is minimal or that minimal
differences in design may suffice.403 As the following discussion shows, the
departs significantly criterion proceeds upon two steps rather one. Firstly, the
extent to which the unusual design or shape may break new ground in the
relevant sector. Secondly, the extent to which the new design may influence
consumer perception in the light of the type of product and existing branding
practices. There is very little “abstraction” in the European approach to the
397

Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 51; see also Voss, 2015 ECLI:EU:C:2015:303, ¶ 92.
See id.; Case C-136/02 P, Mag Instrument, Inc. v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-9182 (shape-of-product mark);
Case C-437/15 P, EUIPO v. Deluxe Labs. Inc., AG Opinion, ECLI:EU:C:2017:41 (Jan. 25, 2017), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=187127&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&o
cc=first&part=1&cid=1355829 (figurative word mark).
399
Henkel Perwoll Bottle, 2004 E.C.R. I-1737, ¶ 45.
400
This is precisely what the CJEU meant when it stated that “regard must be had both to the ordinary use
of Trademarks as a badge of origin in the sectors concerned and to the perception of the relevant public.” Libertel
Groep BV, 2003 E.C.R. I-3822, ¶ 62.
401
Id.
402
Case C-329/02 P, SAT.1 SatellitenFernsehen GmbH v. OHIM Trademark, 2004 E.C.R. I-08317.
403
For instance, in the car market, the EUIPO acknowledges that radiator grilles no longer have a purely
technical function as they have become an essential part of the look of vehicles and a means of differentiating
between different models on the market. But this does not mean every proposed sign representing a grille can
be assumed to be source-identifying and easily overcome the “departs significantly” criterion despite heightened
consumer attention, see Case R-1795/2014-2, Aston Martin Lagonda Ltd., ¶¶ 27–28 (2d Bd. App. Dec. 18, 2014)
(unreported); Case R-1798/2014-2, Aston Martin Lagonda Ltd., ¶¶ 23–24 (2d Bd. App. Dec. 11, 2014)
(unreported). For the secondary meaning claim of the same position mark, see Case R-1792/2016-2, Aston
Martin Lagonda Ltd. (2d Bd. App. Apr. 4, 2017) (unreported).
398
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distinctiveness evaluation of product get-up marks that has for a long time
required that their registration “cannot be assessed without some enquiry into
what is happening on the relevant market.”404 A contextual inquiry includes an
appraisal of “the normal marketing practices of the product in question” in order
to determine the prevailing purchasing habits of the average consumers.405 Thus,
the range of shapes and designs commonly used in trade and to which the
consumers may have been exposed constitutes one factor in establishing the
norm and customs of the sector.406 When the innovative design of the product
suggests there are no similar designs on the market as a point of comparison, the
obvious shape rule enables the tribunal to assess whether the shape mark’s
appearance approaches the design that the product is most likely to take in light
of its practical advantages.407 In examining the market situation regarding mass
consumer goods, case law has thus developed some rules of thumb that in no
way exclude finding distinctiveness as a matter of principle.
For instance, in the confectionary sector, the average consumer is assumed
to pay only fleeting attention to the shape and color of sweets and chocolates.408
It is thus unlikely that, in the absence of any verbal or graphic elements, the
consumer’s choice will normally turn on the form of the chocolate product409 or
its wrapper,410 even if its appearance is striking. These presumed expectations
of consumer reactions are not “policy-blind reflection[s] of reality,” as
Dinwoodie and Gangjee have rightly argued.411 Such presumed consumer
expectations can and do accommodate developments in market conditions as
demonstrated in more recent decisions accepting the possibility that, given the

404
Case R-1206/2006-2, Coca-Cola Co., ¶ 13 (2d Bd. App. Dec. 22, 2006) (unreported); see also Case
R-1035/2004-1, Kustom Musical Amplication Inc., ¶ 48 (1st Bd. App. July 22, 2010) (unreported) (shape of a
guitar); Case, R-827/2005-1, Gen. Motors Corp., ¶ 21 (1st Bd. App. Jan. 18, 2006) (unreported) (shape of a car);
Case R-724/2006-2, Doskocil Mfg. Co., ¶ 15 (2d Bd. App. Nov. 22, 2006) (unreported); Case R-872/2005-1,
Neways Inc., ¶ 18 (1st Bd. App. Apr. 5 2006) (unreported); Case R-118/2003-2, Beecham Grp. p.l.c., ¶ 12 (2d
Bd. App. June 22, 2004).
405
Joined Cases T-241/05, T-262/05 to T-264/05, T-346/05, T-347/05 & T-29/06 to T-31/06, Procter &
Gamble Co. v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. II-01549, ¶ 53; see Case T-358/04, George Neumann GmbH v. OHIM, 2007
E.C.R. II-03329m ¶ 46; Case T-194/01, Unilever NV v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. II-00383 ¶ 48; Case R-367/20032, Develey Holding GmbH, 2004 (Jan. 20, 2004), ¶ 45; aff’d, Case T-129/04, Develey Holding GmbH v. OHIM,
2006 E.C.R. II-00811, ¶ 47; Case C-238/06 P, Develey Holding GmbH v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. I-09375, ¶ 92.
406
Case C-173/04 P, Deutsche SiSi-Werke GmbH v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-00551, ¶ 59; Case C-24/05 P,
August Storck KG v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-05677, ¶ 33.
407
Birkenstock Sales GmbH, ECLI:EU:T:2016:650, ¶¶ 59-60.
408
Joined Cases T-324/01 & T-110/02, Axions SA v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. II-01897, ¶¶ 35–36.
409
Case C-24/05 P, August Storck AG v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-05677, ¶ 33.
410
Id.
411
Dinwoodie & Gangjee, supra note 259, at 339.
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wide range of chocolate products currently available in this sector, consumers
might have developed the habit of perceiving certain shapes as an indication of
the product’s commercial origin.412
Similarly, looking closely into the common trade practices of the food sector,
attempts to register the visual arrangement of food products like sausages and
meat have been rejected largely because the proposed get-up marks are found to
be mere variants of the customary shape of such products. This is so even though
their proposed design is not the form in which the goods are usually presented
to the consumer.413 Irrespective of how novel, original or even unusual the shape
may be, EU courts have for example denied registration in circumstances where
“there are no grounds for believing that manufacturers of gut or charcuterie seek
to differentiate their goods by way of the shape of the gut [for making sausages]
and that, accordingly, manufacturers of charcuterie and consumers are capable
of identifying the shape of gut and charcuterie as an indication of origin.”414
Furthermore, in the beverages sector, case law does not ignore the salient
fact that consumers first and foremost see bottles in which liquids are packaged
simply as a means of packaging for utilitarian purposes rather than a means of
commercial identification.415 This, however, does not exclude the possibility
that a sign may act as a source-indicator in addition to performing other
412
Though the combination of presentational features making up the mark did not “depart significantly”
from the customary get-ups in the confectionary sector even with, for instance, a bas-relief with a depiction of
an animal on the upper side, see Case C-24/05 P, August Storck AG v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-05677, ¶ 59. See
also Case R-1332/2005-2, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG v. OHIM, 2008 E.C.R. ¶ 34, aff’d, 2010
E.C.R. II-00291, ¶ 45; Case C-98/11, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG v. OHIM. 2012
ECLI:EU:C:2009:148, ¶ 47 (explaining that due to technical constrains of the packaging, the Board accepts that
chocolate producers have an incentive to distinguish their goods by the appearance and design of the packaging)
[hereinafter Chocoladefabriken]. It must therefore be assumed that consumers are entirely capable of
recognizing the packaging as an indication of their trade origin provided that the shape has sufficiently unusual
characteristics. See id. That, however, was not the case with the mark consisting of a sitting chocolate rabbit
with a red ribbon and a small bell in gold foil. See generally id. ¶ 20.
413
See Rotter, 2009 E.C.R. II-01071, ¶ 33 (explaining that although arranging several sausages into pretzel
shape may be unusual, consumers will merely see a particular way of presenting the product that is customary
in the sector, not a trademark)); Case R-369/2010-1, Contessa Premium Foods, Inc. ¶ 15 (1st Bd of App., July
8, 2010) (unreported) (explaining that the unusual arrangement of prawns in a circle is non-distinctive
notwithstanding its unusualness because there is no evidence that relevant public may realize that the particular
manner in which foodstuff products are generally displayed is also used as a means of information about the
commercial identity of the producer); Case R-1013/2001-2, Schulte Fleisch- und Wurstwaren GmbH ¶ 18 (2d
Bd of App., Oct. 1, 2002) (unreported); see also Case T-360/03, Frischpack GmbH v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. II04097.
414
Case T-15/05, Win de Waele v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. II-01511 ¶ 41.
415
Develey Holding GmbH, 2007 E.C.R. I-09375 ¶ 92; Deutsche SiSi-Werke GmbH, 2006 E.C.R. I-00551,
¶ 30; Euromex SA, 2004 E.C.R. II-01391, ¶ 24, aff’d, 2005 E.C.R. I-05797.
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functions from the consumer’s perspective, whether utilitarian, aesthetic or
otherwise.416 Nonetheless, in order for the shape to possess trademark
significance, over and above its function as a container, the design must not only
speak for itself but also trigger a mental association of commercial origin. It
must permit consumers to perceive it immediately and spontaneously as a
distinctive signifier of a particular trader, which may be the case when the design
features “depart significantly” from the customary get-ups in the sector. Slight
variations from basic geometrical shapes in which manufacturers typically
package their goods for consumers or shapes which are likely to be an obvious
choice (where there are no identical forms on the market) for packaging the
relevant goods are normally considered to not “depart significantly” from what
is usual or expected in the sector.417
B. The Role of Common Knowledge and Experience
Common knowledge and practical experience crucially underpin the
identification of the adopted norms and customs in the sector within the departs
significantly criterion. Settled case law establishes the principle that European
examiners may base their findings of non-distinctiveness on common
knowledge and practical experience generally acquired in the marketing of mass
consumer goods, including well-known facts, without being required to provide
concrete examples or factual verification.418 These factual findings include
predictions about what is likely to guide consumers in choosing products
according to actual market conditions, prevailing purchasing habits of
consumers, consumer characteristics and level of attention, and what sort of
shapes and presentational features exist or are expected to be used in the
marketing of the relevant goods. In Develey, the GCEU accepted that, where the
Board finds that average consumers are more likely to perceive a product shape

416
August Storck KG, 2012 ECLI:EU:C:2012:537, ¶ 47; Georg Neumann GmbH, 2007 E.C.R. II-03329,
¶ 55; Glaverbel SA, 2002 E.C.R. II-03887, ¶ 24 (explaining that “if the target market perceives the” design
applied to the surface of goods as a source-identifier of the goods, then “the fact that it serves several [other]
purposes at once has no bearing on its distinctiveness”), aff’d, Case C-445/02 P, 2004 E.C.R. I-06267.
417
Melt Water, 2015 ECLI:EU:T:2015:9, ¶ 31; Case T-140/13, Netherlands Mar. Tech. Ass’n v. Comm’n,
ECLI:EU:T:2014:1029, ¶ 25 (Dec. 9, 2014); Case T-323/11, Unión de Cervecerías Peruanas Backus y Johnston
SAA v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2012:376, ¶ 22 (July 12, 2012); Case R-1560/2013-2, Bongrain S.A., ¶ 23 (2d Bd
of App., Jan. 22, 2014) (unreported) (explaining that a hexagonal prism with eight faces representing a box with
a lid is an obvious shape for dairy products); Case R-1626/2008-1, Molkerei Alois Müller GmbH, ¶ 23 (1st Bd
of App., Jan. 22, 2009) (unreported) (explaining that packaging with two-compartment system is an obvious
choice for foodstuffs for practical considerations).
418
August Storck KG, 2006 E.C.R. I-05719, ¶ 54; see also Case C-497/07 P, Philip Morris Products SA
v. OHIM, 2008 E.C.R. I-00101, ¶ 26; Celltech R&D Ltd., 2007 E.C.R. I-02883, ¶ 39.
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as an ordinary means of packaging rather than a manufacturer’s source, “it may
base its analysis on facts arising from practical experience generally acquired
from the marketing of general consumer goods which are likely to be known by
anyone and are in particular known by the consumers of those goods.”419 On
appeal, the CJEU endorsed the soundness of this proposition. It categorically
stated that the Office is not under an obligation to demonstrate positively nondistinctiveness; instead, “it is for that applicant to provide specific and
substantiated information to show that the trademark applied for has either an
intrinsic distinctive character or a distinctive character acquired by usage.”420
Develey therefore affirms the principle that the CJEU had already established in
Storck II, namely that the Office’s duty is simply to state reasons for its
conclusion based upon facts and assumptions arising from its general
experience.421 This principle is rarely remarked upon, causing some academic
confusion about the alleged arbitrariness of the EUIPO’s refusals based upon
non-distinctiveness.422
Notably, if the applicant asserts distinctiveness, despite the Office’s concrete
analysis inferred from general experience, the onus shifts to the applicant “to
provide specific and substantiated information” that demonstrates the existence
of likely or acquired distinctiveness.423 The applicant’s obligation entails, in
particular, specific evidence that “consumers’ habits on the relevant market are
different” to establish that the claimed get-up will “play an important role when
the consumer makes a choice between different products.”424 This is an
important fact that is often overlooked, particularly in the commentary around

419

Develey Holding GmbH , 2006 E.C.R. II-00811, ¶¶ 19, 21.
Develey Holding GmbH, 2007 E.C.R. I-09375, ¶ 50. For a more recent affirmance of the legitimacy of
well-known facts and practical experience in the EUIPO’s assessments of distinctiveness, see also Case T611/17, All Star CV v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:T:2019:210, ¶¶ 54–55, (successful invalidity claim against the
registration of the shape mark of a shoe sole), aff’d Case C-461/19 P, ECLI:EU:C:2019:797, ¶ 20 (citing Storck
II with approval).
421
August Storck KG, 2006 E.C.R. I-05719, ¶ 50.
422
Friedmann, supra note 235, at 41–42; Tiffany Chou, Procter&Gamble v. OHIM: Is the Generic
“Average Consumer” Too Generic for Its Own Good?, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 625, 638 (2006).
423
Develey Holding GmbH, 2007 E.C.R. I-09375, ¶ 50; see Wilfer, 2011 E.C.R. I-574, ¶ 75;
Chocoladefabriken, ECLI:EU:C:2009:148, ¶ 46; see also Louis Vuitton Malletier, ECLI:EU:C:2014:324, ¶ 72
(stating that the evidentiary burden applies even in the context of inter partes invalidity actions regarding
registered Community marks).
424
Unilever NV, 2003 E.C.R. II-00383, ¶¶ 48, 51; see also Case T-547/08 X-Technology Swiss GmbH v.
OHIM, 2010 E.C.R. II-02409, ¶ 50 aff’d, Case C-429/10 P, X-Technology Swiss GmbH v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R.
I-00076, ¶ 41, aff’d, Case C-429/10 P, X-Technology Swiss GmbH v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-00076, ¶ 41. Despite
the Board’s analysis, the applicant “failed to adduce any solid evidence to support its assertion that the [relevant]
consumers are in the habit of perceiving the colour of the toe area of a sock as’ a source-identifier.” Id.
420
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the CJEU’s perceived lack of meaningful engagement with the characteristics
and behavior of average European consumers.425 Absent specific evidence
submitted by the applicant, it is appropriate for the prognosis of the presumed
expectations of the average consumer to be based upon the Office’s general
knowledge and practical experience acquired in the marketing of general
consumer goods.426 This approach implicitly highlights the protective nature of
the nondistinctiveness barrier underpinning the departs significantly criterion.
Furthermore, the case law does not require the Office to carry out an
economic analysis of the market, let alone a consumer survey.427 It is logically
assumed that “the applicant … is much better placed, given its thorough
knowledge of the market” to establish such matters.428 The Office has an
obligation to undertake a specific evaluation of the mark and each of the listed
goods or services as required by the absolute grounds. But its obligation to state
reasons, in the examination of facts or circumstances affecting consumer
reactions,429 is unrelated to the burden of proving distinctiveness.430
Nonetheless, there remains some ambiguity remains about this in the
commentary.431 Unsurprisingly, most applications for packaging/product marks
fail this important hurdle.
425
Jennifer Davis, Locating the Average Consumer: His Judicial Origins, Intellectual Influences, and
Current Role in European Trademark Law, 2 INTELL. PROP. Q. 183, 185 (2005) (criticizing European trade law
for treating the perceptions of the average consumer as “generally presumed but seldom interrogated” and “a
matter of trust rather than science”); see also Jennifer Davis, Revisiting the Average Consumer: An Uncertain
Presence in European Trademark Law, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 15 (2015) [hereinafter Davis, Revisiting the Average
Consumer].
426
See, e.g., X-Technology Swiss GmbH, 2010 E.C.R. II-02409, ¶ 50.
427
Id. ¶ 43.
428
Unilever, 2003 E.C.R. II-00383, ¶ 48; see also, Case T-140/06, Philip Morris v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R.
II-00113, ¶ 35, aff’d, Philip Morris, 2008 E.C.R. I-00101; Case T-390/14, ÉtablissementAmra v. OHIM, ¶ 22
ECLI:EU:T:2015:897 (Nov. 25, 2015) (position mark on rebound boots); Case T-208/12, Think Schuhwerk
GmbH v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2013:376, ¶ 26 (July 11, 2013) (position mark consisting of red anglets on shoe
laces), aff’d, Case C-521/13 P, Think Schuhwerk GmbH v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2222, ¶ 55 (Sept.11, 2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=157841&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2822350; Case T-618/14, Grupo Bimbo v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2015:440,
¶ 32 (July 29, 2015) (shape of a Mexican tortilla), aff’d, Case C-476/15 P, Grupo Bimbo v. OHIM,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:165 (Mar. 15, 2016).
429
Case C-437/15 P, EUIPO v. Deluxe Labs. Inc., ECLI:EU:C:2017:380, ¶ 37 (May 17, 2017),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=190747&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=
lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=2822482.
430
See, e.g., X-Technology Swiss GmbH, 2010 E.C.R. II-02409, ¶ 50.
431
Davis, Revisiting the Average Consumer, supra note 425, at 18 (arguing that the CJEU’s Borco ruling
established that “the views of the average consumer cannot be taken for granted by registering authorities or the
courts but must be ascertained through the collection of empirical data”) Borco, however, simply clarified the
Office’s misunderstanding of Develey regarding the obligation to always conduct a concrete evaluation on
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C. The Role of Branding Practices
Even if the product design or shape is “one of a kind” in the sense of being
truly unusual or fanciful, this alone has never been sufficient to overcome nondistinctiveness.432 As discussed so far, the inherent ability of a sign to guide
consumers in their purchasing decisions is simply less evident when the sign
coincides with the appearance or shape of the product it designates. Such product
shape marks must therefore immediately convey source-related information, as
opposed to mere product-related information. This finding cannot occur in the
abstract but requires a careful examination of contextual considerations,
particularly the type of product, the presumed perception of the average
consumer, and the manufacturers’ branding practices in the relevant market.
Indeed, since at least 2005, case law has consistently insisted that the method of
assessing inherent distinctiveness (without any prior use) is by examining the
branding practices to which consumers are exposed.433 This establishes whether
both manufactures and consumers distinguish products or services by virtue of
their appearance rather than other indicia such as words or labels.434 This
approach gives meaning to the second part of the “departs significantly”
criterion, effectuating the CJEU’s imperative “always to verify” whether the
mark fulfils its essential function by reference to the perception of the average
consumer.
For example, in Philip Morris, the CJEU endorsed the factual conclusion
that cigarette consumers accord only fleeting attention to the shape of cigarette
packets.435 According to the Board’s practical experience arising from the
marketing of cigarettes, these consumers are more likely to focus upon the verbal
and graphic elements on the packet rather its shape.436 Relying upon the
Develey/Storck II principle that European tribunals may base their assessment
upon general practical experience, the Court rejected the applicant’s argument
whether a letter is incapable of being a source-identifier for the relevant goods, based on the presumed
expectations of the relevant public. Case C-265/09, OHIM v BORCO-Marken-Import Matthiesen GmbH & Co
KG, EU:C:2010:508. Moreover, Borco merely serves to highlight that it cannot be generally asserted that a
Trademark is non-inherently distinctive simply because it is composed of one (or two) letters, contrary to the
Office’s assumption. Id. Indeed, such as assumption is contrary to Art.4 Regulation which explicitly refers to
letters as a category of registrable signs.
432
Case T-178/11, Voss of Norway ASA v. OHIM, 2013 E.C.R. -00000, ¶ 72, aff’d, Case C-445/13, Voss
of Norway ASA v. OHIM, 2015 ECLI:EU:C:2015:303.
433
Id.
434
Id.
435
Philip Morris, 2007 E.C.R. II-00113, ¶ 13 (rectangular shape of a cigarette pack with slightly curbed
edges).
436
Id. ¶ 28.
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that the normative presumption underpinning the empirical rule misconstrues
the human perception of signs because it lacks scientific basis and constitutes a
prejudice against shape marks.437 Moreover, the additional finding that the
overall impression of the packaging mark was slightly different from standard
shapes in this sector further confirmed that this variation failed to satisfy the
“depart significantly” test.
Enercon also offers the clearest indication that being a significantly different
shape does not guarantee trademark significance in the sense that highly
attentive consumers are likely to treat it as a source-identifier.438 In Enercon, the
applicant sought to register a shape mark representing the outer casing of the
nacelle of a wind turbine for wind energy converters.439 It claimed the
“American football shape,” which was specially designed by artist Norman
Foster, significantly departed from the customary rectangular boxes on the
market and was consequently inherently distinctive.440 The CJEU upheld the
refusal, especially endorsing the Board’s approach in verifying and deducing
that the specialized public looking to make a significant investment in acquiring
a wind energy converter is more likely to be guided in their purchasing decisions,
not by the shape of the nacelle, but by its commercial name and word marks
which provide them with precise and verifiable information about the
commercial origin of the goods.441 Similar deductions are also drawn from the
fact that such professionals will not identify and purchase wind turbines by
reference to their external decoration or presentation but will look for productorigin information according to company names and word marks rather than
color combination marks.442 Therefore, Enercon also draws upon the

437
Id. ¶ 21–22. Similar arguments based on perceived “prejudice” against 3D shape mark have fared no
better. Case T-63/01, Procter & Gamble v. OHIM, 2002 E.C.R. II-05255, ¶ 29, aff’d, Case C-107/03 P, 2004
ECLI:EU:C:2004:554, ¶¶ 49–50 (3D soap-bar shape).
438
Enercon GmbH, 2007 E.C.R. II-00516, ¶ 30.
439
Id. ¶ 1–3.
440
Id. ¶ 11–15.
441
Id. ¶ 26. Enercon also endorsed the General Court’s reliance on the empirical rule about consumer
perception despite the applicant’s argument that this rule should not apply. Id. This is because wind energy
converters are placed a significant distance from main roads for security reasons, and it is thus impossible to
place verbal or graphic elements on them that can be seen by distant observers. Id.
442
Case T-655/13, Enercon GmbH v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2015:49, ¶ 41 (Jan. 28, 2015) (refusing
registration of a color mark consisting of the gradient of five shades of the color green), aff’d, Case C-170/15 P,
Enercon GmbH v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2016:53 (Jan. 21, 2016); Case T-36/16, Enercon GmbH v. EUIPO,
ECLI:EU:T:2017:295, ¶ 51 (May 3, 2017) (refusing registration of a mark consisting of blended shades of green
for wind turbines), aff’d, Case C-433/17 P, Enercon GmbH v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:C:2018:860 (Oct. 25, 2018).
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Develey/Storck II principle about the legitimacy of deductions from practical
experience.443
Philips Morris and Enercon confirm that the “departs significantly”
examination must proceed in two rather than one step seeking to ascertain not
only how unusual or arbitrary the design mark is from others but also whether
there are contextual considerations for concluding that the average consumer
will expect the unusual design primarily to denote commercial origin as opposed
to mere aesthetic or functional choices. This approach allows tribunals to build
policy considerations into the distinctiveness test, reflecting market realities and
normative choices by reference to the overriding goals of trademark law.444 In
both Philips Morris and Enercon applicants simply failed to demonstrate that,
contrary to the analysis of the Office, consumer habits were different by
reference to concrete evidence that suggests existence of a branding practice that
entailed distinguishing products from different manufacturers primarily based
on their shape rather than other indicia.
V. REVISITING THE CJEU FREIXENET DECISION
A. Is Being Significantly Different Enough?
This background brings us to the Freixenet ruling, a case widely cited in
English decisions for outlining the principles and appropriate approach to the
departs significantly criterion.445 In 1996, Freixenet applied to register two
packaging marks consisting of the presentation method of sparkling wine
products, namely the ‘golden matt’ finish and the frosted “black matt” finish of
a bottle for sparkling wine.446 The applicant described the first of these marks as
“a white polished bottle which when filled with sparkling wine takes on a golden

443

Enercon GmbH, 2007 E.C.R. II-00516, ¶ 47.
Academic commentators have for a long time argued that it is possible to integrate this approach into
the European test of distinctiveness. See Burrell & Beverly-Smith, supra note 236, at 579–80. In some decisions,
the EGC has accepted that sportswear manufacturers use simple geometric shapes as a means of commercial
identification but has required applicants to provide more specific evidence for concluding average consumers
would regard the proposed sign as a source-identifier rather than a mere decorative element. See Shoe Branding
Europe BVBA, 2015 ECLI:EU:T:2015:973, ¶ 28 (two parallel stripe position mark on joggers); Shoe Branding
Europe BVBA, 2015 ECLI:EU:T:2015:972, ¶ 25 (two parallel stripe position mark appearing on long sleeve);
Case T-85/13, K-Swiss Inc. v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2014:509, ¶ 40 (June 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=153680&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&
part=1&cid=2824002 (two stripe position mark on a shoe).
445
Case R-97-2001-4, Freixenet SA v. OHIM, ¶ 47 (Feb. 11, 2004) (4th Bd of App.) (unreported).
446
Id.
444
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matt appearance similar to a frosted bottle.”447 It also clarified that the marks
related to “the specific appearance of its surface,” not the shape of the
packaging.448 Registration was therefore sought for the packaging of a liquid
product and, according to the applicant, its original character distinguished
Freixenet’s sparkling wine products significantly from the presentation of other
sparkling wines on the market at the relevant time.449 The applications were
based not only upon inherent distinctiveness but also extensive market use of the
golden matt and the black matt bottles dating back to 1941 and 1978
respectively.450 The Office refused the registrations and the EGC confirmed the
refusals.451 Upon appeal, the CJEU examined only inherent distinctiveness,
annulling the EGC and Board’s refusals for proceeding upon the flawed basis
that get-up trademarks which consist of the appearance of the packaging of the
product itself and display no verbal elements are thereby automatically excluded
from registration, contrary to settled case law.452
The flaw emerged from the Board’s finding that “since no bottle had [ever]
been sold without a label or an equivalent, only that word element could
determine the origin of the sparkling wine in question, so that the color and
matting of the glass of the bottle could not ‘function as a trademark’… for the
relevant public when they were not used in combination with a word
element.”453 This factual finding, however, comes at the end of a long paragraph
in the Board’s evaluation, which only reinforced the most salient finding in the
factual appraisal endorsed by the EGC on a subsidiary level.454 In that factual
appraisal, the Board concluded that, in its practical experience and deductions
made from examining the branding practices in the sparkling wines sector, “[t]he
usual behavior of the vast majority of wine consumers in any part of the
Community is to choose the brand wine according to the label … with very few
looking at the color of the glass or its surface finish.”455 Having identified this
significant factor, the Board went on to add that, as it was not customary to retail
sparkling wines in “bare” bottles (of the type appearing in the application) and
447

Joined Cases C-344/10 P & C-345/10 P, Freixenet SA v. OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-10207, ¶ 7.
Id.
449
Id. at 7–8.
450
Case R-97/2001-4, Freixenet v. OHIM, ¶ 3 (Feb. 11, 2004) (4th Bd of App., EUIPO).
451
Id.
452
Freixenet, 2011 E.C.R. I-10216, ¶ 7.
453
Id. ¶ 50.
454
See Case T-109/08, Freixenet v. OHIM, 2010 E.C.R. II-00066, ¶ 79; Case T-110/08, Freixenet v.
OHIM, 2010 E.C.R. II-00068, ¶ 78.
455
Case R-97/2001-4, Freixenet v. OHIM, ¶ 3 (4th Bd of App., Feb. 11, 2004, EUIPO); Freixenet, 2004
R-97/2001-4, ¶ 3; Freixenet, 2010 E.C.R. II-00066, ¶¶ 76–77.
448
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bottles on the shelves always appear “dressed” to the consumer with labels
including the applicant’s name. As such it is the label rather than the specific
appearance of the bottle which constitutes the reference point for consumers to
guide their choice of sparkling wine from different producers.456 Thus, the
branding practices of the sector therefore suggested that manufacturers do not
expect consumers to infer commercial origin primarily from the surface of the
packaging but from the words/labels on the bottles; this strongly confirmed the
empirical rule about consumer habits. The CJEU, however, explicitly identified
these findings as legal errors.457
Perhaps one way of rationalizing Freixenet is the CJEU’s strong disapproval
of certain elements of the Board’s reasoning that arguably suggested that the
specific surface of a bottle (including all other forms of packaging) is as a matter
of principle unsuitable for registration because consumers do not encounter
unmarked bottles on the market and only verbal elements could indicate the
origin of the beverage. Thus understood, that reasoning would be contrary to
settled case law according to which European law does not prevent registration
of non-traditional signs (including shapes) merely by virtue of their market use
with other traditional word/figurative marks.458 It would indeed be against
commercial reality to preclude traders from using and protecting more than one
mark in connection with the same product or service. Post-Freixenet, EU
tribunals explicitly acknowledge that it may be possible for consumers to
attribute an origin-indicating function to the appearance of the packaging of the
product that bears no inscription or verbal elements.459 There are nonetheless
other broader implications arising from Freixenet that are rarely scrutinized. In
quashing the Freixenet refusal, the CJEU stated that the Board should have
simply examined “whether the marks for which registration was sought varied
so significantly from the norm or customs of the sector that they had distinctive

456

Freixenet, 2011 E.C.R. I-10216, ¶ 29.
Freixenet, 2011 E.C.R. I-10210, ¶ 55.
458
Case C-353/03, Société des produits Nestlé SA v. Mars UK, Ltd., 2005 E.C.R. I- 6157, ¶ 30; August
Storck KG, 2006 E.C.R. I-5714, ¶ 59. See also Mondelez UK Holdings & Services, Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2018:596,
¶ 68; Cadbury UK Ltd., 2015 ECLI:EU:C:2015:395, ¶ 64; Joined Cases C-217/13, C-218/13, Oberbank AG v.
Deutcher Sparkassen- und Giroverband eV, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2012, ¶ 40 (June 19, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=153812&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&
part=1&cid=2825103.
459
Case T-347/10, Adelholzener Alpenquellen GmbH v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2013:201, ¶ 36 (Apr. 19,
2013); see also Melt Water, ECLI:EU:T:2015:9, ¶ 25; Case R-1793/2016-2, Aston Martin Lagonda v. OHIM,
¶ 54 (Apr. 4, 2017) (2d Bd. of App., EUIPO); Case R-1619/2011-4, Eckes Granini Group v. OHIM, ¶ 22 (Feb.
3, 2012) (4th Bd. of App., EUIPO).
457
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character.”460 This wording arguably suggests that, under EU law, being
significantly different or fanciful is both necessary and sufficient to render the
non-distinctiveness hurdle inapplicable.461 However, this interpretation of
Freixenet is problematic on different levels.
First, the CJEU completely overlooked significant findings in earlier stages
of the Freixenet litigation. Due to procedural breaches and without ruling on the
substantive matter, the EGC had previously annulled the Board’s initial refusals
for violating the applicant’s right of defense and based its decision upon
evidence which it had not brought to Freixenet’s attention.462 In that initial
examination, however, it was found that, in addition to the “classical” packaging
of a transparent green glass bottle, sparkling-wine producers also used a wide
variety of packaging such as white glass bottles, which also took on a different
color when filled with wine, or (and) opaque glass bottles of different colors.463
Given this wider range of packaging confronting the consumer, the Board’s
conclusion was that the Freixenet packaging was not “such a specific and eyecatching characteristic that it can clearly differentiate the bottle applied for from
other bottles sold on the relevant market.”464 Thus, despite the absence of
identical packaging on the market, the “golden matt” and “black matt” finish
would be a mere variant of typical ways of presenting sparkling wine bottles and
consequently unlikely to satisfy the “depart significantly” criterion, as the case
law had previously established.465 The Board therefore had already found that
the marks failed to “depart significantly” from the norms as far back as 2004,
even though these findings were not part of the final appeal to the CJEU.466
Secondly, it is difficult to reconcile Freixenet with the CJEU’s own rulings
in Develey, Storck II, Philips Morris and Enercon, which had previously
460

Freixenet, 2011 E.C.R. I- 10210, ¶ 55.
For similar descriptions of the “departs significantly” criterion as resolving itself into a single question,
see also August Storck KG, ECLI:EU:C:2017:340, ¶ 37 (“ where the issue is establishing the distinctive character
of a mark consisting of the appearance of the product which it designates, it is necessary to verify whether that
mark departs significantly from the standard or customs of the sector, such verification not being reserved solely
to three-dimensional marks.”); Apple, Inc., ECLI:EU:C:2014:2070, ¶ 20 (holding that Apple’s store design mark
can be inherently capable of indicating source “when the depicted layout departs significantly from the norm or
customs of the [economic] sector [concerned].”).
462
Case T-188/04, Freixenet, 2006 E.C.R. II-00078, ¶ 34; Case T-190/04, Freixenet, 2006 E.C.R. II00079, ¶ 34.
463
Case R-97/2001-4, Freixenet, ¶ 23. The online sources from where the Board made these deductions
were not, however, accessible to the applicant, which was eventually found to infringe his right of defense.
464
Id. ¶ 25.
465
Joined Cases C-344/10 P & C-345/10 P, Freixenet, 2011 E.C.R. I-10222, ¶ 47.
466
Case R-104/2001-4, Freixenet, ¶¶ 25, 39 (4th Bd. Of App., Feb. 11, 2004).
461
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established the principle that the Office may rely upon its knowledge of the
market and acknowledged facts, shifting the evidentiary burden of
distinctiveness onto applicants.467 Before the EGC, Freixenet asserted that the
Board never proved non-distinctiveness even though the applicant bears the
heavy burden of substantiating source-identification.468 More crucially,
Freixenet appears to collapse the “depart significantly” inquiry into a single
question, namely the extent of the mark’s divergence from the norms. The
Freixenet approach omits the requisite contextual evaluation into the impact
such divergence is likely to have upon the average consumer, bearing in mind
the initial hurdle that there is generally no consumer predisposition towards
marks consisting of the appearance of goods, as the CJEU itself recalled in
Freixenet.469 Therefore, Freixenet wrongly deviates from the settled principle
that registration authorities must always verify that impact,470 as Philips Morris
and Enercon clearly followed.471 Indeed, the Freixenet packaging marks were
eventually allowed upon the questionable ground that, at the relevant date, it was
simply an “unusual” type of packaging for sparkling wines without verifying
whether, from the viewpoint of consumer behavior, they would function as
source-identifiers.472
Thirdly, nor is it possible to square Freixenet with subsequent CJEU’s
decisions where the issue of inherent distinctiveness did not resolve itself into a
single question of being significantly different but instead the verification of
consumer habits (through the branding practices of the sector) carried the key
analytical weight of the non-inherent distinctiveness conclusion.473 In Lindt, the
argument “that according to the case law of the Court of Justice a mark which
merely departs significantly from the customs of the industry has the requisite
distinctive character” was never endorsed.474 Instead, the CJEU endorsed the

467
Develey Holding GmbH, 2006 E.C.R. II-820, ¶ 14; August Storck KG, 2006 E.C.R. I-05719, ¶ 71;
Philips Morris Products SA, 2007 E.C.R. II-00113, ¶ 11; Enercon GmbH, 2007 E.C.R. II-00516, ¶ 19.
468
Id.
469
Joined Cases C-344/10 P & C-345/10 P, Freixenet, 2011 E.C.R. I-10210, ¶ 46.
470
Case C-218/01, Henkel KGaA v. Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, 2004 E.C.R. I-1755, ¶ 51; Case
136/02 P, Mag Instrument Inc. v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-9190, ¶ 32.
471
Case T-140/06 P, Philips Morris Products, 2007 E.C.R. II-00113, ¶ 11; Enercon GmbH, 2007 E.C.R.
II-00516, ¶ 19.
472
Joined Cases R-2464/2011-2 & R-2465/2011-2, Freixenet, ¶ 37 (2nd Bd. of App., Feb. 1, 2012).
473
See Think Schuhwerk, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2222, ¶ 55; Case C-98/11 P, Chocoladefabriken Lindt &
Sprüngli AG v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2012:307; Joined Cases C-344/10 P & C-345/10 P, Freixenet SA v.
OHIM, 2011 E.C.R. I-0205, ¶¶ 47, 33; Case C-453/11 P, Timehouse GmbH v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2012:291,
¶¶ 43–44.
474
Case C-98/11 P, Chocoladefabriken Lindt & Sprüngli AG, ECLI:EU:C:2012:307, ¶ 33.
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“evaluation of both current practices in the industry and the perception of the
average consumer” undertaken by the EGC relying upon acknowledged facts
from general experience, as established in Develey/Storck II.475 Similar
reasoning based on general experience led the CJEU in Timehouse to uphold the
conclusion that the impact upon highly attentive jewelry consumers, who are
accustomed to seeing a wide range of stylistic variations around the edges of
clock-faces, would be to treat the applicant’s clock-face primarily as mere
decoration.476 Even if reminiscent of a postage stamp, jewelry consumers would
still treat the clock-face merely as an ornamental feature of the product rather
than as means of differentiating between brands of wrist watches. Similarly, in
Think Schuhwerk the CJEU agreed that, following an independent assessment of
the customs in the fashion industry, it was irreproachable of the EGC to conclude
that the applicant had not “[produced] any information suggesting the coloring
of certain parts of shoe laces is usually perceived by the relevant public as an
indication of commercial origin.”477
B. Voss of Noway Decision: Clarifying Freixenet
The recent Voss ruling offered the CJEU the opportunity to clarify the most
important issue besetting the case law on the “depart significantly” criterion,
namely that a get-up mark cannot be assumed to be devoid of distinctiveness if
it is unusual or arbitrary in the relevant sector. That is, whether consumers’
capacity to infer business origin from the appearance of goods could simply be
assumed from the fact that a unique shape differs significantly from the adopted
norms and could perform, for that reason alone, the source-indicating function
of a trademark. At issue was Voss of Norway’s appeal against the Board and
EGC’s decisions to cancel its CTM in respect of a three-dimensional bottle for
consumable liquids on the basis of non-inherent distinctiveness, contrary to
Article 7(1)(b)CTMR.478 The bottle packaging mark was described as a “perfect
cylinder” that consisted of a “cylindrical, transparent container with a non475
Id. ¶ 41 (citing Case C-25/05 P, August Storck KG v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-05719, ¶ 25; Case C238/06 P, Develey Holding GmbH & Co. Beteiligungs KG v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. I-09375, ¶ 79; id. ¶ 47). Given
the wide range of chocolate animals in the confectionery sector and the commonplace elements of the sitting
bunny mark, its impact upon consumers would be simply to see the mark as another chocolate rabbit without
linking to a particular commercial origin.
476
Timehouse GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2012:291, ¶¶ 43–44 (well-known facts from general experience show
that consumers are accustomed to seeing a broad range of designs around the boarders of clock-faces, so the
perforated edges of the clock’s square base forming part of the composite mark would be perceived a mere
decoration).
477
Think Schuhwerk, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2222, ¶ 55.
478
Case R-795/2010-1 Nordic Spirit, ¶ 42.
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transparent cap having the same diameter as the cylinder.”479 Before the CJEU,
the International Trademark Association (INTA) was able to intervene as amicus
curiae in support of the multiple pleas brought by Voss.480 The CJEU roundly
rejected all those pleas.481
For instance, Voss complained there was a breach of the presumption of
validity that registered CTMs enjoy because the lower tribunals reversed the
evidentiary burden of proof, which rested solely upon Nordic Spirit as the
cancellation applicant.482 This was rejected because the EGC—and the Board—
had conducted a fresh independent examination into inherent distinctiveness
without requiring the proprietor to evidence the CTM’s validity.483 As
previously established in Louis Vuitton Malletier,484 the test for applying any of
the statutory grounds for refusal remains the same, both in ex parte and inter
partes actions, with no room for “any ambiguity or doubt [to] be resolved in
favor of the proprietor,” as INTA argued.485 Nor did the CJEU accept that the
application of the departs significantly criterion required beforehand the proper
definition of the norms and customs of the relevant sector by reference to
concrete and verifiable evidence of normal or customary shapes.486 According
to Voss and INTA, the EGC could not lawfully conclude the registered CTM
was non-distinctive without such evidence.487 However, the CJEU agreed that
the EGC could carry out its independent analysis upon well-known facts and
practical experience to conclude that, despite being somewhat original and one
of a kind, the bottle packaging mark was a mere variant of existing shapes.488
Thus, it flatly rejected the amici’s interpretation of Freixenet as prohibiting
reliance upon practical experience.489

479

Id. ¶¶ 47, 51.
See Statement of Intervention for International Trademark Association (INTA) as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellant § 1; Case T-178/11, Voss of Norway ASA v. OHIM, 2013 E.C.R. http://www.inta.org/
INTABulletin/Documents/Vos%20Brief%202014.pdf [hereinafter Statement of INTA].
481
Case C-445/13 P, Voss of Norway ASA v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2015:303, ¶¶ 49, 59, 75, 100, 111, 120.
482
Id.
483
Id. ¶¶ 58, 70–71.
484
Case C-97/12 P, Louis Vuitton Malletier v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:C:2014:324, ¶¶ 72–73.
485
Statement of INTA, supra note 480, ¶ 3.
486
Voss, ECLI:EU:C:2015:303, ¶ 96.
487
Id.
488
Id. ¶ 86. The same support for the EGC’s reliance upon practical experience and knowledge of the
market without offering concrete examples appears in Louis Vuitton Malletier. See Louis Vuitton Malletier,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:324, ¶ 72.
489
Statement of INTA, supra note 480, ¶ 8.
480
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Under settled case law, the spatial and objective delimitation of the context
may include a wider sector taking into account the structure of the market and
the marketing methods used for other goods of the same general class or type
(perhaps outside the market for the products concerned), as those methods might
have already influenced consumer reaction and expectations.490 The amici’s
complaint that tribunals could not conclude that the Voss bottle failed to depart
significantly from the norms, simply because there was no evidence of other
similar bottles on the market at the relevant date, reflects deep-seated confusion
about important nuances in the settled European approach to distinctiveness.491
That approach has nothing to do with anticipatory evidence demonstrating
novelty. It is grounded upon what presentational features consumers would
naturally expect products to have—even if the particular design or arrangement
does not yet exist—according to common commercial knowledge.492 In Voss,
the individual elements of the bottle were typical characteristics of the packaging
for the products without evidence to conclude that the manner in which those
features are combined might result, from the consumer’s perception, in the
whole get-up mark being “greater than the sum of its parts.”493 This by no means
has the effect of being practically impossible to find an inherently distinctive
packaging mark, as there is no presumption that an arrangement of typical
commonplace elements cannot confer distinctiveness upon being combined in a
particular manner.494
C. Outstanding Questions
Perhaps the most important aspect of Voss is the rejection of INTA’s reliance
upon Freixenet to frame the “depart significantly” analysis into a single question
about the trade dress mark’s unusualness and the Court’s affirmation of the need
to always verify whether, in the eyes of average consumers, an unusual get-up

490
Case C-173/04 P, Deutsche SiSi-Werke v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-00551, ¶¶ 32–33 (permitting the
reliance upon the much broader sector of liquids for human consumption in general rather than the more
restrictive market for fruit juices). Thus, the Cancellation Division’s restrictive definition of the sector that Voss
supported in its pleas on appeal is simply contrary to case law.
491
Voss, ECLI:EU:C:2015:303, ¶¶ 76–77.
492
This is clearly the principle upon which the Tabs Cases rest and which the CJEU neatly summarized
in 2007. See Joined Cases C-456/01 P & C-456/01 P, Henkel KGaA v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-05089, ¶¶ 43–44
(get-up of a red and white rectangular dishwashing tablet with an oval blue center).
493
Voss, ECLI:EU:C:2015:303, ¶ 126; see also Case T-237/10, Louis Vuitton Malletier v. OHIM, 2011
E.C.R. II-00449, ¶¶ 72–73, aff’d, Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2014 E.C.R. ¶ 72.
494
Voss, ECLI:EU:C:2015:303, ¶ 124; see also R-127/2013-2, Oy Sinebrychoff Ab ¶¶ 19–22 (2d Bd of
App., Nov. 12, 2013) (unreported) (a successful application to register the trade dress of a can for energy drinks
resembling a “torch battery”).
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may ultimately serve as a source-identifier irrespective of the extent of its
unusualness or divergence.495 Nonetheless, Voss represents yet another missed
opportunity for the CJEU to elaborate upon the implications underlying its
empirical rule that there is ordinarily no consumer habit of assuming commercial
origin of products/services by reference to their appearance “in the absence of
any graphical or word element.”496 For instance, what is the analytical weight of
the fact that the relevant goods or services are generally presented with a label
displaying the applicant’s name or logo? Is it permissible to assume that market
reality and experience may show that, at least for certain categories of goods,
purchasers will instinctively pay more attention to the labeling than to the
shapes? These questions are crucial to the investigation into whether a product
shape may have acquired secondary meaning following market use or may have
been put to genuine use.497 They remain, however, highly relevant to the
contextual analysis underpinning all questions about predicting consumer
behavior to determine the inherent suitability of such marks to serve as sourceidentifiers.
In Voss, the Board interpreted the empirical rule about consumer habits as
meaning “that the average consumer will not normally choose a product …
merely on the basis of its design or the design of its packaging but will look for
signs—on the product or its packaging—that will inform him more reliably
about the origin of the product.”498 This view is also endorsed in some English
decisions.499 It also coincides with the CJEU’s often-cited statement that “it
could prove more difficult” to establish the distinctiveness of product shape
marks than for verbal/figurative marks.500 According to the Board, the branding
practices of manufacturers who very rarely sell their products in unmarked
495
Voss, ECLI:EU:C:2015:303, ¶ 92. The CJEU thus rejected INTA’s interpretation of Freixenet as
implying that marks that differ significantly from the shapes that are normally used in the relevant sector are
necessarily distinctive for protection.
496
Id.
497
Case C-642/15, Toni Klement v. EUIPO, ECLI:EU:C:2016:918 (registered shape of an oven but
always marketed with the word mark “Bullerjan.”). For a final ruling, see Case C-698/17, Toni Klement v.
EUIPO, ECLI:EU:C:2019:48.
498
Case R-785/2010-1, Nordic Spirit AB v. Voss of Norway ASA, ECLI:EU:T:2013:272, ¶ 18. Before
the Board, the cancellation applicant argued that before assessing if the mark differed significantly from the
norms, it was necessary to consider the principal question of whether, in the beverages market, there is a
consumer habit of inferring trade origin from a shape. Thus, unlike the Cancellation Division which focused
solely on how unusual the cylindrical transparent bottle was on the market, the Board of Appeal decided to
address this initial question first.
499
Produits Nestlé SA v Unilever [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2709 [36] (Eng.); Bongrain SA’s Trade Mark
Application [2005] 14 RPC 306 (EWCA) [28].
500
Nordic Spirit AB, ECLI:EU:T:2013:272, ¶ 19.
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containers, but invariably bearing some labeling constitute “a decisive factor” in
predicting the habits and behavior of consumers in the marketplace.501 These are
more reliable indications which allow consumers to distinguish between
products.502 In the Board’s opinion, this new approach was consistently
emerging in the case law of the EGC,503 and we find it consistent with the
requirement that, in the factual prediction of the likelihood that consumers will
use a sign as a source-identifier, the registrar must consider all the relevant
factors and circumstances including practices in the trade. This is part of settled
case law.504 Whilst this does not create a general rule that unmarked containers,
like bottles, may never per se function as source-identifiers because they are
invariably sold with a label,505 it does require applicants to do more than simply
highlight striking features of the get-up mark to sufficiently catch consumer’s
attention. Applicants must also adduce evidence to rebut inferences from
practical experience and from which material circumstances may be drawn to
establish the existence of different branding practices.506
Unlike Freixenet, however, the Board in Voss did proceed to examine the
extent to which the packaging mark departed significantly from the norms after
finding no evidence of a commercial practice to infer business origin from the
container’s shape alone.507 On appeal, Voss criticized the Board’s interpretation
of the case law for imposing a new test based upon the weight given to existing
branding practices but the EGC chose to focus solely on the complaint about the
absence of a significant divergence rather than address the compatibility of its
501

Id.
Id. ¶ 22. The same approach has been adopted by English tribunals, see “Cycling Is …” TM
Applications [2002] RPC 37, 729, 744 (It is relevant to consider the various methods and practices of marketing
that the average consumer of the relevant goods is likely to encounter under normal and fair trading conditions.);
see also Bongrain SA’s Trade Mark Application [2005] 14 RPC 306 (EWCA) [28]; Dyson Ltd.’s Trade Mark
Application [2003] EWHC (Ch) 1062 [39], [2003] RPC 47 (appeal taken from Eng.); O-127-07 In Re O2
Holdings BL (UK IPO, 11 May 2007, unreported) at [42]; O-079-10 In re Coca-Cola Co BL (Feb.(UK IPO, 28,
2010, UK IPO) (unreported) at [35].
503
Nordic Spirit AB, ECLI:EU:T:2013:272, ¶ 24 (citing Case T-12/04 Almdudler-Limonade A. & S. Klein
v. OHIM, 2005); Case T-358/04, George Neumann GmbH v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. II-03329; Case T-140/06,
Philip Morris v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. II-00113; Case 7-109/08, Freixenet SA v. OHIM, 2010 E.C.R. I-10205;
Case T-110/08, Freixenet SA v. OHIM, 2010 E.C.R. II-0068. Of these decisions, on appeal, Philip Morris was
affirmed whilst the Freixenet decisions were both annulled.
504
C-329/02 P, SAT.1 Satellitenfernsehen GmbH v. OHIM, 2004 E.C.R. I-8338, ¶ 44; Case C-363/99
Koninklijke KPN Nederland NV v. Benelux-Merkenbureau, 2004 E.C.R. I-01619, ¶¶ 37, 76; Case C-104/01,
Libertel Groep BV v. Benedux-Markenbureau, 2003 E.C.R. I-03793, ¶ 62.
505
Case R-381/2000-1, Cabot Safety Intermediate Co, 2001 E.T.M.R. ¶ 20.
506
Case R-785/2010-1, Nordic Spirit AB, ECLI:EU:T:2013:272, ¶ 32; see also Produits Nestlé SA v.
Unilever [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2709 [37] (Eng.).
507
Nordic Spirit AB, ECLI:EU:T:2013:272, ¶¶ 36–41.
502
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own case law—upon which the Board had relied—with Freixenet.508 This
limited analysis became the core of the appeal before the CJEU.509 While this
important evolution of the case law remains to be addressed head on, there is
tacit approval in some CJEU rulings.510 Indeed, the AG Opinion in Sisi-Werke,
which the CJEU closely followed, is consistent with the Board’s rationalization
of the evolved case-law511 and “real world” considerations in which consumers
buy products supported in English cases.512 Though Freixenet explicitly
condemned excessive reliance upon the unmarked bottle factor to the extent that
it automatically excludes registration of product packaging marks, such cases as
Philip Morris, Enercon, Timehouse, and Think Schuhwerk strongly suggest that
this contextual factor does have an important role to play.
Furthermore, Philips Morris, Timehouse, and Enercon confirm the principle
established in a line of EGC case law that, though a specialized public is more
likely to pay more attention to different technical and aesthetic features of
products, this does not automatically imply that it may attribute the role of a
trademark to those differences.513 After all, a novel and unusual shape is bound
to be outside the norm of a given sector and attentive consumers are likely to
notice it from a range of others without much difficulty. Nevertheless, the proper
508

See Freixenet, 2011 E.C.R. I-10205.
Case T-128/11, Voss of Norway ASA v. OHIM, 2013 E.C.R. I-00000, ¶¶ 23, 27–28.
510
Case R-1590/2008-1, FRIIS Group Int v. LVM, ¶ 37 (1st Bd. of App., OHIM) (Apart from being
perceived primarily as functional items or ornamental features, another reason why consumers would not
perceive these clasp locks as Trademarks is that these devices often bear the engraved brand name of the product.
It is that brand name rather than the shape of the device that allows consumers to establish a link between the
product and the manufacturer. On appeal, the EGC endorsed these findings as being compatible with practical
experience and acknowledged facts. Case T-237/10, LVM v. OHIM, 2011, ¶ 48–49. On a further appeal, the
CJEU wholeheartedly endorsed the EGC’s conclusions based upon practical experience, which were derived
from the Board’s analysis, see Case T-237/10, Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2011 E.C.R. II-00449, ¶ 53; see also R367/2003-2, Develey Holding GmbH, ¶ 41 (2d Bd. of App., Jan. 20, 2004) (unreported) (In view of the wide
variety of shape bottles, the consumer pays more attention to the label than the bare bottle.), aff’d, Case T129/04, 2006 ¶ 47, and Case C-238/06 P2007, ¶ 92.
511
Case C-173/04 P, Deutsche Sisi-Werke v. OHIM, 2006 E.C.R. I-00551, ¶ 54; Id. ¶ 45 (opinion of the
AG).
512
Produits Nestlé SA v. Unilever [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2709 [47] (Eng.) (Jacob, J.); “Cycling Is …”,
Applications [2002] RPC 37, 729, 744, (“It is implicit in [the European] approach to the assessment of
distinctiveness that the perceptions of the average consumer are to be assessed in context, with due regard to the
realities of the market place.”); Dualit Ltd’s (Toaster Shapes) TM Applications, [1999] RPC 890, 898, ¶ 29.
513
Case T-358/04, Georg Neumann GmbH, 2007 E.C.R. II-03329, ¶ 46 (shape of a microphone head
grill); Case T-351/07, Somm Srl v. OHIM 2008 E.C.R. II-00331, ¶ 29 (shelter for shade); Case T-152/07, Lange
Uhren v. OHIM 2009 E.C.R. II-00144, ¶106 (geometric shapes on a watch-face); Case T-391/07, Alfons Alber
v. OHIM, 2009 E.C.R. II-00157, ¶ 61 (part of a hand grip); Case T-25/11, Germans Boada SA v. OHIM,
ECLI:EU:T:2013:40, ¶ 50 (shape of a ceramics cutter); Case T-363/15, Työhönvalmennus Valma Oy v. OHIM,
ECLI:EU:T:2016:149, ¶ 26 (representation of a wooden carrying crate containing a throwing game).
509
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application of the “depart significantly” criterion requires more. Through a blend
of empirical and normative rules underpinning distinctiveness, European courts
have concluded that it is insufficient that the public is capable of recognizing
differences among various product designs or packaging in the sector, which is
actually within the capabilities of specialized consumers.514 It is also essential
that “the departure of the shape applied for is so significant that the consumer
circles will recognize it as an indication of origin.”515
Close examination of EU case law strongly suggests that it is not only
whether the shape or appearance of get-up marks differs significantly from those
of existing ones that is relevant, but also whether material circumstances exist
to assume that consumers will use the appearance alone to guide themselves in
the market. In other words, evidence must show that the differences are
indicative of commercial origin, not merely of different design or presentation
style. In developing this interpretation, EU courts have adopted the same view
as that expressed in some English decisions, namely that “the consumer must
conclude not just that [the shape mark] is different, but that the difference
signifies that the goods come from a given commercial undertaking.”516
Therefore, the European distinctiveness approach is aligned with that adopted in
Bongrain as a matter of principle even though the examination has escaped
proper academic scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
Distinctiveness is an important doctrinal tool for setting appropriate limits
around protectable subject-matter. The CJEU has hitherto offered little
elaboration on its departs significantly criterion as the primary test for predicting
the potential capacity of unconventional signs to serve as source-identifiers for
consumers. Its case law however offers significant guidance on the contextual
factors that the Office and the courts should follow in their predictive inquiry

514

Id
Case T-171/12, Peri GmbH v. OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2014:817, ¶ 44 (quoting from Case R-1209/2011-1,
Peri GmbH (1st Bd of App., Jan. 26, 2012)). Id. ¶ 18 (Shape of a turnbuckle); see also Case T-654/13, Gako
Konietzko GmbH, ECLI:EU:T:2015:381, ¶ 35 (shape of a medical container with a red lid).
516
Betafence Ltd. v. Registrar of Trademarks, [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1353, [24] (Eng.) (Floyd, J.). The Court
derived this interpretation from the Henkel ruling whereby the CJEU stressed the need for the get-up mark to
enable the consumer to distinguish the designated products from those of other traders, not merely to spot
differences in the products offered. See Case C-144/06 P, Henkel KGaA v. OHIM, 2007 E.C.R. I-08109, ¶ 53;
see also Dyson Ltd’s TM Applications, [2003] EWHC 1062 (Ch) RPC [34]; Yakult Honsha KK’s Trademark
Application, [2001] RPC 39, 756, 759 ¶ 10 (even though the Yakult bottle might be recognized as “different” to
other bottles on the market on account of being both new and visually distinctive, this does not mean it is
inherently distinctive in a Trademark sense.); P&G Ltd’s TM Applications, [1999] RPC 673, 680.
515
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underpinning inherent distinctiveness. That case law unquestionably highlights
the need for trade dress marks to be significantly unusual from what is customary
in the relevant sector but this, alone, cannot be the basis for assuming they will
be understood by consumers to designate source. The contextual analysis of case
law undertaken in this Article has demystified deep-seated misconceptions
around the policies underpinning the departs significantly criterion and has
uncovered an (implicit) additional step in distinctiveness evaluations, namely it
is crucial not only that consumers view the shape as different/unusual from
existing designs but also that they do not perceive it as being expected or
naturally coming to mind in the light of their utilitarian or functional advantages.
In the absence of statutory definition, courts have an important responsibility to
monitor the outer limits of trademark law. There are important policies packed
into the departs significantly criterion even if they are poorly understood in the
current literature. Overall, this article has demonstrated that the distinctiveness
requirement can and does play an important but limited role in preserving
competition; other statutory obstacles such as functionality, descriptiveness, and
customariness have a much greater role and a complementary purpose within
the structure of the European Union’s law. However, the persistent legacy issues
identified here highlight that distinctiveness is under unnecessary pressure to
achieve competition goals that are generally more appropriately addressed
through the functionality doctrine.

